Natural minds: maps, mental causation and virtual machines by Bowes, Simon
   
 
A University of Sussex PhD thesis 
Available online via Sussex Research Online: 
http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/   
This thesis is protected by copyright which belongs to the author.   
This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first 
obtaining permission in writing from the Author   
The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any 
format or medium without the formal permission of the Author   
When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the 
author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given 
Please visit Sussex Research Online for more information and further details   
 NATURAL MINDS 
Maps, mental causation and virtual machines 
 
  
FEBRUARY 1, 2017 
THE UNIVERSITY OF SUSSEX 
Thesis submitted for the degree of PhD Cognitive Science 
Simon Christopher Bowes 
1 
 
Contents 
Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 3 
Chapter 1: Natural Kinds .......................................................................................................... 6 
1.1 What are Natural Kinds? ................................................................................................ 7 
1.2 Are Natural Kinds Found or Made?................................................................................ 9 
1.3 Rigidity ......................................................................................................................... 13 
1.4 Projection ..................................................................................................................... 17 
1.5 Mapping ....................................................................................................................... 25 
1.5.1 Historical precedents ............................................................................................ 29 
1.5.3 Pluto: A case study in natural kind term demarcation ......................................... 31 
1.8 Cognitive Kinds ............................................................................................................. 32 
Chapter 2: Physicalist Reductionism ...................................................................................... 36 
2.1 Reducing Reduction ..................................................................................................... 36 
2.1.1 The ‘Special’ Debate .............................................................................................. 39 
2.1.2 Stuff Happens ........................................................................................................ 42 
2.2 Physicalism ................................................................................................................... 48 
2.2.1 Causal Closure ....................................................................................................... 52 
Chapter 3: Levels of Causal Explanation ................................................................................ 56 
3.1 Causation ..................................................................................................................... 56 
3.1.2 Where to draw the line? ....................................................................................... 61 
3.1.3 Making a difference .............................................................................................. 63 
3.2 Explanation .................................................................................................................. 64 
3.2.1 Laws....................................................................................................................... 65 
3.3 Supervenience & Realisation ....................................................................................... 68 
3.4 Emergence ................................................................................................................... 78 
Chapter 4: Kinds of Mental Content ...................................................................................... 89 
4.1 Mental Kinds ................................................................................................................ 89 
4.2 Representations ......................................................................................................... 101 
4.3 Content ...................................................................................................................... 105 
Chapter 5: Embodied Agents ............................................................................................... 114 
5.1 Rational agency .......................................................................................................... 114 
5.2 Feedback and Feedforward ....................................................................................... 118 
2 
 
5.2.1 Evolution ............................................................................................................. 119 
5.2.2 Expectations ........................................................................................................ 124 
5.3 Externalism................................................................................................................. 127 
5.3.1 Physical Bodies in a Social World ........................................................................ 129 
Chapter 6: Physically Embodied Minds ................................................................................ 143 
6.1 Virtual Machines ........................................................................................................ 143 
6.2 Consciousness ............................................................................................................ 145 
6.2.1 The Feeling of Things .......................................................................................... 148 
6.3 Panpsychism & Composition ..................................................................................... 156 
6.3.1 The Living Dead ................................................................................................... 156 
6.3.2 The Mind-Mind Problem ..................................................................................... 158 
6.3.3 Feeling Things...................................................................................................... 159 
6.3.4 In Two Minds ....................................................................................................... 161 
6.3.5 Selfishness ........................................................................................................... 164 
Chapter 7: Natural Minds..................................................................................................... 170 
7.1 Embodied Virtual Machinery ..................................................................................... 170 
7.1.1 Causation & Causal closure ................................................................................. 171 
7.1.2 Natural Kinds ....................................................................................................... 172 
7.1.3 Physicalism .......................................................................................................... 177 
7.1.4 Emergence .......................................................................................................... 179 
7.2 Mental Causation ....................................................................................................... 179 
7.2.1 United We Stand ................................................................................................. 179 
7.2.2 Freedom! ............................................................................................................. 183 
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................ 188 
Bibliography ......................................................................................................................... 190 
3 
 
Introduction 
My project is an empirically informed investigation of the philosophical problem of mental 
causation, and simultaneously a philosophical investigation of the status of cognitive scientific 
generalisations.  If there is such a thing as mental causation, that is, mental states having effects qua 
mental states, and if we can classify the mental states involved in these causes in a way useful for 
making predictions and giving scientific explanations, then these states will be natural kinds.  The 
first task, then, is to show that there is an account of natural kindhood that can accommodate 
cognitive kinds.  The second task is to say how the scientific statements made using these mental 
kinds are not susceptible to being reduced to statements about physical kinds, and in fact require 
taking into account facts at many levels of explanation, including the biological and social levels.  
Lastly, the case will be made for Virtual Machine Functionalism being the correct account of the 
relationship between cognitive states and the broader physical world.   
I will claim that although there may be problems with traditional accounts of natural kinds and 
mental representations when it comes to contemporary cognitive science, this is no reason for 
thinking that those terms are not useful; we should refine rather than eliminate them.  Something 
would be lost in our understanding if we rejected these terms and the theoretical understanding 
they contain, something that was present before some mistaken theoretical details came to be 
associated with the terms.  Perhaps some terms that have been coined in the development of our 
understanding of the mind, such as ‘qualia,’ should be dispensed with, but others just need to be 
cleaned up. 
Broadly speaking, my argument will be that squaring the widely held but somewhat contradictory 
intuitions of physicalism and anti-reductionism regarding mental states will require modification of 
two other commonly held intuitions, namely physical causal closure and supervenience. 
Another way of stating my aim is in terms of defending the intuitive distinction between 
metaphorical and literal uses of intentional vocabulary, such as ‘wanting’ and ‘trying,’ against those 
who question the meaningfulness of this distinction because they take a physicalist stance on 
questions of consciousness.  They may say the distinction is merely verbal, that there is no real 
difference between saying of a raindrop that it is ‘trying’ to get to the bottom of the window pane, 
and saying of a person that he or she is trying to get to the top of the mountain.  Much of what 
follows is an attempt to describe a metaphysics that is materialist and scientific, but in which the 
difference between the two cases has a natural place.  
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The difference lies in the idea of intentionality: in the case of my desiring something, there is a 
mental state ‘in’ me that is there because it has the function of directing my actions towards 
bringing about the desired state of affairs.  Such states are things that can be scientifically studied, 
and a scientific account of human action would be incomplete if it did not refer to such states.  In the 
case of the water drop, there are no similar states without which the scientific understanding of 
water droplet action would be incomplete.  The temptation to elide the distinction between 
intentional and non-intentional descriptions is based on a belief that since all causation is physical, 
there is no meaningful distinction between the kinds of causes that makes water drops drop, and 
those that make climbers climb.  This results from the fact that it is sometimes felt that reference to 
such things as personal agency in intentional explanations of action is to allow in a disagreeable form 
of dualism.  I will argue that a complete, physicalistic, scientific account of human behaviour must 
include reference to irreducible, mental kinds, such as beliefs and desires. 
The form of the argument follows the content, with natural kinds at the centre of the web of 
concepts that form our understanding of mind and its place in the natural world.  The starting point 
is simple folk explanations of human actions, like, ‘He ate the apple because…’ followed by a set of 
conditions including combinations of beliefs and desires that together constitute sufficient reasons 
for eating the apple.  Many would say such purported explanations are fictions that mask our 
ignorance of the true story, which will, when we know how to tell it, have a reduced cast of 
characters, an exclusive set of ‘purely’ physical types.   
This is well-trodden ground, onto which defenders of ‘embodied cognitive science’ have stepped.  
However, it is not clear who they will side with, whether they could tip the balance one way or the 
other, or indeed whether they will even be a unified force.  A ‘topographical’ account of natural 
kinds will be developed that avoids problems other accounts face, and which is suitable for use in 
the general statements constructed in embodied cognitive science.  Following that, we will use this 
account in the debate around the autonomy of special sciences in general, and the problem of 
mental causation in particular.  The discussion will then broaden out into an investigation of 
causation, including a refined understanding of physical causal closure.  After applying the results of 
these discussions to our understanding of the supervenience relation, a defensible account of 
emergentism will be given.  Next, we will look at the kinds of properties of mental states that may be 
referred to in explanations of rational action, namely, the representational contents of mental 
states.  In order to understand the nature of these states, the feedback dynamics between 
hierarchically structured levels of cognition involved in their evolution will be foregrounded, leading 
to a picture of embodied cognition that is broad and externalist.  We will then look at experiential 
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properties, showing them to be an inseparable part of intentional states, and describing how 
subjecthood is emergent from brain/body/world dynamics.  We will finish by outlining the 
implications of the refined functionalist account defended for the metaphysical notions we started 
with.  The conclusion drawn will be that we can indeed refer to genuine mental causes which ground 
the non-metaphorical use of intentional explanations.  Finally, I will sketch some implications for the 
idea of free will using empirical landmarks from cognitive science to find a path through the eroded 
philosophical landscape, while at the same time using these old philosophical waymarkers to guide 
the scientific exploration of cognition ahead of us.  
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Chapter 1: Natural Kinds 
Rob McKenna was a miserable bastard….  It was a particular type of rain he particularly 
disliked, particularly when he was driving. He had a number for it. It was rain type 17.  
Rob McKenna had two hundred and thirty-one different types of rain entered in his little 
book, and he didn't like any of them.
1
  (Adams, 1984, p. 12) 
Natural kinds, if they exist, are groups of objects about which we can make general statements.  
These generalisations form the basis of explanation and prediction, and as such, without natural 
kinds there can be no science.  Any scientific discussion of the basis for claiming that there is 
such a group of things as intentional agents, as distinct from other kinds of systems that may 
have causal properties, must investigate the ontological basis of those properties that are taken 
to distinguish such systems.  That is, to argue that intentional agents are real is to argue that 
there are certain types of states that have properties that can be called genuine causes of their 
effects, and which are distinct from the causal states of non-intentional objects, processes or 
events.  Before we can state clearly what distinguishes the states of intentional from non-
intentional objects, we need a metaphysical account of object classification that can 
accommodate both types of cases.  But, before we can be clear about why we classify 
something as one kind of thing rather than another, we need to make sure we have a 
classificatory system that is defensible as a way of grouping parts of the world scientifically, and 
which does not beg the question one way or the other.  The words we use in science to classify 
groups of objects, states, properties, and so on, are natural kind terms, and the class of things 
that fall under them, if any, are natural kinds.  For something to be a cause, I will argue, is for it 
to be something about which true scientific generalisations can be stated, i.e. for it to be a 
member of a natural kind.  Thus, if intentional states, such as beliefs and desires, are the causes 
of the behaviour of intentional agents, then such states should be natural kinds.  
In this chapter I will outline an account of natural kindhood that is inclusive enough to accept 
the intentional kind terms of cognitive science as ‘natural,’ and where the true generalisations 
that such terms enter into are not reducible to statements of regularities containing only 
physical kind terms.  As my starting point, I take the debate about the ontological status of the 
so-called ‘special sciences’ between Fodor (1974) and Kim (1992).   
                                                          
1
 The ones mentioned in the text are: 33 (light pricking drizzle which made the roads slippery), 39 ( heavy 
spotting), 47 to 51 (vertical light drizzle through to sharply slanting light to moderate drizzle freshening), 87 
and 88 (two finely distinguished varieties of vertical torrential downpour), 100 (post-downpour squalling, 
cold), between 192 and 213 (seastorm types), 123, 124, 126, 127 (mild and intermediate cold gusting, regular 
and syncopated cab-drumming), 11 (breezy droplets), and his least favourite of all, 17 (a dirty blatter that 
batters against one’s windscreen so hard that it doesn't make much odds whether one’s wipers are on or off).  
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Fodor’s argument turns on the multiple realizability of the kinds referred to in the laws of 
certain sciences, using examples like oxbow lake formation and money.  In both cases there are 
scientific disciplines that refer to these categories in generalisations, but the physical bases in 
which different occurrences of these kinds of things are instantiated are ‘wildly heterogeneous,’ 
in that they do not share any purely physical properties, and therefore will not fall under any 
purely physical generalisations.   These examples could be questioned, but here I will focus on 
the application of this style of argument to functional kinds in cognitive science, specifically, to 
explanations of behaviour that refer to states like beliefs and desires.  Are these explanations 
‘autonomous,’ in the sense of not being rough restatements of complex physical explanations, 
by virtue of the kinds referred to being specified functionally in terms of their role within a 
cognitive system?   
Kim’s response is that since these token instances of mental kinds are physically realised, all the 
causal work is done at the physical level, on pain of dualism.  Given a behaviour, if we had the 
ability to examine exhaustively all the physical causes behind this (nerve signals, muscles, 
neuronal activity, oxygen, food etc.), then there would be nothing left to explain; intentional 
explanations referring to the subjects beliefs and desires would become redundant.  Eliminative 
materialists, e.g. Churchland (1981), hold a similar view, but Kim’s argument relies on 
metaphysical considerations involving the concepts of supervenience, causal closure, causal 
exclusion, and natural kinds.  In the following, I will examine each of these notions with the aim 
of showing that Kim’s argument fails as it relies on misguided understandings of these 
metaphysical principles.  I will show that, with a refined understanding of these, intentional 
explanations are non-redundant; the kinds referred to are part of the natural order about which 
scientific general statements can be legitimately made, and so the science that is made up of 
these statements is autonomous.   
 
1.1 What are Natural Kinds? 
Firstly, natural kinds are parts of the world picked out by natural kind terms.  These are terms that 
can be used as antecedents in causal laws, parts of explanations, the bases of inductive inferences, 
amongst other uses.  Paradigmatic examples are terms such as ‘electron,’ ‘gold,’ and ‘dog.’  Each of 
these refer to classes of things, such that if something is included in that class, then we should be 
able to make inferences depending on our knowledge of the generalisations that hold of that kind of 
thing.  They can be defined as ‘kinds over which numerous reliable inductive generalizations can be 
made’ (Millikan, 1999, p. 40).  Some may think that the reliance on our inductive practices in this 
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definition makes kinds too reliant on human understanding, rather than being fully independent of 
us: to be natural, categories must ‘carve nature at its joints’ (Plato, Phaedrus 265d–266a).  This 
assumes that nature has ‘joints’ to discover, and if nature doesn’t have clear distinctions between 
kinds of things, then our categories are at best intersubjective phantasies.  I aim to show that 
including our inductive interests in the definition of natural kinds does not render them unnatural in 
any harmful way. 
In his overview of the history of thinking on natural kinds, Hacking (1991) distinguishes four main 
historical approaches, associating them with Russell, Mill, Peirce and Leibniz.  Peirce kinds and 
Leibniz kinds have essential properties that determine the manifest observational properties of 
members of the kind; for Peirce, these are not necessarily micro-structural features, whereas for 
Leibniz they are (this is essentially Putnam’s position – see below).  Mill kinds, in contrast, achieve 
membership by sharing observational properties (so both forms of jade (jadeite and nephrite) fall 
under the same Mill kind despite having different chemical compositions).  Russell kinds form a sort 
of bridge between these essentialist and nominalist views by seeing members of kinds as being 
grouped together by their ‘closeness’ to other members in various ways determined by our 
interests, allowing microphysical properties to play an explanatory role, without begging the 
reductionist question (see Chapter 2: Physicalist Reductionism).  Russell thought his kind of kinds 
could not play the role we expect of ‘real,’ ‘eternal’ natural kinds because it is an ‘intensional’ 
notion, and will change with our interests and understanding.  For reasons I will explain, I think an 
account of this kind (which I call topographical), can succeed in giving us what we want of natural 
kinds, while also fitting epistemologically with the development of our (scientific) understanding of 
the world. 
Before analysing the various approaches to natural kinds and terms, we should mention the main 
desiderata of any view, which is that kind terms should have explanatory value.  That is, no matter 
how the extension of kind terms is determined (e.g. by similarity to paradigmatic examples or fitting 
theoretical definitions), or how candidate kind terms are selected (determined by our interests or 
facts about the natural world), whether we are talking about grouping objects, or events, or 
properties, or indeed whether there are degrees of naturalness (LaPorte, 2004), natural kind terms 
must be useful as a basis for inductions.  That is, they must be ‘projectable’: determining that a 
particular thing falls under a kind label should allow us to make predictions about unobserved 
properties of that thing, and unobserved instances of that kind, in other words, to make 
generalisations about things included in that category. 
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1.2 Are Natural Kinds Found or Made? 
Two main positions on the subject of natural kinds have been developed historically; I aim to show 
that there are also ways to steer a course between them.  On the one hand, there are realists, 
starting with Aristotle (Ayers, 1981), who think that natural kind terms ‘cut nature at the joints,’ i.e. 
refer to objective ontological categories, generally characterised by shared essences.  For them, 
natural kind terms pick out ontological entities which have their form essentially.  Non-essential 
properties of things are ‘accidents,’ and any definition in terms of these is called nominal rather than 
real.   
In opposition are non-realists (or nominalists) who believe that there is no fundamental distinction 
between real and nominal definitions: natural kind terms refer to subjective, epistemological and 
observational categories.  On this view nature has no joints; where the lines are drawn between 
kinds is down to us, based on similarity relations in experience.  In reality, differences are always a 
matter of degree rather than kind; everything is ‘on the spectrum’: ‘There are Animals so near of 
kind both to Birds and Beasts, that they are in the Middle between both’ (Locke, 1700, III, vi, 12).   
My position is between these extremes.  The world may not have neat boundaries between kinds of 
things, and so we may contingently define such boundaries to enable us to navigate the world, to 
give directions to each other, but once these boundaries have been drawn, it is an objective fact, 
that depends on the actual structure of the world, what falls on one side or the other.  So far, the 
nominalist can accept this.  The difference is that my position is realist about there being an 
explanation of how the differences have developed naturally.  However, it is not a straightforward 
realism, as there is no fact of the matter about which classificatory scheme is objectively preferable; 
this depends on us, our physical embodiment and cultural embeddedness.  There is not one ideal 
scheme towards which our developing science is incrementally moving. 
This is the topographical account of natural kinds: like a map of a territory, we decide where one 
feature ends and another begins, depending on our navigational interests, but not arbitrarily, as 
these decisions are based on the real features of the landscape.  Moreover, our ‘map’ is refined over 
time as people use it to navigate; previously unnoticed pitfalls are drawn in, misplaced peaks 
redrawn, outcrops named.  Before further defining this position, I will add some detail to the picture 
of the rival positions.   
Frege’s descriptivist theory can be seen as a refinement of the nominalist view.  Words have ‘senses’ 
that exist intersubjectively, and these determine the reference of words in virtue of objects 
satisfying the descriptions attached to these senses.  Kind terms express concepts of the classical 
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sort (Margolis & Laurence, 1999): they are associated with definite descriptions and these supply the 
wielder of that concept with the means to determine whether any given object falls within the 
extension of that term based on manifest, observational properties.  (I am ignoring the distinction 
between kind terms and proper names, and assuming that the names for classes function like the 
names for individuals; these classes being made up of all and only those individuals that satisfy the 
definition of that class.)  For example, the reference of the kind term ‘tiger’ is fixed by descriptions 
like, ‘large, carnivorous, striped cat,’ and we learn how to use the word through learning the 
descriptions associated with it. This has the advantage of enabling us to refer to things that we have 
had no direct experience of: we can talk about Pluto, because we know that it is the ninth planet 
from the sun.  Furthermore, the fact that we use the ‘sense’ (i.e. meaning in terms of definite 
descriptions) to fix the reference of a word, rather than through some sort of direct connection 
between word and object, explains why we are not automatically aware if two words, with different 
definitions, happen to refer to the same object.  The classic case of this is Hesperus and Phosphorus, 
the former defined as the last star in the evening sky looking west, the latter as the first star in the 
morning looking east, but in fact both of them referring to Venus, which was only discovered after 
millennia of using those words to successfully refer to that object in the sky.  Finally, this enables us 
to talk about non-existent things, like unicorns, without being accused of making meaningless 
utterances; the words have sense, but no reference, as no such things satisfy the descriptions 
associated with that word. 
However, there are several problems with this kind of theory.  Firstly, it is not easy to specify these 
conditions for inclusion/exclusion as it seems it is always possible to find exceptions to supposed 
necessary conditions (e.g. not all tigers have stripes), and we are able to deploy terms without 
knowing the descriptions supposedly attached to them.  For example, someone may say, ‘Brighton 
contains the last remaining population of native elm trees in England’ without being able to describe 
or point out elm trees.  Neither is an object’s satisfying the sufficient conditions for being a particular 
kind of thing actually enough.  For example, in the case of an alien ‘dog’: it may bark like a dog, but 
that does not mean it is a dog.   
There is also the related problem of vagueness.  Even if we could define them, sets don’t easily 
accommodate vagueness, making application to the messy real world, where there are few neat 
boundaries, problematic.  Most biological kinds, being the product of the gradual process of 
evolution, could be ruled out: the ancestor of the tiger didn’t suddenly go from satisfying one set of 
descriptions to another.  Furthermore, approaches that rely on definitions cannot account for 
stability of reference through theory change.  If our definitions change, we would, by definition, not 
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be talking about the same things anymore.  This kind of incommensurability is undesirable, since we 
do think that we are talking about the same things as earlier people were when they referred to 
whales, even though we no longer think of them as fish.   
This is the essence of Kripke’s modal argument: it is possible for something to be a member of a kind 
without fitting the description, and possible for something to fit a description without being a 
member, because names (including kind terms) are ‘rigid designators’ (they refer to the same thing 
in all possible worlds), whereas descriptions are not rigid in this sense.  Put another way, names 
don’t connote, they denote.  Natural kinds are such that science discovers about them necessary but 
non a priori things (e.g. the chemical composition of water).  So, to use Putnam’s (1975) example, 
‘water’ on Earth refers to H2O, which satisfies certain descriptions (e.g. wet stuff that falls from the 
sky); ‘water’ will continue to refer to H2O whether or not is satisfies the descriptions we associate 
with it on the surface of earth, but it is possible that some other stuff which is not H2O (and 
therefore not water) satisfies those descriptions elsewhere (so those descriptions will pick out some 
other substance in that context).  
Kripke and Putnam’s alternative to descriptivism is the causal theory of reference, which claims that 
natural kind terms refer to all things that share essential properties with the object that the term 
was first coined to refer to, no matter what ‘sense’ speakers attach to the word.  Kind terms are 
causally connected to an act of ostensive ‘baptism’ (someone points at something and decrees that 
all such things shall be known as X); objects are of the same kind if they share a micro-physical 
essence with the object originally so christened.  These theoretically interesting essences are 
discovered by empirical investigation after this act, rather than being stipulated by definition.  What 
is being referred to depends on the speaker’s intention as to what they are talking about, but does 
not depend on the definition that speaker has in mind.  (This is to assume, for the moment, that a 
referential intention and the knowledge of the intender can come apart unproblematically.)  So 
neither the originator of the usage, nor those who learn to so use the word from her (directly or 
indirectly), may be aware of what this essence is.  The relationship between names and essences is 
one of necessity due to their being ‘rigid designators’: nothing could possibly be water and not be 
H2O, and vice versa.  The advantage of this is that there will be no change of meaning with a change 
of our theories and therefore of our understanding, and no associated problem of 
incommensurability. 
A further benefit of a causal theory of reference is that it gives objective criteria for including things 
in sets in terms of physical properties that allow us to get past inductions from sensory properties, to 
a situation where the terms of mature science pick out things with dispositions for which we can 
12 
 
state the mechanism by virtue of which they are disposed to be such-and-such, and the dubious 
notion of descriptive similarity is disposed with. This allows us to rule out accidental regularities, or 
temporary, contextual effects (Millikan, 1999, p. 52).  It also grants us the ability to talk about things 
we know nothing of, but still say something with meaning.  This is because we can rely on the fact 
that somewhere back in the line of causation of the use of the term there stands someone who 
knew what she was talking about (in terms of knowing the reference of the term, if not the essential 
properties that all objects of that kind share).   
Similar claims could be made for theoretical terms, such as ‘gravitational waves,’ the ‘essence’ of 
which is defined theoretically, but which is not understood by many users of the term.  This seems to 
be a kind of descriptivism, where the description is understood by a few experts who coin it and 
continue to use it.  Such cases rely on the tokening of mental states in a group of experts, rather 
than being a simple label with a usage that is passed along the line.  There are complicated issues 
here that I will put aside for the moment. 
Although causal theories of reference seem to avoid the problem of our being able to deploy kind 
terms without needing to have the associated descriptions in mind, the understanding of the users 
of such terms cannot be totally ignored.  Back down the causal chain, when the coiner of the term 
pointed towards a portion of the world and made a sound, how can we know what he was pointing 
at unless we ask him to describe it?  This is the qua problem (Devitt, 1981), or the problem of 
ostensive definition (Wittgenstein, 1953, §§ 28-30): as what is that part of the world being picked 
out?  Is he pointing at the colour, the leaf shape, or is he intending to name that species of tree?  
Similarly, there is the ‘which’ problem: which thing are you actually pointing at, the tree or the 
wood?  In other words, under which sortal is the ostension being made?  It is unclear how these 
questions can be answered without referring to the intentions, and therefore the beliefs, of the 
pointer.  Also, incommensurability threatens again given subsequent changes in belief systems and 
the uses of words: if the extension of a term depends partly on the theory-laden descriptions 
connected with it, then referrers with different theories may fail to communicate successfully when 
they use that term.  It seems that Kripke and Putnam are guilty of assuming that non-linguistic acts 
like pointing are not ‘contaminated’ by the linguistically acquired beliefs of the pointer.  Kuhn, who 
introduced the term ‘incommensurability’ to the philosophy of science, came to realise this:  
My original discussion described non-linguistic as well as linguistic forms of incommensurability.  That 
I now take to have been an overextension resulting from my failure to recognise how large a part of 
the apparently non-linguistic component was acquired with language during the learning process.  
(Kuhn, 2000, p. 315) 
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The kind of learning process mentioned was evident in his earlier work, in the use of exemplars in 
educating scientists (Kuhn, 1962); through learning canonical applications of a theory, the norms 
that determine the use of terms are learnt. 
Even if it were possible to unproblematically pick out kinds ostensively, this assumes that there is a 
micro-physical essence to all natural kinds worthy of the name.  Is micro-physical essentialism 
something we can assume a priori?  Not if we don’t want to beg the question against certain forms 
of non-reductive physicalism.  In the case of biological kinds, the candidate essences would, I 
assume, be DNA.  As we will see in the next section, this is an oversimplification, but for now, it is 
clear that the metaphysical arguments for a causal theory of natural kind term reference are 
problematic.  It seems that causal theories of reference cannot be ‘pure’: in order to fix reference we 
need to know something about the descriptive information connected to terms.  Put another way, to 
understand the speaker’s intentions, we need some access to the speaker’s intensions.  Moreover, 
we will see below that the causal theory also seems to be at odds with the way scientists actually 
operate. 
 
1.3 Rigidity 
Rather than the rigidity of designation described, we find that science refines its beliefs about 
archetypes upon discovering new specimens that are causally ‘downwind’ of the original coinage 
(Mellor, 1977, pp. 301-4) (see §1.5.3 Pluto: A case study in natural kind term demarcation).  As 
mentioned, some natural kinds have no ostensive archetypes, e.g. neutrinos when they were merely 
theoretical entities.  Also, no reason is given why certain properties must be shared by all the 
members of a kind, rather than members being related by ‘family resemblance’ (Wittgenstein, 1953, 
§§65-71; Mellor, 1977, pp. 305-6).  Mellor concludes: ‘The stock candidates for essential properties, 
are either not even shared in this world by all things of the kind, or their status is evidently more a 
feature of our theories than of the world itself’ (Mellor, 1977, p. 311). 
Despite the ability to cope with theory change being advertised as one of the strengths of the theory 
(‘Causal theory is supposed to assure continuity of meaning and reference.’ (LaPorte, 2004, p. 112)), 
there is the problem that the causal theory has difficulty with cases where terms are refined due to 
theory change, resulting in the need to decide which objects will continue to be included in the 
original category, and which excluded, as happened with debate of the planetary status of Pluto (see 
§1.5.3 Pluto: A case study in natural kind term demarcation). 
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Kind terms may be ‘rigid designators,’ but not independently of fixing some definitions, which might 
depend on facts about us, the definers, as well as the things we define. Once fixed, it may be clear 
what a term does and does not refer to in all possible worlds ‘nearby’ enough to ours to count.  
Thus, rigidity is not what distinguishes natural from nominal kinds, rather this is achieved via a 
hybrid theory of reference that takes into account the intentions of the original ostensive definer 
and not just the microphysical essence of what was pointed at (this will become important later in 
the discussion of Kim’s arguments in §2.1.1 The ‘Special’ Debate).  Thus, causal theory doesn’t get rid 
of theory-laden descriptions, and reference is not determined just by the way the world is.  The 
nature of the original paradigmatic samples may partly determine meaning and reference, but this 
doesn’t block referential change:    
Causal baptisms, which according to the causal theory endow terms with their reference conditions, 
are performed by speakers whose conceptual development is not yet sophisticated enough to allow 
the speakers to coin a term in such a way as to preclude the possibility of open texture, or vague 
application not yet recognised….Speakers are left to decide whether to call the monotremes 
“mammals” on the basis of whether they have the right features, which… seems to leave the matter 
open….Progress is… replacing vague statements… with straightforwardly true statements…. 
Whichever… refinements might have been adopted….The decision to use a term to designate one 
thing rather than another cannot be false.  It is the statements made with a term on a use that can be 
false. (LaPorte, 2004, p. 134) 
So far I have glossed over the distinction between names of individuals and names of categories, but 
there are important differences.  In the case of the rigidity of singular terms like proper nouns, it is 
clear what remains the same through different uses of the word, but it has been claimed that it is 
not clear what remains the same in the case of kind terms (Schwartz, 2002). A term can be said to be 
rigid if the reference remains the same in all possible worlds (or all relevantly nearby possible 
worlds).  The problem, it is claimed, lies in distinguishing between general terms like ‘bachelor,’ 
which are purely nominal, and general terms like ‘tiger,’ which are supposed to be natural, that is, 
not dependent upon our definitions: broadening the notion of rigidity to all general terms, including 
ones dependent solely on conventional definition, is to trivialise it.  The point of rigidity, according to 
this argument, is for it to do the work of differentiating between natural and nominal kinds.  The 
extensions of general terms that are determined by our definitions change as definitions change, but 
the extensions of natural kinds are determined by the structure of the world and a naming event.  
LaPorte (2000, pp. 297-99), in contrast, does not see this broadening as trivialising the notion of 
rigidity, as some general descriptions still come out as non-rigid.  So, while ‘honeybee’ is rigid, the 
co-extensive ‘the insect farmed for honey’ is not, as other insects may play this role in other possible 
worlds.  
Generally speaking, it seems true that all kind terms have an aspect of the perspectival, depending 
on our definitions, as well as some rigidity, depending on the structure of the world.  In the case of 
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the term ‘planet,’ for example, the definition may be a matter of decision, but once it is fixed, it is 
clear what the term refers to in all possible worlds.  The same is true of ‘bachelor’; its meaning is a 
matter of convention, but it can be said to have some rigidity, since in all possible worlds where 
there are males, and a practice like marriage exists (that is, in all nearby possible worlds), it will refer 
to all and only those males who are not married.   
This looks like a sort of two-dimensional theory of meaning (Lewis, 1966), in which terms are taken 
to have a primary and secondary intension, where the primary intension is that internal, reference 
fixing criteria that the user of the term has a priori access to as a competent member of a linguistic 
community, and the secondary intension is the ‘modal profile’ of the term, that is, what it takes to 
be a member of that kind in all possible worlds, which speakers have a posteriori access to.  There 
are two main varieties of two-dimensionalism, namely empiricist and rationalist varieties.  I will 
restrict myself to the empiricist variety here since our ultimate aim is to apply this theory of kinds to 
explanations of human actions, and it is the empiricist variety that foregrounds the causal factors 
involved in individual usage.  For our purposes, I will take the criteria of application of a kind term to 
be a potentially implicit set of pluralistic associations (definitions, prototypes etc.), embedded in 
general usage and the wider communicative practices and empirical concerns of society.  So, the 
primary intension may be a set of implicit conventions which can be subjected to conceptual analysis 
by the user, and could change given evidence.  However, such a posteriori change doesn’t 
necessarily bring us closer to the original meaning of a term, instead changing that meaning.   
Taking the example of water, the primary intension that fixes the extension of that term for speakers 
may be something about potability, falling from the sky, translucence, and so on, and we learn to 
apply that term in the process of learning to use the English language.  Now, it may also be the case 
that our society has, since the scientific revolution, decided that some of our words should have 
their extension determined by being members of a chemical kind, and the word ‘water’ should 
henceforth refer to all and only that stuff that shares a chemical constitution with the stuff that in 
our world is potable and falls from the sky, i.e. H20.  The term ‘water’ has then been rigidified.  But it 
wasn’t necessarily so.  In the case of jade, its usage has not been restricted to a chemical kind.  So, in 
the case of natural kind terms like ‘water,’ the fact that it is an a posteriori truth that ‘water = H20’ is 
not necessary; it is a contingent fact that for scientific purposes we have rigidified the term in that 
way.  Moreover, it is an open question as to what actual substances in the world we will allow to be 
included in the extension of the term, given that there are isotopes, etc. (see §1.5 Mapping).  The 
rigidity of the secondary intension is contingent on our practices just as the criteria of application of 
the primary intension are.   
16 
 
It is the mapping out these various criteria in a multi-dimensional conceptual space that gives us the 
topographical picture of kindhood.  Restricting ourselves to three dimensions for the moment for 
the purposes of ease of exposition, the three axes could be as follows: 
1. The x-axis represents similarity of primary intension.  For example, how similar is it, in terms 
of perceptual properties, to prototypical water? 
2. The y-axis represents some kind of ‘modal distance.’  For example, are there possible worlds 
in which the stuff in question falls under the rigidified term ‘water’?  XYZ would be ruled out 
despite looking and behaving like water; an isotope that is radically dissimilar (e.g. pink and 
fluffy (LaPorte, 2004)) would be ruled out despite being chemically close; but an isotope that 
is liquid and see-through may not be. 
3. The z-axis represents projectability, or inductive utility. On the summit of the lump in 
intensional space that represents ‘water,’ are the clear cases of water found on earth that 
are composed of just H20, are liquid, translucent, and thirst quenching, and which will 
confirm all the generalisations we make about water. 
The advertised benefit of rigidity was to capture the necessity of identities discovered a posteriori, 
like that between the two names, Hesperus and Phosphorus, both of which refer to Venus (Kripke, 
1972).  A similar case could be made in the case of the names for categories of things that we have 
decided should be defined by their sharing a physical or chemical nature.  We have already seen that 
even in these cases the straightforward semantic externalist account is an over-simplification.  The 
next question is how our accounts of the meanings of kind terms apply to other, less basic kinds, like 
biological categories.  According to Schwartz (2002, pp. 270-271), an identity like ‘the honeybee = 
Apis mellifera’ is not like ‘water = H2O,’ in that the Latin name is just a name, rather than some 
biological microphysical property.  He assumes that there must be an equivalent identity between 
biological species and microphysical types, namely DNA.  LaPorte (2000) instead talks of the cladistic 
essence of biological kinds that involves belonging to a lineage, rather than merely being another 
name for the same thing, in which case the Latin name does contain information that could turn out 
to be false, i.e. the assumed lineage.  But rigidity cannot do the work of distinguishing natural kinds 
from nominal ones (LaPorte, 2000, p. 304), for reasons given above (in 1.3 Rigidity), this being left to 
a non-essentialist causal theory of reference, where a term is a natural kind term because we have 
decided to use it as such in our linguistic community. 
In the case of biological kinds, baptism requires some descriptive information: e.g. ‘That is species X’ 
describes the referent as a species.  Such natural kinds are not eternal and immutable; biological 
kinds are paradigmatic natural kinds, with, if lineage is important to classification, historical 
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essences.  Moreover, we do not discover facts about these essential properties a posteriori: 
‘Mammalia = the clade that stems from ancestral group G’ is not discovered to be true, rather, 
‘these terms have undergone meaning refinement to make them refer to the relevant clades….  They 
are rigid de jure, rather than rigid de facto….  A term need not keep its meaning over time in order to 
be rigid at a time’ (LaPorte, 2004, pp. 48-49).  When new evidence turns up there is a choice to 
narrow or widen the term; we have to ask why it belongs to that particular taxon:  ‘If neither the 
biological species concept, or the phylogenetic species concept can be discovered to be true, and 
each stipulate a different essence for the species, how can it be said that scientists discover the 
essences of previously baptised species?’ (LaPorte, 2004, p. 73).  There are competing definitions of 
species, e.g. clades vs. grades, where a clade is an ancestral group and all of its descendants and a 
grade is a group with a shared level of organization.  One system may come to be accepted, but this 
will not be because one is necessarily true in that it is the correct representation of the way the 
world is organised, but rather due to such qualities as its ease of use and ‘tidiness.’  In this way, ‘the 
ranking of groups [may be] largely arbitrary… [but] this casts no doubt on the naturalness of ranked 
groups’ (LaPorte, 2004, p. 186 note 19).  Moreover, given that the proposed ranking may be 
discovered to be too vague to be useful, in order to dispel this vagueness we may need to modify 
the meaning of the term, but this refining cannot be said to be approaching more closely the 
originally intended meaning of the term (LaPorte, 2004, p. 90).  
 
1.4 Projection 
The reason natural kinds matter is because we can make generalisations about them, meaning we 
can explain what happened, predict what will happen in future cases, and, if we desire, intervene in 
the course of events.  In other words, natural kinds are what science is about.  Terms that can be 
used in this way are said to be ‘projectable,’ and the process of making general statements from 
observations is inductive inference.  Therefore, before continuing we need to deal with the problems 
of induction, old and new.   
The problem of induction, as raised by Hume (1738), asks how we can justify going from finite 
observations to a fully general conclusion, as we can never know for sure that the next observation 
will not turn out different from previous cases.  Umpteen white swans may be observed, but we can 
never validly conclude that all swans are white, so scientific generalisations cannot be facts that we 
know.   
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One solution, confirmationism (Carnap, 1950), is to take instances of a law as confirming (raising the 
probability of the truth of) that law.  So the hypothesis ‘All emeralds are green’ is confirmed by 
finding more green emeralds.  At no point can we definitively state that such generalisations are 
known facts, but that doesn’t matter as long as we are satisfied with well-confirmed generalisations 
that we can use in scientific practice. 
But why do we think some generalisations are confirmed by their instances and not others?  This is 
the new riddle of induction (Goodman, 1955).  Not all statements containing projectable predicates 
are confirmed by their instances, that is, they are not all ‘lawlike.’  For example, ‘Green things are 
non-intelligent’ is accidental, and observations of non-intelligent cucumbers do not confirm it.  How 
can we tell that ’Emeralds are green,’ on the other hand, is lawlike?   What about the hypothesis ‘all 
emeralds are grue,’ where ‘grue’ ‘applies to all things examined before t, just in case they are green 
but to other things just in case they are blue’ (Goodman, 1955, p. 74).  So, instances of green 
emeralds examined before t will confirm this hypothesis too.  This means that any particular 
observation could be seen as confirming any number of hypotheses, and there is no reason to see 
such observations as lending credence to any one of them in particular. 
The idea of ‘projectability’ is central to the solution to the new riddle of induction.  The difference 
between ‘green’ and ‘grue’ is that ‘green’ is a projectable predicate, in that it is one on the basis of 
which we can make correct inductive inferences.  That is, on the basis of observed tokens of objects 
with the property of being green, we can say that unobserved tokens of the same kinds of objects 
are likely to be green too.  It is information that we can use to plan ahead.  ‘Grue’ is not projectable 
as the observation of a green token instance of a kind of thing made before an arbitrary time in the 
future does not support the prediction that an observation of another token of that kind made after 
that time will be blue. 
Quine puts it thus: ‘…projectable predicates are predicates ζ and η whose shared instances all do 
count, for whatever reason, toward confirmation of [All ζ are η]’ (Quine, 1969, p. 115).  For example, 
‘All ravens are black’: we can expect that if we see a raven it will be black, that if we see a non-black 
thing it will not be a raven; but we cannot expect non-ravens to be non-black, or black things all to 
be ravens.  In other words, projectable predicates are those that are usable in valid inductive 
inferences from finite observation to general statements. 
According to some, e.g. Israel (2004), ‘grue’ has often been misinterpreted (e.g. by Kripke) to mean 
‘X is green prior to time t' without entailing anything about being examined.  This definition makes 
‘grue’ a two-place predicate, its extension being the set of ordered pairs <X,T> such that X is green 
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and T < t or X is blue and T ≥ t.  Generalisations involving this predicate entail that every emerald will 
change its colour from green to blue at time t.  Israel claims that to be relevant to the wider problem 
of induction, not just prediction, the hypothesis ‘all emeralds are grue’ needs to be accidental, unlike 
the lawlike ‘All emeralds are green.’  If we accept the interpretation of grue where emeralds 
suddenly change colour at t, then this misses the fact that the property of being observed before t is 
crucial, making it a problem about prediction, rather than about generalising from observed to 
unobserved instances (Israel, 2004, p. 335).  Framing it the wrong way weakens the riddle by 
requiring objects of a certain sort to change their colour for no reason.   To say that all objects of a 
certain kind will suddenly, and accidentally, change their colour at the same time, is ‘strange,’ and 
weakens the force of the argument, according to Israel. 
Does it really matter that it’s strange?  It’s also strange if we ‘just happen’ only to have found green 
emeralds so far, on the assumption that there are blue ones out there too that we have, by accident 
alone, not seen. There may be an explanation for why this is so (in which case it is not purely 
accidental, as Israel wants), and if it is just accidental, then that makes it a sampling problem rather 
than a deeper one about justified generalisation.  But equally, there could be an explanation for 
colour changing at a certain time.  The problem with Israel’s way of framing the new problem, is that 
it’s not really new if put that way.  The fact that some emeralds may be blue, although they haven’t 
been observed yet, is exactly analogous to the situation with swans before the discovery of the black 
variety.  Moreover, since there is only an accidental relationship between the colour and time t, 
there is nothing special about the colours being proposed; there is no reason to call this property 
‘grue’ rather than saying some emeralds are green, others are blue (after all, we don’t feel the need 
to say that the colour of swans is ‘whack’).     
But, putting aside such concerns for the moment, Israel wants to say that the definition of grue 
implies there are two kinds of emeralds, green and blue, and that by accident we have found only 
green ones and will continue to find only green until t.  Since an accidental generalization like this is 
not confirmed by its instances, why do we believe some hypotheses are lawlike (i.e. confirmed by 
their instances)?  The problem is that we can make contradictory predictions from the same 
evidence if we accept confirmationism (the view that the likelihood of a given hypothesis being true 
increases with each observation that confirms that hypothesis).  Only predictions based on lawlike 
propositions are valid, but we don't have an independent criterion for lawlikeness.  As mentioned, 
Goodman’s solution is to distinguish between projectable & non-projectable predicates.  If ‘All 
emeralds are green’ is lawlike, then ‘green’ is projectable.  But ‘All green things are non-intelligent’ is 
not lawlike, and the fact that all observed green things have been non-intelligent is accidental.  So, 
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either ‘green’ is not projectable after all (i.e. its instances don't confirm generalizations it enters), or 
projectability of the predicates in a universal proposition is not a sufficient condition for lawlikeness. 
Davidson (1966) says projectability is not a property of a single predicate, but a relation between 
predicates: ‘green’ is projectable for emeralds, but not for intelligent beings.  But here is an impasse: 
if projectability is a property of a single predicate, we cannot use it as a criterion for lawlikeness, but 
if projectability is a relation between predicates, it becomes uninformative (since lawlike 
propositions are those with projectable predicates, and projectable predicates are those found in 
lawlike propositions). 
Israel’s solution is to take projectability to apply to whole propositions rather than predicates (Israel, 
2006).  We project ‘all emeralds are green’ because we believe the proposition is true and lawlike.  
But we still face the problem of distinguishing lawlike from accidental propositions.  Lawlikeness is 
defined by how something would fit into our ‘whole epistemic web,’ with inductive practices linked 
to the (practical) possibility of explanation: ‘A proposition is lawlike if it is rationally explainable (or 
would be if it were true), but the property of being rationally explainable is relative to the context’ 
(Israel, 2006, p. 276).  We ‘project’ generalizations rather than properties: sometimes correlations 
prompt us to look for explanations (e.g. smoking & cancer), and may lead us to revise our epistemic 
web; sometimes they don’t, or shouldn’t.  Projectability ‘depends on context because it depends on 
the entire ‘web of belief,’ including the epistemic values of reflective equilibrium, coherence, 
simplicity...’ (Israel, 2006, p. 276).   
‘Strange’ generalizations cannot be preferred because of the ‘cost’ of including them in our web of 
belief.  The practical possibility of explanation means that relative to a web of belief B, it is practically 
possible to explain the truth of generalization A, iff B implies that (1) A is in fact true or has a high 
likelihood of being true; and (2) B implies that it is possible to explain the truth of A on the basis of 
facts... that actually obtain. (Israel, 2006, p. 279)  
He concludes that not every generalization is confirmed by its instances, only lawlike ones, that 
projectability is not constitutive for lawlikeness, rather lawlikeness determines projectability 
(lawlikeness being determined by the explainability of the truth of a generalization) and that ‘an 
acceptable system of inductive logic that takes only the logical forms of the evidence and the 
hypothesis into account is impossible’ (Israel, 2006, p. 283).  (We will return to the subject of 
explaining in §3.2 Explanation.) 
If this is right, projectability is a matter of explainability within our worldview.  One of the central 
beliefs we have is the principle of sufficient reason: that events happen for reasons.  So, if emeralds 
are grue, there must be a reason, which we should be able to cite, why they will change colour, or 
why we have only observed green ones so far.  In either case, there must be some ‘local’ reason that 
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we can, in principle, observe.  It must be spatially local, otherwise it is not a property of emeralds 
but of something else, which means that it must also be temporally local (i.e. present in emeralds 
before t).  In order to justify a ‘gruesome’ claim, then, we would have to be able to point towards a 
possible present property to explain the properties that go along with being grue.  
Put another way, ‘an observational predicate is apt for induction to the extent to which one can 
locally determine whether or not the predicate holds in a given case’ (R. Chrisley, 2008, pers.corr., 1 
Apr.).  This is to take an experientialist view of observational concepts, in which, in order for one to 
be said to possess a concept, one needs to be able to say one is experiencing an instance of that 
property on the basis of that experience alone.  A full defence of such a position is beyond the scope 
of the present work, but has recently been made in a thesis by Ivan Ivanov (2016, p. 209): ‘Having an 
observational concept… involves having the experientially-based capacity to determine, without 
further empirical investigation, what the property picked out by the concept is.’  He gives this 
summary of his position: 
I. Having an observational concept involves having substantial knowledge of the property picked out. 
II. Such knowledge consists in the capacity to come to know what the property is without further 
empirical investigation. 
III. Experience of instances of the observational property in optimal viewing conditions plays an 
essential role in providing the basis for the capacity to come to know what the property is without 
further empirical investigation. (Ivanov, 2016, p. 204) 
If we accept such a view of observational concepts, then we only need look (in optimal conditions) to 
see if an object is green, but before saying an object is grue, we have to know the time and whether 
it was previously observed.  When a difference like this is noticed between ‘normal’ predicates and 
‘gruesome’ ones, a standard response is to reassert the riddle by redefining the ‘normal’ in a 
‘gruesome’ way: if we claim that grue is disjunctive (in that it is defined in terms of being green or 
blue) whereas green is not, it can be replied that it is possible to define green in terms of being 
either grue or bleen (‘grue and observed before t otherwise bleen’).  That reply may work against an 
argument that claims that the main problem with ‘grue’ is that it is disjunctive, but not against one 
that sees the main problem as being that we should be able to locally determine if an observational 
predicate holds or not.  The advantage with the local solution is that redefining in this way does not 
make green non-local, so we can take as a starting point that being locally determinable is a criterion 
for a predicate’s being projectable. 
It might be asked, though, whether there are some predicates of kind membership (e.g. ‘being a 
dog’) that are not locally ‘observational,’ but rather, historical.  Something that looks and smells like 
a dog, and is observationally identical down to what can be observed about its micro-structural 
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composition, is not a dog unless it shares a common ancestor with other dogs.  Is an artificial dog 
that is exactly similar to a real dog, with respect to locally determinable properties, a dog?  
Predicates like these could be called ‘locational’ in Swinburne’s (1968) distinction between these and 
what he calls ‘qualitative’ predicates, and concludes that where there is a conflict, we should prefer 
qualitative over locational for the purposes of projection.  Swinburne uses ‘qualitative’ in a broad 
sense to include any kind of possible observations, not merely ‘naked eye’ ones, so the correctness 
of application of a qualitative term can be determined without knowing anything specific about the 
time or place of the occurrence, and can include, potentially, dispositional properties, like ‘being 
brittle’ (which could be tested by striking).  Interestingly, this notion of qualitative is relative to the 
development of our instruments of observation, and so the wider network of scientific beliefs. 
To the objection that membership of an evolutionary kind is not locally determinable, then, we can 
reply that although our explanatory practices refer to the evolutionary past, how we determine 
whether a creature is a member of a particular evolutionary lineage is generally by examining facts 
that are locally determinable, e.g. about its DNA, as well as what it and its parents look like.  These 
count as locally determinable pieces of evidence for its belonging to that ‘historical’ kind.  The fact 
that it is conceivable that an exact copy could be made just means that we could be fooled, rather 
than being a reason for rejecting this notion of kindhood altogether. 
Another way we could approach the problem is to allow a distinction between ‘pure’ and ‘impure’ 
properties, where the pure properties are non-relational, and all other properties are impure.  This 
latter kind, though, may still be contained in the broad definition of observational outlined 
previously. 
Besides, whether something has the appropriate lineage probably won’t make a difference when it 
comes to projectability.  If it’s physically identical to a real dog, it will bark in appropriate 
circumstances, and it won’t become a cat at midnight.  Or if it were to, then we would expect to be 
able to find some properties present in the creature that would explain this and enable us to, in 
principle, predict that.  There would be some physical mechanism keeping track of the time for 
example, or one that is triggered by external events coupled with that time (e.g. the striking of the 
clock 12 times).  The general point is, kinds are generalisations made by us to fit in with our 
theoretical understanding of how the world works, which includes a general physicalism that states 
that causal properties must be physically realised, which entails that we must be able to locally 
observe the relevant causal factors that enable us to say that an object belongs to such and such a 
kind, on the assumption that we have the necessary observational apparatus.  Such historical 
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properties are either of interest etiologically, or in allowing inference to some property shared with 
creatures of that kind, justifying projection. 
To recap: we are looking for a way to ground the projectability of properties as the epistemic 
criterion for natural kindhood in such a way that it can be used to make valid inductions from one 
token of a kind to the next, and the reason we are looking at natural kindhood is to allow a detailed 
analysis of a form of argumentation found in the reductionism/non-reductionism debate that focus 
on the relationship between lawlike statements made at different levels.  The expectation that we 
will encounter the same properties when we next encounter an object of the same kind depends on 
the idea of observational resemblance.  According to one of the main proponents for reduction, the 
ontological criterion for this resemblance is the sharing of a causal nature, based on the principle of 
‘same cause, same effect’: ‘Causal powers involve laws, and laws are regularities that are 
projectable’ (Kim, 1992, p. 525).   
The other main antagonist in the debate about the metaphysical status of ‘higher-level’ laws, or the 
autonomy of ‘special scientific’ laws, Fodor, defines natural kind terms as ‘projectable’ terms that 
enter lawlike statements in a scientific discourse as antecedents or consequents (Fodor, 1997).  
Assuming that underlying lawlike regularities referred to in scientific discourse are causal 
relationships, this is one point that he and Kim can agree on: the principle of causal individuation of 
kinds: ‘Kinds in science are individuated on the basis of causal powers; that is, objects and events fall 
under a kind, or share in a property, insofar as they have similar causal powers’ (Kim, 1992, p. 522).  
(What they don’t agree on will be explored in detail in §2.1.1 The ‘Special’ Debate.) 
Science carves nature up into kinds using empirical methods based on epistemic criteria, like 
predictive and explanatory power, and ontological beliefs.  It explains how the things we find in the 
world came to be and be as they are, and what the effects are of their being thus (for understanding 
and control).  Hume (1738, Book I, Part III) called causation the cement of the universe, but his 
regularity account of causation leaves us unable to explain singular causal statements or partial 
regularities (see §3.1 Causation), for which the notion of kinds is ‘the link between singular and 
general causal statements’ (Quine, 1969, p. 239).   
As mentioned, Fodor (1974) explains kindhood in terms of laws: a given predicate P is a ‘kind 
predicate’ of a science just in case the science contains a law with P as its antecedent or consequent 
(which is in line with a generally Quinean ontology).  For an autonomous science, the laws containing 
such kinds should not be replaceable without loss of predictive power by more ‘basic’ statements 
containing the kind terms of another, more fundamental description: causal properties are 
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properties of objects which persist in their own right, not mere aggregates of the causal properties 
of their constituents.  (These issues will be explored in Chapter 2: Physicalist Reductionism and 
Chapter 3: Levels of Causal Explanation.)    
According to this position, we should restrict ourselves to talking about causal properties to avoid 
‘subjectivising’ the notion of kindhood.  Things are similar in a cosmically primary sense, then, ‘to the 
degree that they are interchangeable parts of the cosmic machine revealed by science’ (Quine, 1969, 
p. 240).  (I will put aside for the moment the quibble that being ‘interchangeable’ could be 
interpreted subjectively, and that causal statements depend, to some extent, on the taking of a 
perspective.)  Given that the laws of science are causal, and that the existence of laws requires 
‘independent fundamental magnitudes’ (Putnam, 1969, pp. 249-51), to replace each other (to be 
tokens of the same type) things must share a causal nature.  But to avoid deflating the notion of 
kindhood through being too strict in the interpretation of ‘sharing a causal nature,’ we have to say 
that they have similar causal properties, which re-introduces subjectivity, as what counts as similar 
enough depends on judgements we make, according to our own explanatory interests. 
The reason we expect the next emerald to be green rather than grue is based on causal similarity, 
but it is, according to Quine (1969) this that creates the puzzle, as it seems there is no respectably 
scientific way to cash out the notion of similarity: how do we draw the line between things close 
enough to the paradigm and far enough from the ‘foil’?  How do we choose a paradigm?  We start 
with our innately endowed, perceptual similarity space (‘good for food-gathering’), then we start to 
theorise, and adopt new groupings on the basis of those that are inductively fruitful, and so those 
become ‘entrenched’ (in Goodman’s terminology).  Statements like ‘emeralds are grue’ are not 
entrenched in accumulated scientific and linguistic practice.  However, according to Quine, similarity 
should not be defined relative to our theorising, but must be a fact about the objects and their 
properties: ‘[Similarity] belongs in the subject matter not of our theory of theorizing about the 
world, but our theory of the world itself.  Such would be the acceptable and reputable sort of 
similarity concept, if it could be defined....  It does get defined in bits: bits suited to special branches 
of science’ (Quine, 1969, p. 240).  Quine wants to get beyond inductions from sensory properties, to 
where the terms of mature science pick out things with certain dispositions for which we can state 
the mechanism by virtue of which they are disposed to be such-and-such.   
This, I will claim, can be achieved by the Virtual Machine Functionalism I will argue for later (§6.1 
Virtual Machines), without having to reduce everything to physics or throw out the notion of 
similarity all together.  On the topic of functional kinds, many, including Fodor (1994, p. 31), would 
distinguish them from natural kinds, the latter being defined by similarities in their microstructure, 
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as opposed to their causal dispositions.  This is, in my opinion, giving up too much ground to the 
reductionists (strange for Fodor to do so), as I don’t think a clear distinction can be drawn.  I will turn 
now to describing my own position that, I claim, manages to find a way between the problems of the 
above account.  
 
1.5 Mapping 
The account presented and defended in the following will describe our space of natural kind 
concepts as being analogous to a map: something created by us for our use in navigating this world, 
the nature of which depends on both our needs and the structure of the world.  I will call accounts of 
this type topographical. 
A topographical account is not realist about the existence of kinds as abstract objects (universals in 
old money): kinds in that sense don’t exist separately from our construction of them.  But it is realist 
in the sense that the tokens so classified are such that they objectively have certain properties that 
mean they fall under kind terms once we have fixed the meanings of those terms.  Neither is this 
account nominalist, even though nominalists could accept the points just made, as the categories 
are not constructed by us before they get applied to the world; they emerge as the result of a 
reciprocal, feedback dynamic through evolutionary, socio-cultural, and developmental timeframes.  
This allows the world to play a formative role in the construction of our world-picture, and 
consequently a normative role too.  Nor is it conceptualist, despite agreeing that our perception of 
the world is penetrated by our understanding, this penetration is not ‘all the way down,’ but rather a 
negotiation whereby the map may draw our attention to certain features of our experience, but it is 
not the only means by which we engage with the world, and some of our experience may be 
unconceptualised despite being somewhere on the map (a place with no name). 
Natural kinds don’t necessarily get at nature’s joints, because sometimes there aren’t any joints but 
rather a collection of individuals along multiple continuums of similarity.  Some of these individuals 
are common enough, similar enough, and important enough, for us to feel the need to classify them 
as kinds.  The problem with the traditional conception of natural kind terms is the requirement to 
state necessary and sufficient conditions for the application of the term.  The world is 
uncooperative, refusing to fit neat categories that the discrete nature of language demands.  Our 
kind terms should rather be seen as picking out ‘geographical’ features in a topographical space, like 
naming mountains, and parts of mountains in a landscape: the tops ‘stand out’ as features, but at 
some, ill-defined point the slopes become the surroundings, the boundary being drawn by us.  This 
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may seem unsatisfactory, but fits with experience.  As in a physical landscape, whether a certain 
feature deserves its own name depends on us and our relationship to the feature: is it useful to be 
able to refer to it with a name?  Such namings are thus instrumental, but nevertheless refer to some 
real feature of the world.  An ‘ideal’ language, one that captured every feature of the domain, would 
be unwieldy, since it would require a word for each point in the space, like using a 1:1 ratio map.  
Lewis Carroll in ‘Sylvie and Bruno Concluded’ (which inspired George Luis Borges’ story ‘On 
Exactitude in Science’) saw the ridiculousness of the idea, imagining a kind of competitive map ‘race’ 
to produce the most accurate map, ending with a map of 1 mile to 1 mile, which became useless, 
resulting in people using ‘the country itself, as its own map, and I assure you it does nearly as well’ 
(Carroll, 1895).  (There’s an interesting parallel here to later work in situated robotics, see §4.2 
Representations.)  Of course, we need a map that has enough detail for us to get around and find 
what we want, without getting in the way.  In terms of the points of interest we include on our map, 
if those were microphysical ‘essences’ there would be no room for the ambiguities that come with 
descriptions in a language.  For example, in the case of ‘water,’ isotopes of water are included, not 
because of micro-physical similarity (we could keep changing this very gradually and asking each 
time ‘Is this still water?’) but because of the descriptions we attach to what we call water (clear 
liquid at room temperature that can be drunk, etc.).  On the other hand, it is questionable whether 
we would accept as water a substance that is H2O but for some reason is pink and fluffy at room 
temperature (example from LaPorte (2004)). 
At this point, as with all theories that attempt to give an account of how we engage mentally with 
the world, we need to ask how the theory applies to itself, since our minds and the kind terms we 
employ are themselves part of the world.  It could be a criticism that maps are abstract 
representations separate from the world represented, and so not suitable to account for our 
embodied, immediate engagement with the world.  My response is to observe how a skilful 
orienteer uses a map: it is part of an embodied, reciprocal practice, interpreting what is seen in the 
world and on the map in terms of each other, constantly reassessing on the move.  Moreover, the 
topographical claim is not merely one about our conceptual structure, but also about the structure 
of the world; it is a claim about how our conceptual structures can be said to be accurate in a 
meaningful way more than pure pragmatism, by which I mean a pragmatism that does not account 
for why a belief is useful. 
The topographical model is an attempt to include the truths contained in both of the main historical 
camps in the field of natural kinds (the realists, who say that our terms make the same distinctions 
that nature itself has made, and nominalists, who say that our terms are a function of the way we 
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perceive a reality that in itself has no real distinctions).  This is supported by recent discussions about 
biological species concepts.  The consensus had swung from realism (Aristotle) to nominalism 
(Locke, Frege), and back to realism (Kripke, Putnam).  Kripke and Putnam revert to essentialism, 
‘denying traditional accounts that make the reference of terms a function of something like their 
Fregean sense… [saying there are] properties which nothing can lack and still be of the kind’ (Mellor, 
1977, p. 299).  Mellor (1977) criticised the latter realists saying the essential properties alluded to in 
these theories are more a feature of our theories than the world itself.  Putnam’s thought 
experiment about water and ‘twin water’ aims to establish the anti-Fregean conclusion that ‘water’ 
can have different extensions for users who have in mind the same Fregean sense.  But this assumes 
that what matters is microstructure (H2O or XYZ).  Couldn’t we say rather that what we would 
actually have discovered in Putnam’s scenario is that not all water has the same microstructure (as 
indeed we have with the discovery of isotopes)?  As Mellor (1977, p. 304) says, there may be a 
‘division of labour’ in deciding reference (we defer to experts), but ‘it might be a Fregean labour for 
all that.’   
Rather than kind terms picking out a discrete set of entities definable with necessary and sufficient 
conditions, the topographical model claims that what they actually do is delimit an (in some cases 
vague) area of an ‘intensional topography’ where the axes along which the topography is plotted are 
the various measures of similarity we find between things in the world.  Despite the fact that the 
map we form with kind terms depends on our interests, perceptual abilities, and history, it is still a 
map of some territory.  The validity of the map must be justified without some naïve notion of direct 
correspondence though, but rather in a pragmatic way akin to a process of selection.  Not just the 
selection that has been part of our evolution, which must have led us to be able to pick out real 
things (to run away from or towards) or we wouldn’t have survived, but also the selective processes 
at work in the progress of empirical science (cf. Quine).  It is realist in the sense that if there is 
something right about the way we categorise things, then we can use a categorisation to ‘project,’ 
and this fact is explained by our having successfully captured something about the actual structure 
of the world.  It is also realist like causal theory in that subjectivity is part of reality, and there is a 
real way in which history plays a part in how the world presents itself to us: we ‘resonate’ with the 
world. 
There is an important difference in emphasis between this account and Quine’s (1969) view of 
natural kinds as sets.  Sets are extensional, thus, so are kinds.  But on the topographical view, kinds 
are not sets, and the conditions for their application are intensional, in that we name those features 
that matter to us, and draw the boundaries around features in a way that makes sense to us.  Having 
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a boundary makes it look like a set, but that boundary depends on us, and so is not purely 
extensional, even though it does, more or less, succeed in picking out a class of objects which share 
certain properties which we can use projectively in predictions and explanations.  It is true that if we 
ascend semantically to the formal level, where we can discuss how words are used, rather than 
whether they are used successfully, then this view shares with Quine’s the fact that a term’s 
significance depends on its extension, but unlike Quine’s view, mine is not behaviourist to the extent 
of saying this exhausts its significance. 
This is consistent with the causal individuation of kinds: when we understand a kind, we understand 
its causal properties (even though we may have to arrive here by a process of induction).  But a 
causal account has trouble dealing with similarity, which the topographical account can handle, since 
we can retain the subjective sense of similarity without rendering our account subjectivist in a way 
that would cut us off from real structure in the world.  In a topographical theory of kindhood, the 
similarities between things in the world are seen as defining a kind of landscape, and our kind terms 
pick out noticeable features on a contour map of this.  This captures the way that kind terms depend 
both on the contingencies of our interests and on the actual world.  It describes ‘joints’ in nature, 
but exactly where we ‘carve’ them depends partly on us.   
This is not anti-realist, since, given our epistemic limits and purposes, what is picked out by the 
terms is an objective fact.  Where we draw the boundary is up (or down) to us; that doesn't mean 
the place where the line is drawn is not a real place.  Once the criteria we are using are decided, the 
fact that something satisfies this is objective.  Maps are made according to our conventions, but are 
constrained by the reality we are trying to portray.  As long as we have the right axes, the completed 
picture will be a picture of reality, a better or worse one depending on the axes and our 
measurement of them.  
For realists, a term refers to something only if that thing has certain essential properties, irrespective 
of the speaker’s understanding of this aspect of the term’s meaning or those physical properties.  
For nominalists, reference depends on a match between how something impinges on the senses and 
an internal model of the sensory impact of various kinds of things.  Once the models are thus fixed, 
there is nothing, of course, to stop determinate parts of the world being objectively picked out.  The 
topographical approach improves on causal realism by not discounting the role of the agent’s 
understanding in fixing reference, and on nominalism by giving the way the world is a constitutive 
role in forming the categories we deploy through a process of diachronic feedback.  Moreover, this 
feedback has a top-down effect on determining our sensory perception, and therefore the 
subsequent maps we draw (see §5.2 Feedback and Feedforward).  We don’t simply discriminate 
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between given experiences; we actively use our understanding to negotiate with the world, 
experimenting with the practical usefulness of different ways of seeing the world.  Perceptions don’t 
just lead to understandings, ways of understanding also lead to ways of perceiving. 
The topographical model bridges the gap between inner and outer by building a model over time 
through engagements with the world.  Rather than being an abstract re-presentation, the map is an 
active part of the process which is refined through use, leading to a situation where the map can, on 
occasion, replace the world as the former of perceptions and actions.  The topographical model is 
constructed in a conceptual space, where there may be multiple dimensions depending on the 
various ways we find it useful to categorise things (e.g. size, colour, behaviour, chemistry, taste).  
Differences between concepts may not just be dichotomous or a matter of degree; there may be 
multiple discontinuities, some nested within others.  Concepts should be analysed so as to be 
consistent with linguistic usage and useful for prediction and generalisation.  The latter empirical 
considerations can trump the former ones, this being how language develops over time (Sloman, et 
al., 2003, p. 18). 
1.5.1 Historical precedents 
A natural kind is like what in topology is called a neighbourhood….  Cats, for example, are like a star 
cluster: they are not all in one intensional place, but most of them are crowded together close to an 
intensional centre.  Assuming evolution, there must have been outlying members so aberrant that we 
should hardly know whether to regard them as part of the cluster or not. (Russell, 1948, p. 461) 
Russell did not develop these ideas, as he thought that there was no rigorous way to specify this 
‘closeness,’ because similarity is too subjective a notion.  However, the account I am advocating can 
cope with similarity without becoming problematically subjective, because the way in which things 
are similar, and the degree of difference that makes a difference, is negotiated over time.  The 
structure is neither inherent in the world, nor a free-floating conceptual balloon, but rather is 
‘tethered’ to strategic points. 
For Millikan, members of kinds are similar to each other because they share a history, rather than a 
physical essence, and this shared history causes the members of the kind to be similar, thus 
grounding induction.  The kinds of historical links that can produce these similarities are 
evolutionary: there must be a mechanism for copying traits in response to a certain environmental 
contingency (Millikan, 1999, p. 55).  But purely historicist accounts like this fail in the important case 
of functional kinds.  We can imagine two different organs in evolutionarily diverse lineages that 
function to pump a nutrient-carrying fluid around the body of their host organisms.  To rule that we 
cannot classify both kinds of organs as hearts because they don’t share a selective past seems 
arbitrary; the similarity of their function will allow projection and justify calling them members of the 
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same kind for many purposes.  A possible response could be that we can take the organs as sharing a 
history without sharing an origin, in that both were selected for the same reason on different 
evolutionary lineages.  However, that identifying of a shared selective circumstance is one that is 
only definable in terms of the function of the organ. 
Of course, our explanatory interests might be such that there would be good reason to distinguish 
between different kinds of hearts, in terms of how they work, what they evolved from, and so on.  
Therefore, there may be no fact of the matter as to which is the best classificatory schema 
independent of our perspective, but if the possibilities do reflect the structure of the world in being 
constrained by it, then this is still a variety of called realism rather than conventionalism.  Dupré’s 
(1993) ‘promiscuous realism,’ which takes the entities of some domain and maps them onto a multi-
dimensional quality space, resulting in clusters corresponding to groups of similar entities, is close to 
the account being advocated here: ‘Dupré’s account is realist because the clusters in quality space 
reflect the real structure of nature.  It is promiscuous because there will be many different clusters 
on which we could choose to focus’ (Cooper, 2004).  
The topographical account, though, is less promiscuous, more faithful to nature.  Not all 
classificatory schemas are equally deserving, and it could be legitimate to overrule a particular way 
of classifying, if one scheme is more apt for induction, or is simpler.  Promiscuous realism, in other 
words, does not have the resources to justify normative judgements about conflicting classificatory 
schemas, and common-sense categories have equal standing to scientific ones (Dupré, 1996).  If this 
were the case, then there would be no way to convince someone who was brought up to call a 
whale a fish that they should change the way they use those words.  In effect we would have to 
accept that we speak different languages.  But that is not only an unproductive approach to 
disagreements, it also doesn’t fit with the historical fact that we have been persuaded to change the 
way we use words on the basis of evidence and the virtues of non-commonsensical ways of talking. 
Another position in sympathy with the present one is the ‘cluster kinds’ of Boyd (1989).  This is 
where higher-level kinds are a cluster of lower-level properties, none of which are necessary or 
sufficient, but which are clustered together due to some historical, causal reason, thereby 
supporting inductions.  For example, biological species are part of a lineage that is inseparable from 
its spatio-temporal niche, the homeostasis being underwritten by the process of the exchange of 
genetic materials (Boyd, 1991, p. 142).  This is a kind of functional rather than physical essence. 
However, this is not a concept of kinds that has general applicability, being only suitable for non-
basic kinds.  Some kinds do have necessary and/or sufficient properties, for example certain, basic 
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physical kinds may necessarily have charge.  Before seeing how a topographical account works when 
applied specifically to mental kinds, it is worth exploring how it handles kinds in another, far 
removed domain, since the account should have general applicability if it has any. 
1.5.3 Pluto: A case study in natural kind term demarcation 
‘I’m fed up with all this ‘bananas are not a fruit, tomatoes are’ rubbish.  If it can go in a fruit salad it’s a 
fruit and scientists can go stuff it.’ – David Mitchell 
We may give microphysical essences the pride of place for natural kinds, but whether we do so is our 
decision, and we are only likely to do so when it comes to physical kinds.  To say further that no 
group of things that do not share a microphysical essence can be members of a kind seems question-
begging.  Are there kinds of things that share causal natures without sharing microphysical 
essences?  We may give causal definitions to the kinds we use in science, without specifying the 
physical causal processes that underpin them, but these will be, to some degree, vague and interest 
and/or context relative.   
In 2005, The International Astronomical Union gathered to decide on the definition of a planet, after 
there had been debate about whether some newly discovered objects in the solar system were to be 
called ‘planets’ or not.  After agreeing on the criteria of having a large enough mass to pull the object 
into a near spheroid shape and clear its orbit, they then say that ‘nature decides’ whether or not 
something is a planet: ‘Our goal was to find a scientific basis for a new definition of ‘planet,’ and we 
chose gravity as the determining factor.  Nature decides whether or not an object is a planet’ (Prof 
Richard Binzel, The Independent, 2006). 
On the face of it, it seems problematic to claim that nature decides when they made a ruling by 
majority vote.  But, with a little more careful wording, the claim is not obviously wrong: we decide 
the criteria, and then it is a matter of objective, physical fact which objects satisfy those.  But that 
does not mean that there are some things that are essentially planets in and of themselves.  Not 
only is ‘near spheroid’ vague, and therefore what counts as near enough a matter of convention, but 
there are many respectable scientists who make reasonable arguments for Pluto remaining a 
‘classical’ planet, and say that it is culture, not nature that decides such things.    
Language routinely recognizes natural categories that have no good scientific basis…. There's no way 
to define the lily that doesn't include a lot of tulips as well.  And other words like shrub and weed 
don't have any kind of scientific definition at all.  So why can't we just keep using planet however we… 
please? (Nunberg, 2006) 
Such appeals to ordinary usage may be appealing, but are ultimately unconvincing in these cases, as 
ordinary usage should take into account the findings of science.  Linguistic usage develops as part of 
the cultural evolution of our society, and should reflect our improving empirical picture of the world.   
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Actually, a new category was constructed to include Pluto: dwarf planet, or pluton.  In terms of the 
topography of the conceptual space occupied by cosmological object kinds, it is a newly labelled 
‘hillock’ on the side of the mountain that is the kind ‘planet.’  Since one of the ‘axes of similarity’ 
along which objects are placed is sphericalness, there will be some objects that are not objectively 
one or the other, but that should not lead to any kind of anti-realism about the categories; there will 
be many objects that do fall squarely into one or the other category, and as such we will be able to 
make valid inferences based on this categorisation.  A criterion for a subset of a kind not being a kind 
itself, is if everything that is true of the subset is true of the broader kind except the single property 
that makes the subset different.  For example, white dogs are not natural kinds because all the 
inductively useful properties that are true of white dogs are also true of dogs, except being white 
(example from (Machery, 2003)).  In the case of dwarf planets, I take it to be different along a 
number of such dimensions and so to be separate kind.  According to the topographical view, this is 
accounted for by the ‘prominence’ of the peak, and is open to debate, like the discussion among 
climbers and cartographers about what counts as a separate summit or a subsidiary peak. 
Whether Pluto is a planet is, in my opinion, a question on which the jury is out; we will know when 
future users of the term have learnt and accepted a usage from the textbooks they are exposed to.2  
But the point is clear: although we may decide on a causal definition for kind terms, it is our decision 
where we draw boundaries between kinds, and the causal features we focus on will be relative to 
our interests.  However, this should not lead us into nominalism, as the map is an ongoing project, 
dependent also on the real structure of the world, as exposed to us through our ongoing attempts to 
navigate in our environment.  
 
1.8 Cognitive Kinds  
What does this view mean for how we view the kinds of states referred to when we do science 
about the mental causes of behaviour in beings like us?  In this section, I will make some initial 
remarks that will be expanded on (§4.1 Mental Kinds) after clarifying other important metaphysical 
issues. 
Concepts are formed from non-conceptual parts through time, and it is only when we have managed 
to bring together these parts into a generalisable whole that we can be said to ‘possess’ a concept 
(see §4.3 Content).  These non-conceptual parts can be images, sensations, bits of language, etc., 
                                                          
2
 Since the time of writing, my infant daughter was given a rubber place mat that has the planets on it, and 
there were eight.  So maybe she will grow up finding it natural to think that way.  Pluto was there on the edge, 
but depicted as left out, and sad. 
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and the results of these accumulations can be grouped together as kinds using a topographical 
model of similarity. 
We can give pretty clear conditions for the holding of explicit, linguistically stated beliefs.  The case is 
not so clear when we are attributing beliefs in less explicit cases, like that of animals.  In some sense 
the dog that learns how to open a door does have beliefs about that door handle, but not in the 
same sense most adult humans do: the dog probably learned an association between a behaviour 
and a desired result, rather than having an explicit belief about ‘doorknobs’ which can be used in a 
more inferentially flexible way.  Thus, an explanation of the dog’s opening the door by referring to its 
beliefs is in some sense instrumental; it doesn’t have a concept of DOORKNOB that it can manipulate 
in off-line thought processes in the way humans do.  But there are commonalities between a dog’s 
belief and ours: they both fulfil certain conditions, like being caused by sensory experience of 
specific aspects of the environment, being used to drive action, etc.  In terms of the topographical 
account, we could say that a dog’s beliefs and ours are both part of the same ‘hillock,’ in that they 
share some characteristics but not others.  The human concept is ‘higher’ in that it is apt to be used 
more flexibly in more types of cognitive process: that is, it supports more generalisations.  
This fairly heterogeneous view of concepts, which places such a variety of mental particulars as dogs’ 
and humans’ representations of doorknobs under the same kind, is vulnerable to the objection that 
these particulars are too heterogeneous to count as a kind, since they only share the fact that they 
represent the same things, whereas kinds should share many more inductively useful properties.  
For example, Machery (2003) argues that there are at least three different kinds of concepts 
(exemplars, prototypes and theories) that are all concepts in that they are ‘poised to be used in our 
higher cognitive processes’ (Machery, 2003, p. 451), but which are used for different ends and 
‘possess different representational properties [and] different functional properties’ (Machery, 2003, 
p. 457). 
However, Machery, in my view, is focusing on a rather narrow set of inductively useful properties, 
that is, only those of interest to psychologists (Machery, 2003, p. 436).  If we grant that different 
cognitive processes are involved in making inductions, categorising, etc., it still may be that there are 
properties of interest to others that are shared by these various sub-types of concepts.  In effect, 
Machery does not go ‘high enough’ when he is talking about how concepts are used ‘by default’ in 
higher cognitive processes.  Inferring a list of probable attributes objects that fall under a kind 
possess may call upon a different cognitive process than categorising a given object or making 
predictions about its behaviour, but when it comes to making a conscious decision to act that may, if 
you are trying to take into consideration as much information as you have at your disposal in order 
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to come to the best possible decision you can, and if the concepts used in such processes can be 
called a kind because we can form useful generalisations about them in terms of the kinds of 
behaviour they produce when combined with other concepts, then we have a case of a higher-level 
natural kind.  Moreover, these higher-level kinds can exert top-down influence on our lower level 
concepts, a fact that Machery does not consider.   
Machery explicitly rules out a view of natural kindhood being a matter of featuring in laws, even if 
those laws are taken to be context sensitive, ceteris paribus generalisations, because such ‘laws’ are 
missing the fact that ‘at least one causal mechanism… accounts for these generalisations’ (Machery, 
2003, p. 447).  Again, this is only to see such causal mechanisms as working in one direction.  If the 
higher-level kinds, which are heterogeneous in terms of their lower-level causal origins, can 
nevertheless be part of the causal mechanism that explains intentional action, then there is a strong 
case for counting such cognitive kinds as natural kinds.  It is a large part of the aim of this thesis to 
make this case. 
Another way we can see that there is a top-down influence on lower-level cognitive processes is in 
the case of categorisation.  If it is the case that there can be such top-down influence, it must be that 
the higher-level and lower-level concepts share more than just picking out the same objects in the 
world, and that there is a much more intricate and intertwined landscape of concepts, rather than 
the simply bottom-up, modular view of Machery.  ‘Whales are fish’ was not wrong because ‘whale’ 
and ‘fish’ have always referred to what they do while the concepts WHALE and FISH referred to 
subjective categories.  Categorizations are not just given by nature, but depend on our interests too.  
We have decided that ‘fish’ means more than ‘a creature that swims with fins in the sea,’ not 
because it is ‘more natural,’ but because it is more useful, satisfying, neater, fits our purposes better, 
and so on.  Past speakers were saying something different; in a way, they were using a different 
language.  This leads to a question: when meanings change, what is left of the old meaning?  On a 
topographical view, the meaning has been added to, differently subdivided, additional features 
added or some taken away, more details resolved, focussed on or given more prominence, but it’s 
still a similar enough ‘lump’ in intensional space for us to be able to communicate.  And, although 
the way the world is ‘carved up’ may change, the categories can still be regarded as natural.  As our 
language changes, due to cultural progress, we refine the concepts we use to categorise and make 
inferences depending on how useful they are, which in turn depends on the way the world is. 
In the cognitive sciences, the obvious candidates for projectable terms that enter generalizations on 
the basis that they share causal properties are the folk psychological categories of beliefs and desires 
that enter intentional explanations like, ‘A person who desires X and believes that doing Y is a way of 
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getting X will do Y (all other things being equal).’  The question then is: is the autonomy of these 
explanatory schemas threatened by the fact that in a physical universe where there are no 
‘mysterious’ forces at work, all ‘special scientific’ kinds must be realised by, and supervene on, 
physical kinds?  In the next chapter, we will address this reductionist worry through a subtler 
understanding of what it is to be physical, to be reducible, and to be causally closed.  This refined 
understanding will then be used to show how the account I am defending allows for an autonomous 
realm of psychological causation within a physical world. 
 
  
36 
 
Chapter 2: Physicalist Reductionism 
The status of cognitive states like beliefs as natural kinds that can enter into causal explanations is 
threatened by reductive arguments purporting to show how such higher-level states are nothing 
more than a convenient shorthand for the complex causal explanations involving the fundamental 
kinds of the physical sciences.  Before countering this threat head on, we should first make sure we 
are clear about the terms of the debate, namely, what does reduction involve, and what is the 
nature of this physical stuff to which everything is argued to reduce to? 
2.1 Reducing Reduction 
The status of psychological terms like beliefs and desires as kind terms in explanatory scientific 
statements is dependent on the ontological status of the intentional mental states they refer to.  
This status may be threatened by reductionist arguments that claim, in brief, that in a physical world, 
it is the causal powers of the matter that constitutes such states that do the actual causing.  This 
debate can be seen as parallel to the individualism/holism debate in the social sciences, where it 
may seem to make sense to say that causal generalisations about social entities are entirely reliant 
on causal generalisations about the individuals who comprise those entities.  In response, holists 
point to how the social groupings we belong to, and the positions we hold within them, influence us 
as individuals, which is a sort of ‘downwards’ causation, from social to individual.  We can find 
significant regularities not only in the behaviour of individuals in certain kinds of positions in certain 
types of groupings, but also in the circumstances under which various types of groups emerge.  Such 
social entities, then, have a causal existence; they are visible to the scientific method.  But there is an 
asymmetry between the social and individual levels of description: the latter is necessary for the 
former but not the reverse.  Individuals can exist without social grouping, but not vice versa (see 
§3.3 Supervenience & Realisation).  This asymmetry is less strong than it may first appear, though, as 
there is something necessarily social about humans.  From the point of view of cognitive science, we 
need to understand (at least) three complexly interwoven mutually influencing realms: biology and 
its interaction with the physical environment (this is the same for all organisms), and both of these 
realms’ relationships with the social environment (this is true for social organisms).  A full 
understanding requires all three aspects. 
In the relationship between the physical and psychological there is also an asymmetry: the latter 
needs the causal resources of the former, and many would conclude (like the individualists) that this 
means that the latter entities are mere fictions of convenience, shorthand for the real explanations 
that are too complex to comprehend.  Fictionalism about psychological states is advertised as a 
response to eliminativism, by making it meaningful to talk about them without making risky 
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ontological commitments (Daly, 2008).  Sometimes fictionalism may be the correct stance, for 
example, with regards to numbers it makes sense to avoid committing ourselves to their 
independent existence and restrict ourselves to using them to make useful truth claims.  The same 
may be true of laws of nature: the law of gravity may be usefully imagined to be a force that is 
pushing things around, and use this, in combination with air resistance, to calculate the trajectory of 
a falling object.  I will argue for a more robust ontological commitment to psychological states, by 
showing both how they are useful, and how they come to be in the world with the causal properties 
they have.  Like social entities, psychological ones have an informative history, a past that explains 
their present.  Different pasts may lead to the same physical present, but unless you understand the 
past of this thing, and what it shares with the pasts of things we would count as similar enough to 
group under a kind term, then we will be able to make fewer meaningful predictions.  Without such 
a robustly realist account of mental states, they will be too insubstantial to support other important 
aspects of being an autonomous agent with minds of our own (see §7.2 Mental Causation). 
This is where I would distance my position from Dennett’s (1987) ‘intentional stance.’  As Hutto 
(2013) argues, Dennett’s ‘mild-realism’ is equivocation; if talk of mental states is only true in an 
instrumental sense, because the physical level of explanation is practically inaccessible, then it is a 
form of fictionalism, which leaves folk psychology as a kind of myth and pushes advocates of such a 
position down the slope to eliminativism (Hutto, 2013, p. 597).  Folk psychological explanations are 
not necessarily confabulations: the fact that we can be wrong about our understanding of the 
reasons for our actions implies the possibility of sometimes being right: some narratives are factual 
(Hutto, 2013, p. 600).  Where I would disagree with Hutto is that I hold that reason giving can be a 
true explanation of action even where the mental states being referred to are subpersonal states, as 
when we explain the actions of other people and animals (see §4.1 Mental Kinds). 
The motivation for defending anti-reductionism within a physicalist ontology comes not just from an 
intuition that there is a level of ‘intentional causation’ distinct from aggregates of microphysical 
causal processes, but also from an aversion to the kinds of explanations of cognitive traits that refer 
only to physically ‘respectable’ facts, e.g. involving DNA or neurons.  The fact that scientists claim to 
have found a gene that explains brain size does not eliminate the need for non-genetic explanations 
of the need for a large brain.  That would be to make the mistake of only looking at synchronic 
causes (see §2.2.1 Causal Closure).  The presence of the gene provides one kind of explanation for 
brain size, but then we have to ask for an explanation of why that gene spread so rapidly and widely 
through the population.  The broader explanation would refer to the adaptive importance of tool 
use and large cooperative groups.  The presence of tools and political groupings become 
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environmental resources and constraints that shape individual development and the evolution of 
the species (see §5.2.1 Evolution). 
The idea of constraints is important, with the most important constraining factor being the nature of 
physical stuff itself.  Matter constrains the possible course of events, but does not alone determine 
what, with those constraints, emerges.  Constraints can partly cause new things to appear with 
properties that are projectable: e.g. flowing water will form whirlpools in certain conditions.  These 
emergent phenomena are, of course, wholly composed of physical matter, which is describable in 
terms of physical causal laws, but which nevertheless exhibit causal properties not ascribable to the 
parts but only to the whole, e.g. that of being able to suck down floating objects.  If the laws of 
physics are at base indeterminate, these properties may be genuinely novel, but, in the case of 
phenomena like that of fluid dynamics, they are still physical causal properties.   
Reproduction and selection take such emergent properties and ‘frees’ them as kinds in their own 
right: they don’t just emerge from the interaction of physical kinds each time like the first, but cause 
physical kinds to come together to form the next generation of those biological kinds.  An 
indeterminate physical event, like that which happens when strands of DNA are recombined, causes 
the emergence of a macro-phenomenon, like an abnormally large brain.  But then something more 
happens: that large brain causes the big-headed organism to be reproductively successful, and that 
strand of DNA becomes a gene that is inherited and reinforced by environmental constraints.  This is 
life, and the causal properties of such living organisms are no longer describable using purely 
physical terminology.  The same could be said of the mental kinds in psychological organisms.  In 
these cases the new level of causation ‘bubbles up’ from the existing sea of forces and spreads 
outwards.  As we will see in the case of cognition, the evolutionarily emergent objects of selection 
are complex, virtual machines (§6.1 Virtual Machines).  Before we come to giving that account, 
though, we need to address the arguments given for and against reduction about mental states and 
statements that cite them in explanations of action.  
The classic kind of reduction proposed by logical positivist philosophers like Nagel (1961) is analytical 
reduction, where ‘bridge laws’ act as translation principles between generalisations in the language 
to be reduced and those in the language of the reducing theory.  This requires strong covariance, 
where (in the case where statements about X’s are being reduced to statements about Y’s) each Y is 
sufficient for X, and X is sufficient for the disjunction of Y’s that may realise X.  This account raises 
many questions, like whether disjunctions of properties can be kinds (Armstrong, 1978), whether 
disjunctive reductions should be barred, or whether general facts supervene on particular ones.  
Davidson’s (1980) anti-reductionism instead targets nomological reduction.  Here, rather than asking 
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if statements can be translated, nomological reduction requires that the empirical laws of one 
theory can be accounted for by the empirical laws of another (Davidson’s argument being that 
logical positivism’s failure shows the impossibility of providing analytic reduction, and secondly, 
since the mental realm is anomalous, that there are no laws to be replaced in a nomological 
reduction – see §2.2 Physicalism).  We will return to these questions after a detailed presentation of 
the debate on the status of the so-called ‘special sciences’ between Fodor and Kim. 
 
2.1.1 The ‘Special’ Debate 
In the 70’s, Fodor argued for the autonomy of the ‘special’ sciences (Fodor, 1974), these being 
sciences with laws that are not re-stateable in the laws of the sciences that govern the behaviour of 
the matter out of which the objects of these sciences are composed.  The standard account of 
reduction at the time was Hempel’s, where a law at one level can be said to be reduced to a lower 
level when ‘bridge laws’ are found that allow a ‘translation’ from the language of the higher level to 
that of the lower.  So, for example, it could be claimed that statements in chemistry about the 
properties of the elements and their combination can be stated in the language of physics, 
mentioning atoms, electrons, etc.  Fodor argued for the autonomy, i.e. non-reducibility,  of the 
‘special sciences,’ meaning non-physical sciences like psychology or sociology, on the grounds that 
such sciences contain natural kinds that are multiply and heterogeneously realised.  He took a 
natural kind to be a class of objects which fall under a causal law as either antecedent or 
consequent.  So, if we have noticed a causal regularity among a class of objects, and those objects 
do not share sufficiently similar physical characteristics for us to reclassify them as physical rather 
than special-scientific kinds (i.e. they are multiply realized), then there is not a physical level law to 
which the special-scientific law reduces.  It can be illustrated with this diagram:  
  
The arrows represent causation and the dashed lines realization.  It illustrates cases where there is a 
causal relationship between two non-physical kinds, and where these may be physically instantiated 
in a variety of ways.  Further, although there may be causal laws connecting the instantiating bases, 
these laws are between kinds that do not fall under a single class at the physical level, or there may 
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be no physical law at all.  This heterogeneity at the level of the realization bases means that bridge 
laws between higher and lower-level phenomena cannot be found, since bridge laws should be 
biconditional (i.e. given a bridge law it should be possible to infer M from P and vice versa) whereas 
causal laws are simple conditional statements (i.e. given M1, M2 can be inferred).  Thus, reduction via 
bridge laws is blocked due to the inability to infer the realization base given the realised higher-level 
kind.  This is because the higher-level kinds are realised in ways that are insufficiently similar.  It 
could be argued that there are species-specific bridge laws, where the realisation bases would not 
be ‘wildly’ heterogeneous.  However, it seems to me that even within species we wouldn’t want to 
tie ourselves down to particularly narrow definitions of realisation bases.  If the various kinds of 
physical states that can realize the non-physical kinds are ‘wildly’ disjunctive, and as such do not 
form a kind, they would not share many properties apart from the fact that in certain circumstances 
they happen to realize certain non-physical kinds.   
Fodor illustrated this disunified picture of the sciences with examples such as oxbow lake formation 
in geology and money in economics.  Oxbow lakes are formed by rivers despite differences in the 
mineral make-up of the land through which they flow.  We can make meaningful generalizations 
about money despite the fact that money can take the form of a bank-note, an electronic trace, or a 
conch shell.  In response it could be said that in the case of oxbow lakes, the real dynamics are 
happening at the physical level, that our statements about oxbow lakes are mere useful shorthand 
for a very complicated story, but that if that story were told, rather than a reduction we would have 
an elimination, since we could predict the same events (better, given no restriction on 
computational power) despite the heterogeneous realization of what we call oxbow lakes.  In the 
case of money it could be said that what plays the causal role is our beliefs about money, not the 
stuff we accept as money due to the conventions of the society we live in.  Here we have meandered 
into the area of beliefs and their consequences, of explanations that cite such phenomena as beliefs 
as antecedents in causal generalizations.  Are they like oxbow lakes: rough and ready shorthand for 
the impossibly complicated true causal story of neuronal firings, chemistry and ultimately physics; 
are they things that only exist in the stories we tell each other and ourselves about our behaviour, or 
is there a robust sense in which beliefs, desires and other intentional mental states play an 
irreducible causal role?  That is, are intentional mental states natural kinds in that they have causal 
natures of their own? 
Fodor says reductionism implies ‘every natural kind is, or is coextensive with, a physical natural kind,’ 
where natural kind predicates are ‘bound variables in a science’s laws’ (Fodor, 1974, p. 690).  
However, the ‘special sciences’ make interesting (i.e. counterfactually supporting) generalisations 
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‘about events whose physical descriptions have nothing in common,’ e.g. money and psychological 
states (Fodor, 1974, p. 691).  Thus, if higher-level kinds enter into laws but reduce to disjunctions of 
physical kinds, then the reducing ‘laws’ will have disjunctive antecedents and consequents, which 
may be logically equivalent to the original law, but will not themselves be laws, since their bound 
variables will not be natural kinds, as they will not be projectable (Fodor, 1974, p. 695; Kim, 1992, p. 
520).  The upshot is that we must either give up the idea of higher-level kinds, or give up 
reductionism and accept a token physicalistic ontology implying an event/property dualism (in 
contrast with substance dualism) (Fodor, 1974, p. 689).  Fodor urges us to towards the latter. 
Kim, on the other hand, argues that, given the principle of the causal individuation of kinds, 
reductionism is unavoidable: the realisation bases could not be ‘wildly’ heterogeneous, since then 
the higher-level kinds would not be sufficiently homogenous to form a kind (Kim, 1992).  He argues 
that if special-scientific kinds supervene on and are realised by physical ones, then, given the causal 
closure of the physical domain, the causal power of the ‘higher’ kinds comes from that of the lower.  
Thus, there is reduction to each realisation base, so no higher-level kind in fact (Kim, 1992, p. 523).  
To deny this would be to accept some sort of downward causation (violating causal closure) and 
‘magically’ emergent powers.  Since the physical is causally closed, and events cannot be 
‘overdetermined,’ all causal properties are inherited from the realiser, and non-physical kinds cannot 
have a causal nature to call their own. 
Here are the main steps in the argument, which will be expanded on below (Kim, 1992, p. 136): 
1. Events are instances of property instantiation. 
2. Emergence: for a causal property to belong to an autonomous realm of investigation, its 
causal powers must be novel. 
3. Supervenience: all properties are physically realised and dependent on physical 
properties. 
4. Downward causation: given emergence and physicalist realisation, for one event to 
cause another, it must also cause its realisation base. 
5. Physical causal closure: every physical effect has a sufficient physical cause, so the 
realisation base of the caused event has a sufficient physical cause. 
6. Exclusion: given the presence of a sufficient physical cause, there is no room for another, 
‘downward’ cause. 
Kim uses the example of jade as a purported natural kind, multiply realised by two distinct chemical 
kinds, his conclusion being that jade is not a natural kind because the similarities between the two 
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kinds are accidental, in that they are separately explicable by reference to the respective chemical 
kinds. 
In response, Fodor accuses Kim of picking a fight with a straw man.  Indeed, jade is not one kind but 
two, and so not projectable.  But functional properties like pain are projectable, and are multiply 
realised.  He makes a distinction between multiply-based properties that are disjunctive and 
multiply-based properties that are disjunctively realised (Fodor, 1997, p. 153).  Kim ‘wants to just 
stipulate that the only kinds there are are (what he calls) local.... In effect, Kim wants to make it true 
by fiat that the only projectable kinds are physically homogeneous ones’ (Fodor, 1997, p. 161).  We 
will return to the issue of locality later (§3.1 Causation). 
The exclusion argument is analysed in Humphreys (1997b, pp. 1-2), looking at a similar argument 
that assumes mental events are not physical events and concludes that mental events must be 
causally irrelevant: 
1. If an event X is causally sufficient for an event Y, then no event X* distinct from X is causally 
relevant to Y (exclusion). (This needs to be supplemented with a synchrony condition.) 
2. For every physical event Y, some physical event X is causally sufficient for Y (physical 
determinism). 
3. For every physical event X and mental event X*, X is distinct from X* (dualism). 
4. So: for every physical event Y, no mental event X* is causally relevant to Y 
(epiphenomenalism).  
In these arguments, some technical vocabulary is carefully defined, but some equally important 
concepts that are from everyday language are left somewhat vague and unanalysed.  A key word is 
‘event,’ which we may think is unproblematic since we all know what events are.  However, a lot of 
work is done by this word, and our everyday understanding needs careful examination, which is the 
task of the next section. 
 
2.1.2 Stuff Happens 
An event is something that happens.  Classically, they happen to objects (apples fall, fallings don’t 
apple).  But some would say objects are events, in that they are not static and unchanging, but are 
happenings at a time and space.  Or are events just facts?  And, how ‘fine grained’ are events? 
Kim relies on a ‘property instantiation’ account of events.  Events are the coming to be of causal 
properties at a particular place and time: ‘We may consider talk of ‘event kinds’ as equivalent to talk 
of ‘properties’ of events, since every property of events can be thought of as defining a kind of 
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event, namely, the kind comprising events with that property’ (Kim, 1996, p. 59).  When something 
happens, what happens is that a certain (causal) property is instanced.  It is these properties that are 
then plugged into his argument.  However, things might not be as simple as he makes out. 
Equating events to instances of properties is to conflate facts and events; describing things 
differently results in different facts.  Kim says ‘Brutus stabbing Caesar’ and ‘Brutus killing Caesar’ are 
different events (Kim, 1976).  But did Brutus, after stabbing Caesar, have to perform another action, 
namely, killing him?  After all, there is on the face of it only one action, and so one event, being 
described differently.  Facts are too fine-grained.  Kim tries to side-step such attacks by 
distinguishing between ‘constitutive’ properties and ones referred to in ‘extrinsic’ descriptions (Kim, 
1976, p. 318).  This may prevent there being ridiculously many different events happening at the 
same time and place, but the thrust of the objection remains: to count this instance of stabbing as 
one event and this instance of killing as another is to count too many events.  There may be different 
explanations for why Brutus stabbed Caesar and for why he killed him, but explanations are geared 
to propositions rather than to what the propositions are about.   
Compare Davidson: ‘It is not events that are necessary or sufficient as causes, but events as 
described in one way or another…. Events are identical if and only if they have exactly the same 
causes and effects’ (Davidson, 1969, pp. 301-6).  So, the causes of stabbing are different from the 
causes of killing in that a knife is necessary for the former but not the latter.  That is to bring in a 
counterfactual element, though: the knife is not necessary because Brutus could have used poison.  
However, here we are talking about a factual event in the actual world, which can be variously 
described as stabbing or killing.  Different descriptions do entail different explanations, because the 
description directs our interest, and so affects what is relevant, in a particular way.  We can talk 
about the different causes of stabbing and killing, so either we accept that they are different facts, or 
we say that various possible causal descriptions attach to an event and give it its identity.  Such 
complex entities would not be very useful as a basis for generalisations though, as each event would 
be unique.  Either way, it is the causal properties named in descriptions that can form the basis of 
the general statements we are interested in. 
Kim could also be attacked for his reliance on a property instantiation account of eventhood.  His 
reductive conclusion doesn't follow if we take events to be ‘bare’ occurrences, which may be 
described in various causal ways depending on our interests.  For example, the shot that killed 
Archduke Ferdinand could be described as the event that started the First World War, or as the 
event that ruptured his heart, and so on.   Of course, given that we want to be realists about the 
world we are describing, the structure of the occurrence constrains the possible descriptive 
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properties we can clothe it with, but that doesn’t mean that events are property instantiations as 
there is a many to one relationship between properties and the events they describe, unless an 
event is identified with all the possible properties that could be used to individuate that event.  But 
descriptions cannot have such ontological clout; rather they are like indexicals: they point to an 
event, rather than constituting it. 
But can't we ask, ‘What is it about that event that makes it the event that we take it to be?’  That is, 
what gives that event the identity it has in our world?  There are many ways it could be described, 
but not all these are of the same status, since some of them are necessary in that they would be 
found in all conceivable, nearby possible worlds (nearby in that they resemble the actual world 
enough for us to be able to say that it was the same event).  Physicalism is committed to there being 
only one kind of stuff, not one kind of thing.  What counts as the same depends on the description it 
is under, of course.  In terms of being the event that caused the First World War, it wouldn’t matter 
if a different kind of gun were used.  In terms of being the firing of a 1910 Browning, changing the 
gun would make it a different event.  Thus, every change could make an event a different event 
under some description, so events are not independent of the properties used in our descriptions of 
them.  What counts as an event of a particular kind depends on the kind of explanation we are going 
to use the event in.  It makes no difference to the explanation of the causes of the First World War 
that it was a 1910 Browning.  It does make a difference that it was a Serb nationalist who pulled the 
trigger.   
So, we can separate those properties that are essential to an event under a particular description by 
seeing what can and cannot be varied while retaining its explanatory power in the intended 
explanation.  If in all the possible descriptions of this event that could be called the same event the 
intentional facts are present, then these are necessary to the identity of the event.  And if these are 
necessary (and reductionism is false) then the physical parts of this description cannot be sufficient.  
Indeed, they might not even be necessary (except in that there must be some suitable physical facts: 
he couldn't have killed him with a peach).  If the Archduke had been stabbed by a Serbian 
Nationalist, it would still have been the event that started WW1.  If he had been shot by a psychotic 
Austrian, it would have been a different event.  But if we are interested in explaining what killed the 
Archduke, the wielder doesn’t matter, the weapon does.  So, events can be seen as instantiations of 
certain ‘core’ causal properties, and Kim's argument might still go through on these, since if these 
properties include mental properties, there is still going to be a conflict between the causal powers 
of the event as described mentally, and the causal powers of the physical supervenience base of 
those mental properties. 
45 
 
Either events are unanalysed things (one thing happened when the Archduke was shot, but it can be 
described in different ways, as his assassination or as the start of the war), or events have structure 
(two things happened but they have the same physical-level description).  Can we really think of 
unanalysed events though?  How do we enumerate them?  Can we point and say, ‘That is an event’ 
without giving some description to specify what aspects of the world are being pointed at?  Without 
the descriptions by which we categorise, there is just an undifferentiated and unbounded boiling sea 
of change. 
Putting the potential vulnerability of the property instantiation account of events aside for the 
moment, Kim's argument also relies on a causal theory of reference of kind terms, where kinds are 
baptised by acts of ‘original ostension’ (Kim, 2005, p. 113), the term referring to all and only those 
objects that share essential microphysical properties with the original object (Kripke, 1972). But, as 
pointed out above (§§1.2 Are Natural Kinds Found or Made?, 1.3 Rigidity), baptism doesn't work by 
ostension alone (LaPorte, 2004); some description is necessary, and the extension of kind terms is 
also decided partly by convention.  However, perhaps the reductionist argument can be recast in 
terms of the causal properties used in explanations that refer to events as described.  On that 
assumption, let’s look at the other premises in Kim’s argument. 
For the exclusion argument to work, events need a strong sense of causal identity, which may be 
given by supervenience if we can identify a higher-level property instance with a collection of lower-
level property instances, that is, where the causal properties of the supervenience base can simply 
be added up to give the causal properties of the supervenient state (Humphreys, 1997a).  However, 
this assumes that each individual part of the whole is still a separate entity, and they are all acting 
together at each moment (if supervenience holds synchronically), rather than those individuals now 
being subsumed in a larger whole in such a way that they no longer can really be said to exist as 
individual objects.  This stronger sense of ‘fusion,’ where individual parts no longer have separate 
identities as such, is a variety of emergence.  Causal closure may be maintained diachronically (see 
§2.2.1 Causal Closure), as we could trace a causal chain back to a time when the parts were involved 
in independent events.  If, however, we broaden supervenience to allow a temporally extended 
supervenience base, then it is doubtful that supervenience can still do the job Kim requires of it. 
The key to Humphreys’ argument is the notion of ‘fusion,’ by which he means a real physical 
operation by means of which separate physical entities become parts of ‘a unified whole in the 
sense that its causal effects cannot be correctly represented in terms of the separate causal effects’ 
(Humphreys, 1997b, p. 10) of the constituting entities.  This is because the causal properties that 
some of those entities had as individuals have been ‘used up’ in the process of fusing.  Thus, it is a 
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mistake to see microphysical parts making a causal contribution to a whole.  In a way there is a bi-
directional set of constraints: the properties of the whole are constrained by the nature of the 
composing parts, and, at the same time, the properties of the parts are constrained by the whole in 
which they partake. 
We could talk about the causal properties of the individual entities that compose to make the larger 
entity, but those causal properties are not the same as those they had before; they are now 
determined in part by context, by being a part of that whole.  So, to speak of each part having its 
own causal properties, which are added up to form the causal properties of the whole, is to miss the 
fact that the parts have those causal properties because of their context.  This is always true in a 
sense; causation is never context free, and ceteris paribus clauses can’t cover up that untidy fact.  In 
the case of such fusion, the context that is the macro-entity takes its parts with it; it is an entity 
because it persists, and because it persists (and takes its causal properties with it) we can make 
predictions about it.  Of course, we can choose to focus on the causal properties of the parts, and 
there may be good reasons for doing so sometimes (e.g. in investigating a disease), or we can choose 
to take it as a whole, or indeed as part of a wider entity (e.g. a population).  But that doesn’t mean 
that calling an organism an independent entity is arbitrary, as it is the locus of complexly 
interweaving causal processes, knotted (‘fused’) together.  It is natural to take such an entity as 
independent because of the amount of explanatory work that this can do. 
For Lowe (2008a), talking of events as having causal properties is misguided.  Lowe advocates the 
view that all causation is substance causation, that is, the causing of events by substances: 
‘causation is fundamentally a matter of substances exercising their causal powers to act upon other 
substances possessing suitable causal liabilities’ (Lowe, 2008a, p. 164).  For example, a magnetized 
piece of iron acts upon some nearby iron filings to make them move towards it.  Talk of event 
causation is not wrong, just not ontologically fundamental: ‘Events consist in the doings of 
substances.... They are mere changes in things and not the source of those changes’ (Lowe, 2008a, p. 
342). 
By substance, Lowe means an ‘individual substance’: an ontologically independent entity that bears 
properties, stands in relations to other substances, persists through time and undergoes qualitative 
change over time. The causal powers and liabilities of these substances are a species of disposition, 
‘intimately connected with the natures of those substances, with what kinds of substances they are 
and how they are constituted’ (Lowe, 2008b, p. 166).  What he calls ‘the philosophers’ myth of event 
causation’ is probably a hangover from positivism’s insistence that ‘science is only concerned with 
recording observable events and noticing their patterns of recurrence, [whereas] real science is 
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concerned… with revealing the causal mechanisms underlying and explaining recurrent patterns of 
events’ (Lowe, 2008b, p. 166).  When it comes to what constitutes us as substances known as human 
agents, he rejects the ‘Humean’ view of persons as ‘bundles of perceptions.’  We are not constituted 
by mental events, but are substances that ‘have’ those events.  So, humans are ‘psychological 
substances,’ and as such have causal powers. 
If we take causation to happen between ‘property instance atoms’ (Humphreys, 1997b, p. 13), which 
are properties of a psychological subject (‘substance’ in Lowe’s terms) and do not decompose unless 
they are interacted with in such a way that they are no longer parts of the causal chain, then the 
parts of which they are composed are taken along for the ride as parts of that emergent individual.  
This rejects the assumption that the only way to cause a higher-level property is to cause its 
supervenience base.  Macrophysical as well microphysical entities have irreducible causal properties, 
since, if, when looking for causes, you only see microphysical causes, then you will miss much of 
what is happening; I have a causal history going back to my birth, at least, even though none of the 
atoms in my body may be the same as then, but, if you think the only really existing things (as in 
causing things to happen in the world) are microphysical particles, then I do not really exist.  This is a 
conclusion I would like to resist. 
In response, a reductionist could say that while it might be useful to describe a rock as a whole in 
order to make predictions, given enough computational power it would in theory be possible to 
make the same predictions, or even better (whether or not determinism is true) without making 
reference to the ‘rock.’  In the case of an organism, however, the level of description that takes it as 
a single instantiation of a natural kind is, I would claim, the ‘best’ level of description, in that the 
lawlike statements that those kind terms enter into do not reduce to (their predictive power is not 
‘trumped’ by) statements that only involve kind terms from physical science (whereas lawlike 
statements about rocks perhaps do).  The feedback dynamic inherent in biological evolution, which 
gives evolved organisms their special place in the ontology of the universe, is also found in the realm 
of cognition, where there are the evolution-like processes of social evolution and individual 
development.  In the case of animals like ourselves, which develop in an environment where 
language is a vital developmental resource, and where self-ascription of mental properties allows 
social and personal ‘evolution’ to feed off each other (due to, for example, expectancy effects in 
selective perception), the process of naming mental kinds itself (through scientific endeavour) 
affects the kinds that emerge (see 5.2 Feedback and Feedforward). 
If there are such causal properties, then they will be visible to science.  Higher-level kinds are 
realised by collections of lower-level ones, and so there is always a description of what happens at 
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the physical level.  However, the explanation of the higher-level kind requires an evolutionary-type 
story, where the explanatory role will be played by the higher-level kind not the lower-level 
descriptions.  These matters will be explored in detail below (Chapter 3: Levels of Causal 
Explanation). 
 
2.2 Physicalism 
For something to cause a physical event, it must itself be physical.  This is in essence the principle of 
the causal closure of the physical used in Kim-style reduction arguments.  It seems innocuous on the 
face of it, which is probably why Kim doesn’t argue for it, assuming it is something that all good 
physicalists would accept (Kim, 1992).  However, under the surface of this principle are some 
assumptions worth unearthing.  Causal closure and causation will be the focuses of the next two 
sections; here I will look at the grounds of physicalism itself. 
What is a ‘good’ physicalist?  I take it to be someone who doesn’t resort, or tolerate others 
resorting, to mysterious, spiritual, or otherwise non-physical forces or entities to explain the 
existence of the mental, whatever that is.  That verges on being circular and trivial, though it will 
serve as a starting point.  This is not the place for a survey of the dualist debate, but clearly there is 
something non-trivial about saying that the mind is physical.  If someone claims that their intuition is 
that the mind is physical (because they have been brought up as ‘good’ physicalists), the fact that 
they are right doesn’t mean that they know what they are saying (Democritus may have been right 
that all matter is composed of atoms, but he didn’t know what that meant).  It is a mystery how my 
experience of being in the world could be a purely physical thing, just as my cup of tea is, even 
though there is (probably) nothing it is like to be a cup of tea.  All the atoms in my tea could be 
described, and there would be nothing more to know about what it is to be tea.  But most 
(unindoctrinated) people feel that a description of them down to the atomic level would somehow 
miss something essential, namely, what it feels like to be them.  Kim asks the question like this: ‘How 
can there be such a thing as consciousness in a physical world, a world consisting ultimately of 
nothing but bits of matter distributed over space-time behaving in accordance with physical law?’ 
(Kim, 2005).   
The physicalist position (or rather, the physicalist methodological precept), often takes it for granted 
that we know what we mean by ‘physical,’ but closer interrogation may reveal some ‘smuggled’ 
assumptions.  Berkeley defines it as ‘an inert, senseless substance, in which extension, figure, and 
motion do actually subsist’ (Berkeley, 1710, §9).  He shares this assumption that it is senseless with 
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Descartes and his followers.  But, why assume this?  Panpsychists challenge it (see §6.3 Panpsychism 
& Composition), and even if we don’t, it is instructive to ask why we assume it, and furthermore to 
state the conditions under which something composed wholly of matter could acquire sense.  
Physicalists who believe that there is something about the arrangement of the matter in bodies like 
ours that make them suitable to experiencing sensation also disagree with Berkeley, but not in the 
same way as panpsychists (see §3.4 Emergence). 
Physicalists like me, then, are committed to there being only one kind of stuff in the world, not one 
kind of thing.  That is, there is more to us than particles following physical laws, but that something 
more is not from outside the physical world, or in any sense separate from the physical.  I assume 
that no physical laws are broken in building things with minds, and that a purely natural explanation 
can be given for the existence and nature of our mental properties.  There may, then, be at least two 
senses of what we mean by ‘physical property’ when we say that all properties are either physical 
properties or supervene on physical properties.  One is that they are the kinds of properties that 
physical theory tells us about, the other is that they are the kinds of properties that ‘paradigmatic’ 
physical objects are made up of.  Moreover, although these may be the same set of properties, they 
also may not be (Stoljar, 2009). 
Stoljar also subtly distinguishes the completeness question (What does it mean to say that 
everything is physical?), from the condition question (What does it mean to say that everything is 
physical?), and argues that we should focus on the latter: ‘If Thales says that everything is water, or 
Up-to-Date-Thales says everything supervenes on water, we don't understand what he says unless 
he says something about what water is. The physicalist is in the same position’ (Stoljar, 2009). 
If we are tempted to define the physical (by define I mean doing more than giving an ostensive 
definition a la causal theory) by referring (deferring?) to physical theory (theorists), then we are 
stuck by Hempel’s dilemma: we can either define the physical with regards to current physical 
theory, or to some future completed physical theory; the first horn is unattractive given that we can 
assume our current theory is in many ways incomplete and mistaken; in the second case it is trivial, 
since we don’t know what the completed theory will be like, so we can just say it will include 
whatever properties we find.  Kim openly opts to take the second fork: ‘…biconditional laws would 
allow the rewriting of the laws of the reduced as laws of the reducer, and if any of these rewrites is 
not derivable from the pre-existing laws of the reducer, it can be added as an additional law’ (Kim, 
1990, p. 18).  However, given that neither option is acceptable (plus the logical fact that there are no 
options between them), we should conclude that we cannot define physicalism by reference to 
physics. 
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Recently there has been an interesting trend in metaphysics towards rejecting the kinds of 
physicalism that rely on causal arguments of the kind Kim utilises, e.g. Ney (2016).  These are 
labelled neo-Russellian, as they are similar in spirit to Russell’s position of neutral monism, which 
claims that although there is a single kind of substance, which can manifest either physical or mental 
properties, it is not itself characterisable as physical.  These neo-Russellian positions reject 
arguments from the causal completeness of physics to the exclusion of mental causes since there 
are in fact no causes at the microphysical level.  One of the main arguments against microphysical 
causation is that generally accepted microphysical laws are ‘time-reversal invariant,’ whereas 
causation requires there to be a temporal asymmetry: causes happen before their effects.  It is only 
when microphysical parts are gathered into wholes that can be lumped together in multiply realised 
kinds due to their trajectory in the direction of increasing entropy that causal statements can 
meaningfully be made (Ney, 2016, p. 148).   
I will not be investigating such positions further here.  Suffice it to say that if a form of neo-Russellian 
physicalism turned out to be correct, it would help rather than hinder the case for non-reductive 
physicalism, as it agrees that mental causes are not excluded by physical ones, and that causes are 
correctly seen as applying to objects and states composed of physical stuff, the causal properties of 
these being constrained by, rather than determined by, the nature of the composing matter and its 
context.  Furthermore, the idea that it is multiply-realisable objects in dynamic, diachronic processes 
that are the loci of causal statements resonates with the account being defended here. 
Chalmers (2002) includes another kind of Russellian position in his taxonomy of types of physicalism.  
Panprotopsychism is the idea that in order to explain the presence of consciousness in a physical 
universe, the physical ultimates out of which everything is composed must have some properties apt 
to lead to consciousness, properties that are not captured by physical theory, for, as Russell pointed 
out (Russell, 1927), physics talks only of the relational properties between bits of matter, but is silent 
on what intrinsic properties these bits might have.  We will return to these arguments below (§6.3 
Panpsychism & Composition). 
Another species of physicalist in Chalmer’s taxonomy is characterised as accepting interactionism, 
emergentism and property dualism, and rejecting physical causal closure.  Chalmers calls this a type 
of dualism, in that it is a property dualism, but it is still a kind of substance monism.3  I will defend a 
version of functionalism that fits this category, Virtual Machine Functionalism, which has the benefit 
of being a valid intermediate position between type and token physicalism.  Type physicalism claims 
                                                          
3
 According to Chalmers, such Type-D dualists include Foster 1991, Hodgson 1991, Popper and Eccles 1977, 
Sellars 1981, Stapp 1993, and Swinburne 1986. 
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that for every distinct higher-level type (like a kind of mental state) there must be a corresponding 
type of physical state.  However, this has the consequence of our not being able to talk about 
humans sharing kinds of mental states with creatures who are physically dissimilar.  Token 
physicalism on the other hand merely requires that each instance of a higher-level kind is identical 
with some physical state, without requiring any commonality between these realising states. This 
permits functional definitions of mental states to be given, although some would question whether 
such states are indeed respectably physical (e.g. Jackson (1998) calls functional properties ‘onlooker 
properties’ rather than counting them as physical).  It is this kind of ‘looseness’ in the ties between 
the mental and the physical that opens the door for Kim-style reduction arguments, as there has to 
be some relation between the kinds of physical states suitable for realising mental states.  There are 
other possibilities between type and token, though, loose enough to allow in the kind of 
functionalism being advocated here, but not so tight as to lead to reductionism (c.f. Cussins’ 
construction constraint (1990, pp. 374-8)). 
Another well-known argument for physicalism which utilises some not dissimilar assumptions to 
Kim’s is Davidson’s (1970, p. 116).  The assumptions are: 
1. The principle of causal interaction: ‘at least some mental events interact causally with 
physical events.’ 
2. The principle of the nomological character of causality: ‘events related as cause and effect 
fall under strict deterministic laws.’ 
3. The anomalism of the mental: ‘there are no strict laws on the basis of which mental events 
can be predicted and explained.’  
 
The argument goes like this: 
a) Mental event m causes physical event p. (by 1) 
b) Under some description m and p instantiate a strict law. (by 2) 
c) Strict laws must be physical laws, not psychophysical laws. (by 3) 
d) If m falls under a physical law, it has a physical description. (by definition) 
e) If m has a physical description, it is a physical event. (by definition) 
f) m is a physical event. 
 
Davidson’s account is ultimately unsatisfactory, in my view, because of the claim that mental events 
are strictly anomalous: if there are to be meaningful scientific explanations about human behaviour 
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that refer to mental causes this cannot be the case.  He assumes that the mental is fundamentally 
different from the physical, then shows that the mental is physical if it is causal (see §3.3 
Supervenience & Realisation).  The nature of causation, laws and their relation to the mental will be 
investigated further below (Chapter 3: Levels of Causal Explanation).  For now, we will work with a 
version of the standard argument for physicalism from Lowe (2000): 
There are 3 assumptions: 
1. A physical causal closure principle (see next section). 
2. At least some mental events are causes of physical events. 
3. The physical effects of mental causes are not causally overdetermined. 
Conclusion: at least some mental events are identical with physical events. 
Now, let’s look closely at the first assumption.  A lot rides on this principle, but, as mentioned, it is 
often taken for granted. 
 
2.2.1 Causal Closure 
We’ve seen the principle of causal closure of the physical (henceforth PCCP) used in an argument for 
reduction (§2.1.1 The ‘Special’ Debate) and for physicalism in general (§2.2 Physicalism).  It is often 
assumed that any right-minded physicalist should accept this principle without argument, but if it is 
used in an argument for physicalism, that is question-begging.  We should ask what form this 
principle takes precisely, whether there are different possible understandings of it, and whether it is 
the same principle being used when arguing for reductionism and physicalism.  I will claim that the 
principles adverted to in the above arguments are distinct, and that the one used in arguing for 
physicalism is acceptable, while the other one is not. 
Lowe analyses the different interpretations of the PCCP, some being stronger than others, and 
concludes that if it is too strong then it is question-begging, but too weak and it fails to establish the 
conclusion.  His argument is that there are ‘various forms of naturalistic dualism, of an emergentist 
character, which are perfectly consistent with the strongest physical causal closure principles that 
can plausibly be advocated’ (Lowe, 2000, pp. 572-3).  If a PCCP is to be used as a premise in an 
argument for physicalism it shouldn’t be so strong as to stipulate the desired conclusion, but if it is 
weakened (e.g. to a diachronic principle – see below), then it allows for the possibility of non-
physical causation.  As an example of a weak version Lowe gives: 
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1) Every physical event which has a cause has a sufficient physical cause (Lowe, 2000, p. 575). 
This is not strong enough to rule out naturalistic emergence because of the transitivity of causation 
(the physical cause could be a historical one).  The stronger version that Kim needs in order to get his 
conclusion should be synchronic: 
2) At every time at which any physical event has a cause, it has a sufficient physical cause 
(Lowe, 2000, p. 576). 
Causal closure principles that don’t include a stipulation that the causes must be concurrent with the 
effects can allow for diachronic emergence and downwards causation, given the transitivity of 
causation (Lowe, 2000, pp. 575-576). 
For completeness, it’s worthwhile listing the variations on PCCP that Lowe distinguishes: 
(1A) All physical effects have sufficient physical causes. (D. Papineau) 
(1B) All physical effects have complete physical causes. (D. Papineau) 
(1C) Every physical effect has a fully revealing, purely physical history. (S. Sturgeon) 
(1D) Every physical effect has its chance fully determined by physical events alone. (P. Noordhof) 
(1E) No physical effect has a non-physical cause. (S. Sturgeon) 
(1F) Every physical event which has a cause has a sufficient physical cause. 
(1G) At every time at which any physical event has a cause, it has a sufficient physical cause. 
(1H) Every physical event contains only other physical events in its transitive causal closure. 
Lowe doesn't go into detail about the first four, but the discussion of the last four can be applied to 
them. 
He says (1E) is too strong, since it renders redundant the non-overdetermination clause in 
arguments against downward causation. (1F) on the other hand is too weak in that in conjunction 
with premises (2) and (3) (of the above argument for physicalism) it doesn't entail the conclusion 
because it doesn't take into account the transitivity of causation. (1G), which he says is close to Kim's 
formulation, also fails to rule out nonphysical causes, since it doesn't rule out the possibility of 
simultaneous causation, where a physical state P has a sufficient physical cause, P', which causes P in 
part by causing a mental state M, which is also an immediate cause of P in that ‘it is not the case that 
in the absence of either one of them P would still have occurred’ (Lowe, 2000, p. 577). This sounds 
like he's taking P' and M to be individually necessary for P, which is something I would endorse, but 
since P' is (synchronically) sufficient for M, and given the transitivity of causation (which is a 
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conceptual principle, not just a temporal one), then P' is sufficient for P, and M is epiphenomenal, in 
that it doesn't have an interesting causal role of its own. 
Lowe, though, wants something stronger than (1F), proposing (1H), where by ‘transitive causal 
closure’ he means the immediate causes of P, the immediate causes of these causes, etc.  He says it 
is weaker than (1G) ‘in that it does not imply that any physical event has a sufficient physical cause’ 
(Lowe, 2000, p. 582), and that this gives it an empirical advantage over (1G) in that it is consistent 
with probabilistic causation.  Here, in order to give mental kinds a role, he makes a distinction 
between causal events and causal facts, where the latter are facts about what certain physical 
events cause: M causes it to be a fact that P' causes P, which doesn't violate (1H) because M isn’t an 
immediate cause of P', although it is a cause of sorts.  
I don't think this works though: if it is the case that P' wouldn’t have caused P unless M also 
occurred, then M is a necessary condition for P, just as P' is.  I don't think a clear distinction between 
causal facts and causal events can be maintained: how does M cause it to be the fact that P' causes P 
if it isn't a causal event with an effect that is also a causal event? 
I take from the foregoing that a ‘weak’ PCCP, one which allows for emergence, is sufficient to make 
an argument for physicalism but not for reduction, and a strong PCCP, which can be used to argue 
for reductionism, is question-begging in terms of an argument for physicalism.  In other words, there 
is no problem with a principle of the form, ‘everything is caused by things that are made up of 
physical stuff and no other kind of stuff,’ but there is a problem with principles of the form, 
‘everything is caused by things made up of physical stuff and whose causal properties are 
describable in terms of the causal properties of their constituent matter.’  This can be seen in terms 
of the arguments given above (§2.1.2 Stuff Happens) by Humphries (1997a): objects are formed by 
the fusion of parts; no new parts emerge, but a new whole does; it is a whole in that it has causal 
properties that are not merely the causal properties of the parts added up.  The causal trajectory of 
the parts is tied up with that of the whole it is a part of to the extent that in order to predict this 
trajectory, you would have to refer to the whole.  
Therefore, physicalism can be concluded without ruling out emergence.  Emergent causation 
organises matter in such ways as to have certain causal properties (it builds machines), which are 
determined by the evolutionary process not the constituent matter (the power to cause things being 
derived from their being designed to extract, store and use energy from the environment).  These 
are kinds of causation not captured by physical science, which is interested in causal regularities 
holding between its own fundamental kinds (that is, if physics is interested in causes at all). 
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This view of objects seems intuitive, which I take to be an advantage, but it does need to be fitted 
with an appropriately philosophically sophisticated account of causation in general.  Such accounts 
exist, for example in the notion of ‘mark transmission’ (Salmon, 1984), where a thing can be said to 
have diachronic continuity to the extent that the stages of that thing are sufficiently causally related.  
The next chapter is going to explore in detail the concept of causation (§3.1 Causation), advocating a 
‘difference making’ account, linking this to explanation and scientific laws (§3.2 Explanation).  We 
will then be in a position to give a detailed characterisation of notions that have been used liberally 
in the above, namely supervenience and realisation (§3.3 Supervenience & Realisation), leading to a 
characterisation of emergence (§3.4 Emergence). 
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Chapter 3: Levels of Causal Explanation 
3.1 Causation 
What caused the explosions in London on 7/7/2005?  There are many possible partial answers: 
British foreign policy; the emergence of radical political Islam; evil terrorist criminals; the beliefs & 
desires of the four bombers; the triggering of an electrical current in the presence of acetone 
peroxide; the birth of my daughter during the night.  Apart from the last one, which would be an 
irrational belief resulting from an attempt to make sense of the coincidence of two significant but 
unrelated events, all the others seem to be valid to an extent, in that they seem to have some 
explanatory value.  Explanation will be analysed further below (§3.2 Explanation), but here we will 
look at the nature of causation and the relationship between the various types of cause. 
What makes all but the last causal explanations plausible is that they could be said to have played 
some important part in bringing about the event, which could be analysed by saying that without 
being preceded by the aforementioned states of affairs, it wouldn’t have happened.  For example, in 
the counterfactual situation where everything else is the same but the terrorists had forgotten to 
put batteries in their triggering devices, there would have been no explosions.  On the other hand, if 
my daughter had not been born in the night but everything else were the same, we think the 
explosions would have happened anyway.  Another way of putting this is to say that causes are 
individually necessary and jointly sufficient for their effects.  Furthermore, we assume that other 
states of affairs sufficiently similar to the ones mentioned would have the same effect.  For example, 
whether the batteries are alkaline or lithium based would make no difference, as long as the 
temperature is held constant within certain bounds.  This leads to the important matters of 
repeatability and generalisation in relation to causation. 
I assume one of the main aims of science is to classify the world into kinds with causal powers in 
order to explain, understand and control the world.  I also assume (as a physicalist) that the only way 
to have causal powers is to be made of (or supervene on) physical stuff.  Therefore, in an important 
sense, our account of causation is prior to our understanding of natural kindhood.  If, on our 
understanding of causation, the only suitable causal relata are objects found in the generalisations 
of basic physics, then there will be no valid causal generalisation involving beliefs as beliefs, 
therefore no genuine causal powers of beliefs, and thus, on the above understanding of natural 
kindhood, beliefs could not be natural kinds referred to in scientific statements about the causes of 
actions. 
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This accords with Fodor: ‘causal powers... in the psychological case... supervene on local neural 
structure.... mind/brain supervenience(/identity) is our only plausible account of how mental states 
could have the causal powers they do have’ (Fodor, 1987, p. 44).  Fodor also says that these kinds of 
assumptions are inherent in the very concept of science itself; that science must operate by 
classifying things into natural kinds, each of which possesses intrinsic causal powers (Rockwell, 2007, 
p. 59). 
But science does not necessarily require that we can spell out exactly how higher-level causal 
relations are realised physically.  Causal statements are abstracted from individual observations, 
which generally don’t involve the microphysical components of the observed system.  Newton and 
subsequent generations of physicists didn’t say how gravity works, but based on observations, we 
have little problem saying that an unsupported apple will fall to the ground due to gravity.  Likewise, 
the lack of neural ‘spelling out’ of intentional explanations of action does not invalidate them as 
causal statements, on the assumption that no ‘spooky’ action at a distance is invoked. 
Thus, an important question for any theory of causation, whether it be a counterfactual analysis, a 
regularity based account, or one that refers to causal powers, is to what extent it is realist about 
causation.  Are causal statements about person-sized objects merely reflections of our epistemic 
limitations, which could always be supplanted by the micro-causal story of the composing ultimates, 
whatever they be?  Can we be realist about physical causation without ruling that talk of mental 
causes be eliminated?  (As hinted at, my answer will be that we can be realist about mental causes 
while holding that everything is wholly composed of physical stuff, which places strict constraints on 
what things with minds can cause, and what kinds of minds they have.) 
Relatedly, philosophers often stress the importance of distinguishing epistemological questions from 
metaphysical ones: metaphysically, we may hold that all causation is a matter of material micro-bits 
banging into each other, but when it comes to producing actual statements about how objects will 
behave causally, we remain limited and so must rely on ‘rougher’ causal statements that refer to 
macro-objects and may be riddled with exceptions.  However, I question the clarity of this 
distinction.  Do we have any means to answer the question ‘What is a cause?’ apart from thinking 
about the world as it presents itself to our scientific enquiries?  Can we just assume that the world is 
such that it is made of atomic particles which do all the real causal work?  The argument for 
physicalism above (§2.2 Physicalism) does not provide sufficient a priori grounds for this further 
claim about causation; it merely says that all causal processes must involve physical parts, that 
possibilities are constrained by this fact, but not that all such processes are the additive result of the 
causal processes of the smallest physical parts, whatever they are. 
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Another problem with relying on the metaphysical hunch that all causal statements must ultimately 
be ‘cashable’ in terms of the causal properties of the fundamental things objects are composed of, is 
that our causal statements are then held hostage to the fortune of causation at that fundamental 
level.  If, as held by neo-Russellians, the notion of cause is inappropriate at the fundamental level, 
then our higher-level generalisations will suffer ‘causal drainage.’  If it turns out that the physical 
ultimates do not have the kinds of causal properties we are used to in the everyday world, for 
example, if there are uncaused or purely random events, then the tactic of analysing macro-causal 
statements in terms of micro-causal ones will mean that causal properties leak away through the 
bottom of your metaphysical bucket.  That would leave us with a purely epistemological account of 
causal statements, and a correspondingly nominalist position on natural kinds.  This seems to make 
the causal generalisations we make in sciences that refer to the everyday objects we see around us, 
or to mental states, vulnerable to being falsified by empirical discoveries in physics.  However, as 
long as we can construct a robust and physicalistically respectable account of emergence (see 3.4 
Emergence), discoveries about the causal nature of base physical reality may explain and constrain 
the causal nature of larger scale objects without undermining the autonomy of causal statements 
about those objects.  
To put it another way: focusing on micro-causal atoms would mean not seeing the macro-objects 
they compose (like your body), as the atoms are born in stars and only briefly get caught in the 
space-time eddy that is you.  If objects like you cannot be part of the story that science tells us about 
the world, and science gives us our ontology, then you do not exist.  If you are not so philosophically 
self-destructive, then you should prefer a view of causation that allows science to include you in the 
arc of its narrative.   To make your body visible to causal narratives, we need a way to draw a 
boundary, to say when an atom is part of the story we are interested in when we are talking about 
your body, and when it is not.  Such boundaries are not drawn at the level of atoms, even though we 
may require that the boundary is drawn in a way that is consistent with explanations of higher-level 
causal properties in terms of lower-level ones. 
The problematic assumption that causation is, in the final analysis, a matter of the causal properties 
of the stuff that composes things, is of a piece with the problematic assumption that causes should 
be seen as universal regularities (the Humean account).  This picture sees the context within which a 
cause happens as an interference that prevents what would happen in the absence of confounding 
factors from happening.  On these accounts, these contextual factors are ‘externalised’ (or swept 
under the rug) from the regularity by ceteris paribus (all else being equal) clauses.   
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However, there are no contextless events, so no ‘neat,’ universal regularities.  In fact, the context 
enables causation rather than interferes with it.  Moreover, if a regularity account tried to include 
context in a statement of a universal regularity (rather than a tendency as in the capacities account I 
will be endorsing), the result would be a law for every particular event.  These ‘laws’ would be about 
never-to-be-repeated states of affairs, and therefore would not function as generalisations to be 
used in scientific explanation or prediction.  All events are particular, but science must try to abstract 
from particulars to make useful statements; if it tried to cover all particulars without abstraction, this 
would be like Lewis Carroll’s useless 1-1 scale map (see §1.5 Mapping).   
The solution, according to Cartwright (1999), is to ‘internalise’ ceteris paribus clauses by 
‘externalising’ causal properties.  The Humean approach is to see the causal properties of an object 
or state as intrinsic to it, as essential, non-dispositional properties, prevented from ‘pure’ expression 
by the context.  Thus the need to ‘cut out’ the context in order to see the causal properties express 
themselves without interference.  But nothing happens without a context in which to happen, so this 
is to assume that there is some sort of naturally neutral background that would allow the cause to 
bring about its effect unhampered.  However, there is no neutral background, no ‘view from 
nowhere.’  We can agree on a ‘normal’ background to take as a base, for example air pressure at sea 
level on earth in the case of the boiling point of water, but this does not allow us to see the intrinsic 
causal nature of water at work, since the choice of that background is contingent on facts about the 
planet we happen to have evolved on.   
In the ‘impure’ real world, where there are always interfering factors (i.e. a context), multiple ceteris 
paribus clauses have to be added to statements of regularity in order to maintain them.  Capacity 
accounts, like Cartwright’s, ‘internalise’ these clauses, since the causal capacity of something is 
defined as the capacity it has to bring about certain states of affairs in certain circumstances.  To 
take a living example, in the case of a micro-organism in the sea that uses light to direct it to 
oxygenated water, the context (i.e. that light reliably indicates oxygen, due to the fact that water 
near the surface is more oxygenated) cannot be ignored when describing the causal powers of (parts 
of) the organism.  Change the context, with a torch for example, and the state no longer achieves 
what it should.  A regularity account that ignores external context would only be able to say that the 
organism tends to react to light, but this does not adequately account for the presence of that part 
of the animal that has this property.  That part of the organism was selected for its tendency to 
direct the organism towards oxygen in Earthly seas, which it does by directing the organism towards 
light.  This is a more informative, more explanatory (it answers more ‘why?’ questions) description of 
the causal situation, and it makes causal properties ones that belong to objects in the world, rather 
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than being defined by ideally abstract laws that may be expressed in the world in a partial, 
encumbered fashion.  Causal laws are abstract because we do the abstracting for pragmatic reasons, 
to create useful statements about the structure of the world.  They remain statements about real 
objects in a messy world, rather than Platonic laws that only ever find imperfect expression. 
Since in a capacities account causal statements are about the kinds of causal capacities particular 
kinds of objects have in particular kinds of context, certain types of scientist are mistaken in their 
belief that they are uncovering universal regularities in the world.   Such scientists try to shield the 
objects they are interested in from the world of ‘interfering’ causes, and so say something universal 
about them, by isolating them in laboratory conditions, which Cartwright calls ‘nomological 
machines,’ as they are built specifically to produce such laws.  However, there is still a context, 
although a replicable one with clearly defined contextual factors.  This further demonstrates the 
error of the metaphysical assumption that the causal properties of objects are the additive result of 
the causal regularities of the atoms of which they are composed, which assumes that each atom has 
its own contribution to make to the whole, based on the laws it is following, rather than being itself 
governed by the whole it is a part of.  This view, while it might not be endorsed by physical scientists 
who see themselves as discovering the universal laws of nature, may serve as a useful corrective to 
the kind of ‘physics envy’ that practitioners in other sciences sometimes suffer from.   
As an illustration, think of a physicist falling through the air.  He might think that there is a natural 
speed, terminal velocity, that his body ‘wants’ to fall at, if it weren’t for the interfering factor of air 
resistance pushing against this.  He may calculate his actual speed by visualising this in terms of 
vector arrows with particular velocities.  However, the fact is that his body is travelling at exactly the 
speed it should, given the context.  If we took away the air, the context would be different.  But just 
as causes don’t happen without a context, physicists never fall in a vacuum. 
But, how do we individuate objects?  How do we draw boundaries around portions of the cosmos, 
the contextual causal properties of which we then discover?  As mentioned (§1.2 Are Natural Kinds 
Found or Made?), this depends on our understanding of it as a causal entity.  Therefore, we need an 
account of causation which is suitable both for the initial proposing of kinds of objects according to 
their typical causal contributions to their contexts, as well as for the subsequent investigations that 
will refine our understanding of such things.  Of course, wholes are made up of atoms and nothing 
else, so in what sense are the properties of wholes something other than just the properties of those 
atoms all added up?  We can start to give a general answer to this by looking at quantum physics, 
chaos theory or other examples of non-linear dependence.  The global set up of, for example, the 
double-slit experiment, affects the pattern of interference exhibited, which is not the additive result 
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of the behaviour of the parts.  Those, like Kim, who argue against higher-level causal properties, it 
seems to me, are implicitly assuming a classical, Newtonian framework.  Even in classical mechanics, 
however, there are dynamic, chaotic systems, like those found in fluids where the context sets up 
eddies that lead to emergent phenomena like whirlpools.  So, even more narrowly, reductionists 
seem to be relying on situations akin to those nomological machines Cartwright talks of, where 
contextual effects are, as far as possible, ruled out. 
There is a genuine question for positions like the one advocated here to answer, though: am I not 
moving from the pragmatics of being able to make useful generalisations to some sort of illegitimate 
reification?  Unlike the neo-Russellians mentioned above, I am not depending on there being no 
causation at the micro-level to reduce to, partly because it seems clear that the causal properties of 
the constituting matter play an important role in constraining the higher level.  I will attempt to 
answer this question by outlining my view of object individuation in the next section, with reference 
to difference-making accounts of causation and Mackie’s INUS conditions. 
 
3.1.2 Where to draw the line? 
Nothing can better show the absence of any scientific ground for the distinction between the cause of 
a phenomenon and its conditions than the capricious manner in which we select from among the 
conditions that which we choose to denominate the cause. (Mill, 1843, p. 198) 
Our nomination of certain aspects of the context preceding an event as a, or the, cause of that 
event, as opposed to being just part of the context within which the cause operates, is dependent on 
our explanatory purposes.  What to hold constant and what to vary is a decision we make relative to 
our interests.  In order to pick out the causes of an event, we have to be able to refer to the objects 
or properties involved, which requires separating background conditions from causes.  For example, 
when we say the spark caused the fire, the complete causal context includes the presence of oxygen 
in the atmosphere (without which the fire would not have happened), but we ‘background’ such 
regularly occurring conditions.  We can distinguish background conditions from causes by looking at 
the ‘nearby’ possible worlds: we say the spark is the cause, the oxygen the background, because the 
nearby possible worlds contain an earth like ours, with an atmosphere like ours.  This particular 
abstraction (‘sparks can cause fires’) is therefore of use to us.  
As with our drawing of lines between kinds of things, the fact that facts about us are relevant to 
where lines are drawn does not make those lines subjective in a ‘bad’ way.  That is, it doesn’t make 
those lines not part of the real world: given those facts about us, where those lines will be is an 
objective fact.  Mackie’s (1974) account concurs, describing causes as Insufficient and Non-
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redundant parts of Unnecessary but Sufficient causes (INUS conditions).  Here, we don’t need to 
identify the cause, as separate from background conditions.  The whole situation (spark plus oxygen 
plus combustible material) is sufficient to bring about a fire, but some other combination could have 
brought about the same event.  However, the spark is not redundant in an explanation of this 
particular event, even though it was not sufficient in itself to make it happen.  When we choose to 
describe the spark as the cause of the explosion, this is good for teaching how to make a bomb, but 
not for a socio-political explanation.  So, causal properties are relational, context dependant, and we 
choose among all the causal factors in play depending on our interests, and one of our interests is to 
discover useful generalisations we can apply in many situations, so we ascribe causal powers to 
kinds of object intrinsically because they have that property in many situations (knives cut many 
kinds of things).   
For the purpose of explaining actions in terms of their mental causes, we are interested in the kinds 
of things that can support the sort of causal mechanisms that can explain the causal link between 
events seen as cause and effect, that is, we are interested in events and their causal properties.  As 
argued earlier (§2.1.2 Stuff Happens), it is a mistake to say that properties are events: events can be 
described in a variety of ways depending on our explanatory interests, and causes are properties of 
events.  The causal properties can be described in physical terms, or mental ones, depending on our 
explanatory interests, without suffering the problem of causal exclusion – see below (§3.1.3 Making 
a difference).   
The picture is of causal properties as relations between event types that happen in and to certain 
kinds of objects.  This does not need to be an instantiation of a universal regularity, just something 
that is, or would be, useful for predicting and explaining those types of events.  We ascribe a causal 
power to a kind of object or event when we can reliably use that tendency to bring about other 
events in our predictions and explanations.  In the example of an explosion, depending on our 
interests, we could explain the effect by reference to either the causal power of sparks in the 
presence of volatile chemical mixtures, or the power of radical ideas in vulnerable minds.  In both 
these cases, the putative cause/effect relationship is not an instantiation of a universal regularity 
that played out without being confounded by other factors (e.g. moisture or surveillance); it is rather 
a statement of what tends to happen to certain kinds of things in certain kinds of contexts. 
This type of explanation, which refers to contextual tendencies rather than universal regularities or 
laws, clearly requires an alternative model of explanation from the traditional deductive-
nomological one, as this relies on the prior existence of laws in the form of universal regularities.  
This will be the topic of the next section (§3.2 Explanation), but here I will note that the idea that 
63 
 
causes require laws, as in the idea that to be a cause an event must instantiate a universal regularity, 
or the governing-law model, e.g. (Armstrong, 1978), where it is the law that drives the behaviour of 
the object, seems, to me, the wrong way round.  This would make instances reliant on properties, 
but rather, properties are abstracted from instances.   
Causation happens between individuals, and laws may be abstracted from many instances of 
causation if we can group them together in a meaningful way.  These laws, by which I mean 
contextualised generalisations, are not accidentally true local facts, and not instances of universal 
laws or regularities, because they are explained by the causal tendencies of the kinds of objects 
mentioned in the generalisations, in the kind of context we are taking as background conditions.  
When we cite such a law in an explanation or prediction, the explanatory or predictive power 
derives not from the law itself, but from the context-embedded instances it is abstracted from. 
 
3.1.3 Making a difference 
Before moving on from this necessarily brief discussion of causation, I will outline and endorse the 
analysis of causation as ‘difference making’ (List & Menzies, 2014).  The truth conditions for making 
a difference are as follows: the presence of F makes a difference to the presence of G in the actual 
world if and only if it is true in the actual world that (i) F□→G; and (ii) ~F□→~G.    
This solves a potential problem with the idea that causal relations hold between instances rather 
than properties, as outlined above, the problem being that this could lead one to make causal 
statements that are too ‘fine-grained.’  To use List and Menzies’ example, take several instances of a 
parrot pecking at crimson coloured spots.  One might be tempted to generalise from this to ‘Crimson 
causes pecking.’  But observations of crimson pecking only give us the first condition, that crimson is 
sufficient for pecking to occur.  It doesn’t satisfy the second condition, that pecking wouldn’t occur if 
the spot were not crimson, because it happens that parrots will peck things of all the various shades 
of red.  So, ‘Red causes pecking’ is the correct generalisation, which may be realised by instances of 
crimson.  They call this ‘proportional causation’: ‘Satisfaction of these conditions ensures that causes 
are specific enough for their effects, but no more specific than needed’ (List & Menzies, 2014, p. 6).  
As such, this account of causation is suitable for the kind of contextualised generalisations we are 
interested in here.  
One important implication of this account is that the exclusion principle is false (List & Menzies, 
2014, p. 10).  List and Menzies (2014, p. 3), state the principle thus:  
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If a property F is causally sufficient for a property G, then no distinct property F*, that 
supervenes on F, causes G (given physical causal closure).   
In the example given, red supervenes on its instances, one of these being crimson.  Crimson is 
sufficient for pecking, but it is the case, under this analysis, that red causes pecking, because it is not 
the case that there is no pecking when there is no crimson.  Obviously an account is needed for 
determining supervenience relationships in order for this to work.  This will be addressed below 
(§3.3 Supervenience & Realisation). 
Before looking at the implications of the views outlined for the special science debate, we need to 
look in some more detail at the concepts of explanation and law. 
 
3.2 Explanation 
3 statisticians go on a duck shoot.  A duck flies overhead, one statistician shoots low, another shoots 
high, the third shouts “We got him!” – David Foster Wallace 
Some, e.g. Pietroski (2000), take the view that whereas causation is a relation between events, 
explanation is a relation between facts.  However, it seems to me that both relations rely on 
abstraction in a way that makes them difficult to pull apart.  Facts, whether particular or general, use 
kind terms and properties to refer to and describe states of affairs.  Events, when related causally, 
are likewise taken to happen to particulars described using general terms (e.g. red things).  The 
picking out of a particular object or event depends to an extent on our categorical tendencies and 
explanatory interests.  Some ways of doing this may be ‘better’ than others because they more 
clearly track the dynamics of the actual world, but there is no single, true way of picking them out 
that is divorced from us.  
Of course, there are useful forms of explanation that are non-causal: the explanatory use of non-
causal laws (e.g. nothing travels faster than light), mathematical reasoning, symmetry principles, 
geometric laws, inter-theoretic relations, renormalization group methods, fact causation, statistical 
modelling, etc.  A detailed analysis of these is beyond the scope of the present work, but I would 
argue that they all ‘piggyback’ on implicit causal relations (see Skow (2014) for an argument of this 
kind).  I would say that proponents who overstate the importance of these modes of explanation are 
in the same position as the third statistician in the joke at the start of this section.  As with statistics, 
these methods are useful, but the reason that they are useful is that they manage to capture some 
causal facts about the world, even if they don’t refer to those facts explicitly. 
65 
 
Explanations are often answers to ‘Why?’ questions, but they can also be answers to ‘How?’ 
questions, and both may be required for a full explanation.  For example, in biology, giving the 
function of a trait explains why it evolved; giving a mechanical description explains how it works.  
There may be many possible ‘hows’ for each ‘why,’ and also, given different contexts, multiple 
possible ‘whys’ for each ‘how’ (e.g. exaptation): neither in isolation will give a full explanation. 
As an illustration, take the candiru fish of the Amazon.  This fish is reputed to swim up urine streams 
to its food source.  (It turns out this may be a myth, but it can still work as an example, swimming up 
a stream of thought instead.)  In order to achieve its ends, it will need to have a way to sense urine 
and its direction of flow, and to orient the fish upstream.  On identifying parts of the fish’s anatomy 
that seem to have a particular function, we can ask the questions ‘What is it for?’ and ‘How does it 
work?’  It could be that we start with a functional understanding and this leads us to look for the 
mechanism that achieves that end.  Depending on our explanatory interests, the answer to the 
question ‘What kind of thing is it?’ may require both.  The physical description will not be enough, 
since another creature could have exactly the same equipment for doing a different job, and since it 
evolved by a different route for a different purpose, it would be a different kind of thing.  The 
functional description will be insufficient because the same job could be done by a different 
mechanism, also with a different selective history.  It could be the case that swimming up a stream 
of urine was an ability selected for leading the fish to food, or leading it to a place to hide from 
predators.  The question of how a function is achieved is answered by citing the causally efficacious 
property that underwrites real explanations, but we don’t have to name that property itself in order 
to have an explanation of why a behaviour occurs.  Selection-based laws provide descriptions that 
allow this indirect explanation, because selection-based processes produce variably realised kinds 
(Papineau, 2010). 
If belief/desire explanations really are explanations, then they should be such that they can be used 
to form causal generalisations, and thereby be natural kinds.  For this to be the case, there must be 
physical, causally efficacious properties that underwrite these generalisations.  This, though, leads us 
back to the possible problem of the purported intentional-level explanation being excluded by 
sufficient ‘subvenient’ causes.  Before turning to the issue of supervenience (§3.3 Supervenience & 
Realisation) we will look at the relation between explanation and laws. 
 
3.2.1 Laws 
One reason we need to talk about laws is that we need a theory of the mental that contains real 
laws, rather than dispositional definitions, in order to create a theory that can explain the necessary 
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connections between the physiological and the phenomenological (Steels, 2003).  As we will see 
later (§6.2 Consciousness), we need there to be real laws involving the phenomenal in order to 
explain the impossibility of philosophical zombies.  If there is to be a genuine science of the mental, 
one that includes states like believing, then such states should be causally efficacious, and as a result 
should be useable in generalisation, categorisation, prediction, etc.  That is, we should be able to say 
things about them that have the form of laws.  However, objections are often raised to the effect 
that mental states cannot be subject to laws, not without losing their essential intentionality.  
McGinn (1978), for example, says that psychophysical laws can be ruled out because mental states 
are not natural kinds, this being because mental states fail to display the standard characteristics of 
natural kinds.  However, he only considers everyday usage of mental vocabulary, and generalises this 
to all mental talk (Cooper, 2005, pp. 70-71). 
Davidson (1970) says that although intentional states like beliefs and desires are causes, they are 
singular rather than lawlike, because they are reasons for action, but do not guarantee the action is 
performed: we can always decide not to do what we want.  Davidson sees the problem of 
psychological laws as their being not strict enough, in that they are ‘infested by ceteris paribus’ 
qualifications that can never be discharged.  Putting aside the question of whether it is possible to 
act against one’s desires freely, without introducing another desire to so act for some reason, the 
deeper problem that makes it difficult to see mental states as falling under natural laws is the 
assumption that laws are universal regularities governing the behaviour of things.  As argued above 
(§3.1 Causation), things don’t follow laws, laws don’t determine what things do; the way things 
behave determine the causal generalisations that we abstract from events.  If we adopt an account 
of causation that refers to contextual causal capacities rather than universal regularities, then these 
clauses can be eliminated, the cost of this being to localise the scope of the laws.  Since the causal 
capacities of organic kinds are relative to the environment in which natural selection worked, this 
should not be seen as a problem.  To extend this story to mental states, a selection story needs to be 
told for them that makes the mental state emergent and causally efficacious (see §§2.2.1 Causal 
Closure, 5.2.1 Evolution). 
It could be objected at this point that, on a view like this, where causal laws are seen as abstractions 
from individual events, laws cannot do explanatory work, as they are just re-descriptions of the data.  
My response is that the explanatory work is done by explicit reference to kinds of objects and their 
irreducible causal capacities.  Moreover, this view provides us with a strong response to views like 
Kim’s, which use principles like causal exclusion and closure to threaten the causal efficacy of mental 
states qua mental states. 
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The error of assuming a governing-law model, where laws are eternal, unchanging facts that 
determine the behaviour of every physical particle, leads to the also mistaken idea that all you need 
to do is add up the influence of these laws on each part that composes a whole in order to deduce 
the behaviour of that whole (see §2.2 Physicalism).  But, if laws instead are seen as abstractions, 
generalisations based on what we know about the behaviour of material objects, then we have no 
right to infer the universality of the laws we arrive at.  This is a version of Hume’s fork, for if 
everything follows universal law, and we know what they are and the positions of all particles, then 
the rest follows a priori; but if all we have is abstraction from limited observation, then nothing is 
ever certain.  The latter certainly seems more like the status of most science, apart from the most 
mathematical of them, but, as pointed out (§§2.2 Physicalism 3.1 Causation), they may have no 
place for causation at all, so we can exclude them from the present discussion.   It might be that laws 
have been different at different times in the history of the universe, that as the behaviour of matter 
changes depending on its context, so the laws change, since there is no such thing as a contextless 
bit of stuff.  So, as the matter contained within an organism has a different context, with properties 
that depend on its developmental, evolutionary trajectory, then why assume that the particles 
contained within are simply following the laws of physics, rather than being affected by biological 
and cognitive laws? 
The assumption that causation requires strict laws is a highly idealised picture taken from physics 
(and one that may not even be true in that field).  Capacity accounts like Cartwright’s don’t see laws 
in such strict terms, unless it is specified that the system is artificially isolated in experimental 
conditions specifically designed to isolate particular causes from their normal contexts (Cartwright, 
1999).  The way the causal closure of the physical is often portrayed is based on these narrow ideas 
of causal laws.  In reality, systems are never isolated like this, and the regularity account leads us to 
say that in uninsulated contexts there is a fundamental regularity being interfered with.  In the case 
of higher-level kinds of things like organisms and minds, they have causal capacities given their 
environment, and with kinds like these it makes no sense to ask how they would behave in isolation; 
their environment is a necessary part of the description of their capacities. 
To summarise: a capacities account of causation and laws, instead of looking for universal 
regularities that may be confounded by context, identifies the effects that kinds of objects tend to 
have within their context, thus ‘internalising’ the ceteris paribus clauses by making the contextual 
effects part of the cause rather than an external factor.  Rather than asking what universal laws are 
being interfered with, it asks what particular kinds of things tend to contribute to their causal 
contexts.  The context is thus part of the nature of a thing, making this a natural way to think of 
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causation in the case of evolved, embodied agents.  Laws don’t cause anything, things in the world 
do, according to their nature and context; laws are derivative (c.f. Lewis’ (1973) ‘Humean 
supervenience’).  Assuming a universal regularity which may be blocked by certain conditions means 
the job of science is often to specify these ceteris paribus clauses.  According to capacity accounts, 
the task of science is to ask what effects things have a (perhaps imperfect) tendency to produce in 
certain contexts.  Thus, with respect to mental explanations, a science of the mind should investigate 
the mechanisms and processes involved in producing behaviour and the idea of strictly law-like 
regularities is dispensable. 
Instead of trying to infer from observations what the laws are, we instead infer what causal powers 
objects have in the kinds of contexts in which they are observed.  Of course, the usefulness of 
generalisations is determined by a balance between generality and applicability.  We want to be able 
to apply scientific generalisations to as many situations as possible, without making them so ‘ideal’ 
so as to not apply to any in fact; and we want generalisations to apply to real situations without 
making them so specific that they are no longer general. 
A thing’s causal nature is defined by its typical causal contribution, and, in the case of evolved kinds, 
may require reference to its environment and selective history, since here-and-now physical causes 
may not be enough to determine what it was ‘designed’ for.  Here-and-now physical causes answer 
‘how?’ questions without answering all the interesting ‘why?’ questions: evolved kinds come to be 
for a reason, which explains their causal natures.   
To repeat, what is needed for explanation in the case of evolved mechanisms, like the ones we are 
assuming are behind decision making and action formation in cognitive beings like us, is reference to 
an evolutionary trajectory: what was it selected for?  This functional description provides 
explanation, and therefore grounds our claims that such mental states can be natural kinds as we 
can make true, causal, generalizable statements about them.  These functional properties supervene 
on the physical properties of the composing matter without reducing to the physical properties of 
that matter (they are emergent).  It is the defence of this claim that will occupy the next section. 
 
3.3 Supervenience & Realisation 
A first pass: A supervenes on B iff something happening to A necessitates something happening to B.  
For example, a belief X supervenes on brain state Y iff a change in belief (to not-X) cannot happen 
unless some change also happens in the brain-state.  The states upon which the higher-level states 
(e.g. beliefs) supervene, are said to realise those higher-level states.  The question is whether this 
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sketch of the relation between levels of description holds, and what the consequences of its holding 
would be. 
The notion of supervenience is of central importance to contemporary metaphysics and the 
reductionism debate, as it is advertised as a way of understanding the relationship between 
different levels of reality within a monist metaphysics.  It is supposed to be a way of understanding 
how certain properties can be real, in that they are physically realised without requiring any extra, 
mysterious forces, but are at the same time not reducible to statements about the stuff that realises 
them.  However, this raises the question of whether the fact that a mental state supervenes on 
certain physical states means that the mental state is ‘nothing over and above’ the physical states.  
Can we have mental kinds that are distinct from (i.e. irreducible to) physical ones ontologically, but 
which are composed without residue of physical kinds?  Before interrogating the notion in order to 
extract answers to these questions, I will first make some more general comments. 
There are issues around whether the kind of strong co-variation that supervenience offers is 
necessary or sufficient for the kind of dependence we want to ground our mental talk, and what this 
buys us at the explanation counter.  Is co-variation sufficient for us to say that a subject S is in 
mental state X because S’s brain is in physical state Y?  I would say that co-variance alone, no matter 
how strong, doesn’t get you the kind of dependence relation you need to buttress an explanatory 
claim; not all, or even most, of the interesting ‘why?’ questions are answered by a mere 
supervenience claim.     
Accepting a supervenience claim without further explanation of why that arrangement of matter has 
these mental states is unsatisfactory.  Identity claims without this leave the connection between the 
mental and the physical as contingent rather than necessary (Steels, 2003).  The conceivability of 
philosophical zombies (that there could be an exact physical replica of you that lacks your mental 
states) is an artefact of a mistaken analytic reductionism about mental terms, i.e. that mental terms 
are synonymous with the physical terms that describe their realisers.  Those aspects of mental states 
we use as ‘reference fixers,’ such as functional roles, should be seen as necessary in the same way 
that some aspects of water (e.g. its density) flow necessarily from its physical composition and its 
context. (See §6.3.1 The Living Dead)    
Token identity (the claim that each instance of a mental state is identical with some physical state) 
preserves physicalism (McGinn, 1978, p. 211) without the problems associated with type identity 
(the claim that every mental kind is identical to a physical kind).  Type identity doesn’t allow for the 
kind of multiple-realizability we require for mental kinds (e.g. that I can share a belief-type with you 
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without sharing a physical state-type).  However, it is unsatisfying to say that the mental kind is 
identical to the disjunction of possible realisers; this seems to be a kind of gerrymandering.  We 
need to say more about what kind of physical states are suitable for realising such mental states and 
why, in order to be able to make useful predictions and explanations. 
Kim uses the claim that the multiply-realized properties are disjunctive properties, and that such 
properties are not projectable, to argue that functional kinds are not scientific kinds.  Fodor, in his 
rebuttal of Kim's critique of his earlier theory about Special Sciences, makes a ‘distinction between a 
multiply based property that is disjunctive, and a multiply based property that is disjunctively 
realized’ (Fodor, 1997, p. 153).  Pain is a kind because it is a functional property which is projectable.   
One way to argue that reductionism of the mental to the physical will not succeed is to argue against 
the thesis that the mental supervenes on the physical (what McLaughlin (1984) calls a FIST, that is, 
‘argument by appeal to a false implied supervenience thesis’).  Do non-reductive physicalists need to 
argue against supervenience of the mental on the physical, or is it enough to show how 
supervenience is misconstrued by reductionist uses of the relation?  I will now turn to the ways in 
which the term can be construed in general, and in this debate in particular. 
There are various ways the supervenience relation can be stated and understood.  For example:  
mental phenomena (Ms) depend on physical phenomena (Ps) in that there cannot be any M events 
without P events; M supervenes on P if being P indiscernible implies being M indiscernible; M 
supervenes on P if there can be no change in M without a change in P; the supervenience base P for 
M is all those P-properties that are jointly sufficient for the M properties (Kim, 1992). It can be taken 
to be ‘weak,’ as in being true of objects in a particular world, or ‘strong,’ as in holding of objects 
across possible worlds (Haugeland, 1982).  It is normally taken to be an asymmetric and conceptual 
relationship, in that M supervenes on P but not vice versa, though whether this is something added 
to the basic idea of supervenience or inherent in it is open to question.  Supervenience itself doesn’t 
imply that M is ‘nothing but’ P, or that M is ‘explained away’ when we understand how it depends 
on P.  It just helps to understand the relationship between distinct descriptions of the world.  Where 
does the asymmetry enter, and does this change the nature of the relationship?  
As mentioned, the basic idea that all flavours of supervenience share is that if M supervenes on P, 
then there can be no difference in M without a difference in P.  This implies that if two cases are P-
identical then they are M-identical.  It is not taken to mean that P causes M, but that there is a 
certain relationship of covariance between P and M.  Clearly, there isn’t the asymmetry in this 
relation that most anti-reductionists would want: given a constant temperature, the pressure of a 
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gas supervenes on its volume, and its volume supervenes its pressure; there can be no change of 
one without a change in the other.  Strictly speaking supervenience can capture the kinds of intra-
level dependence of causal relationships (e.g. pressure, temperature, volume), or geometrical 
properties (e.g. the proportions of the sides of triangles), without saying that one is ‘nothing but’ the 
other and is thus ‘explained away’ (Humphreys, 1997a, pp. S339-S340).  To get the kind of 
asymmetrical dependence consistent with our intuition about the relationship between the mental 
and the physical (that the mental is dependent on the physical in a way that the physical is not on 
the mental), we have to introduce a ‘and not vice versa’ clause.  This asymmetry is what you would 
expect in versions of physicalism that want to allow for the possibility that there may be multiple 
ways for supervenient properties to be instantiated materially, since here facts about the realisation 
base will determine facts about the realised property, but facts about the realised property will not 
determine facts about the realisation base (although they might be constrained in interesting ways). 
What we want from the supervenience relationship is a way of capturing the relationship between 
realized and realizing properties and objects.  Moreover, we want a way of characterising the kind of 
multiple-realization we need for a functional analysis of mental phenomena.  Mental properties 
depend on physical properties, but physical properties do not rely on mental properties (in the same 
way).  This is a conceptual relation rather than a causal one in that the subvenient physical 
properties do not cause the supervenient mental properties; to do so they would have to precede 
them, whereas they are co-instantiated.  Thus, the supervenience base for any particular M is all 
those P properties that are jointly sufficient for the instantiation of M.  For illustration, it can be said 
that a statue of the president supervenes on the marble it is carved from in that the marble can 
change (e.g. through the chemical effects of weathering) without a change in the identity of the 
statue, but the statue cannot be changed (e.g. altering the features so it resembles a goat) without 
also altering the marble. 
In ‘everyday’ use supervenience means (or meant) something like, ‘to follow on from’: e.g. “By 
reason of the cold supervenient winter, I was tyed to the bed” (Hume, A. (1594) in (Kim, 1990)).   It 
was a causal notion, but one where the effect is singular and so unpredictable.  In philosophy, it is a 
specialist term, generally taken to be independent of this vernacular sense (McLaughlin, 2008).  I’m 
not sure the disconnect is so absolute, though.  It first came into philosophical use with the rise of 
emergentism in Britain, where it was used synonymously with ‘emergent’ (Morgan, 1923; Broad, 
1925).  Emergent phenomena follow on from, become naturally manifest in, but are not explained 
by, are in addition to, a certain set of circumstances (although the kind of ‘following on from’ is 
taken not to be a causal kind), and, importantly, the supervenience of M on P does not necessarily 
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entail that P explains M.  It may be the case that my feeling of ennui supervenes on parts of the 
physical world, including my brain, but that doesn’t mean that pointing at a splash of colour on a 
brain-scan will answer the question of why I feel like that.  Supervenience is still used in this way by 
many non-reductive physicalists (Kim, 1990).  Having said that, it seems true that our use of the term 
is not constrained by ordinary use in the way that concepts like ‘freedom,’ ‘cause,’ or ‘good’ may be 
(McLaughlin, 1995). 
The term was put to use by moral philosophy (Hare, 1952), to describe the relation between natural 
and moral facts, without reducing ethical facts to physical ones.  Contrary to those who say that 
there is no relationship between these two kinds of facts, it was claimed that it is inconceivable that 
two worlds could be exactly alike with respect to all natural properties while differing in their moral 
properties (global supervenience); there can be no moral difference without a natural difference, 
but there can be natural difference without moral difference.  This seems to capture a strong 
intuition.  How could it be the case that some possible world is exactly the same in all natural 
properties as this one but where the moral properties are different?  To say otherwise would be to 
accept that while in this world the invasion of Iraq on false pretexts was wrong, there is a possible 
world in which everything is the same except that it was right. 
In this sense there is much to recommend supervenience when it comes to understanding the 
relation between generalisations using mental vocabulary and the physical world that underwrites 
all events, if physicalism is true.  As laws are statements about general patterns in the world rather 
than governing principles, the nomological reduces to the definitional; and metaphysical reduction 
(in terms of everything being composed of physical matter) is achieved by showing how mental 
properties can exist in a physical world, without implying analytical reduction (which would be the 
case only if law-like statements involving non-physical properties could be translated without loss 
into statements referring solely to physical properties).   
The concept was introduced into the literature on the mind-body problem by Donald Davidson: 
‘there cannot be two events alike in all physical respects but differing in some mental respects’ 
(Davidson, 1970, p. 214).  He used it to formulate his theory of the explanation of actions, known as 
Anomalous Monism, the importance of which to the contemporary debate is such that it is worth 
briefly outlining it here.  Davidson takes it for granted that at least some mental events are causes of 
physical events, that events related as cause and effect fall under strict laws to that effect, and that 
there are no strict laws connecting mental events.  This last condition is the ‘anomalous’ part, which 
follows from the way mental explanations cites reasons, which may be beliefs and desires, and are 
related to other beliefs and desires in a holistic way not found in the realm of physical causes.  The 
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‘monism’ part is part of the attempt to dissolve the apparent contradiction contained in the three 
assumptions, and says that mental events are token-identical with physical events. That is, some 
events have descriptions that are mental descriptions, and also, by supervenience, they have 
physical descriptions. It is by virtue of having physical descriptions that they can cause other physical 
events in a way that can be made into a strict law; and it is by virtue of having mental descriptions 
that they can be related to other mental events in intentional explanations.   
Davidson gives us a picture of the relationship that goes beyond ‘mere’ covariance (which is 
insufficient to account for the ‘asymmetry intuition’ mentioned above), by showing how the mental 
depends on the physical without reducing to it. However, there is a tension between these two 
conditions: if M’s are too ‘strongly’ dependent on P’s, then reduction threatens.  If, like Davidson, we 
don’t want mental explanations to reduce to physical ones, then we will not want to endorse too 
strong a supervenience claim, despite the fact that it allows you to keep your intuitions about what 
grounds mental descriptions.  We will return to the question of the ‘strength’ of supervenience later 
in this section. 
Kim claims that the tension between being dependent on but not reducible to results in a failure of 
arguments against reduction that rely on supervenience.  For Kim, for a mental state (M1) to cause 
another (M2), given supervenience, it must cause its realising physical state (P2).  This is so-called 
downward causation.  But, given the causal closure of the physical, P2 must have a sufficient physical 
cause, and given causal exclusion, if P1 is sufficient for P2, then M1 is excluded as a cause.  It is only by 
being P1 that M1 causes M2, and M1’s causal power is dependent on P1’s.  If there is no causation 
between Ms, there are no causal laws involving Ms, so Ms are not natural kinds.   
However, the argument relies on the premises of causal closure of the physical and exclusion, but as 
pointed out above (§2.2.1 Causal Closure), these are not perhaps as solid a ground for Kim’s 
conclusions as he seems to assume.  Moreover, his argument relies on a causal theory of reference 
of kind terms, where kinds are baptised by acts of ‘original ostension’ (Kim, 2005, p. 113), which is to 
assume that we can pick out the essential causal nature of a thing by naming it, which I have also 
given reasons to question above (§1.3 Rigidity).  Most importantly for our present purposes, though, 
is the fact that the synchronic & diachronic (local & non-local) interpretations of causal closure are 
seldom adequately distinguished, and once we loosen these binding principles, there is, I will argue, 
room for an ontologically robust form of emergence.  Now, as there are a variety of supervenience 
concepts to choose from, we will consider whether there is one that is amenable to anti-reductionist 
arguments. 
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The ‘strength’ of a supervenience claim could be on a range from the weakest to the strongest.  
Weakest-supervenience states that the relationship only holds in this world, whereas strongest-
supervenience states that the relationship holds in all possible worlds.  Towards the weak end, we 
could have a supervenience relationship that holds in ‘nearby’ possible worlds, which resemble this 
one in some important respects but not others, for example it contains the same individuals with the 
same histories except for one fact that we manipulate in a supervenience thought experiment.  
Towards the strong end, we could distinguish between nomologically and metaphysically possible 
worlds.  If our supervenience concept is too weak, we won’t be able to hold onto our intuition that 
there is something explanatory in the relationship between the physical and the mental, as it would 
not necessarily be the case that two physically identical people in nearby possible worlds are 
mentally identical.  If our supervenience concept is too strong, multiple-realization will in effect be 
ruled out as there will be nothing left to describe after a physical description is given.  Kim-style 
arguments from supervenience to reduction rely on a strong version, as the weak one does not give 
him the kind of dependence required to ground mental states in local physical properties.   
Weaker versions do carry an explanatory burden, as one would have to say why the relation doesn’t 
hold under certain changes, but I do not think that burden is unwelcome, as I think we do want to 
give explanations of why the mental supervenes on some kinds of physical processes in some 
circumstances, rather than just taking it as a brute fact.  So, the interesting question is what strength 
of supervenience we should plump for.  Is there a medium strength version that is rich enough to 
ground mental states naturalistically in the physical world without being so strong as to lead to 
reduction? 
The distinction between weak and strong supervenience is modal, that is, it depends on whether the 
relation is a necessary one, and what kind of necessity we take that to be (e.g. logical, nomological, 
metaphysical) (Kim, 1990).  When we say ‘No M-difference without P-difference,’ is this meant to be 
true given the laws of nature, or the laws of logic, or something else?  One way of interrogating 
intuitions on this point is to consider the possibility of philosophical zombies (Chalmers, 1996): could 
there be an exact physical duplicate of you that is not a conscious thing?  If the mental weakly 
supervenes on the physical, there is no reason such a being couldn’t exist.  As well as there being 
things that we normally think of as minded not being so, there could also be things with minds that 
we usually don’t think of as having the right kind of architecture to have them, e.g. a super 
intelligent shade of the colour blue.  This fits with the kind of token identity that requires no further 
explanations.  If the mental strongly supervenes on the physical, such things are impossible: any 
being with the same physical goings on as you will have, as a matter of necessity, the same mental 
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goings on as you; and things without the ‘right’ kind of physical realisation could not have minds.  
According to Kim (1990), Davidson and Hare are using the weakest version, which is not strong 
enough for the reasons given.   
Another dimension of distinction between supervenience concepts is that between global and local 
supervenience.  McLaughlin gives the following definition of global supervenience:  
A-properties globally supervene on B-properties if and only if for any worlds w1 and w2, if w1 and w2 
have exactly the same world-wide pattern of distribution of B-properties, then they have exactly the 
same world-wide pattern of distribution of A-properties. (McLaughlin, 2008) 
He uses this to formulate physicalism, which it may be suited to, but for our purposes this suffers 
from a similar problem to weak supervenience: it doesn’t result in a kind of dependence between 
states and their realization bases that is informative.  It is consistent with there being differences 
that should be insignificant at the subvenient level that lead to wholesale differences at the 
supervenient level.  For example, it is consistent with it to imagine a very nearby possible world 
where there is one more atom of hydrogen on Jupiter and no mentality on an earth, despite the fact 
that everything on earth looks the same (Kim, 1990).  In other words, it doesn’t imply property 
covariance, and so can’t ground intuitions of dependence.   
The opposite, a strongly localist supervenience claim, both spatially and temporally, though, is 
inconsistent with the kind of multiply-realised, embodied, states we need to account for.  It leads to 
the kind of eliminativism that follows from a reductionist argument.  Is there a middle way?  Can we 
have some sort of ‘regional supervenience’ (Horgan, 1982), a form of individual supervenience with 
some of the advantages of global supervenience?  This kind of supervenience of an object over its 
parts may be called mereological supervenience.  In the case of mental states it is usually assumed 
that we are talking about the brain as the realisation base, but it may be that less or more than the 
whole brain is necessary for mental states to be instantiated, and that this may vary with the mental 
state in question (see §5.3 Externalism). 
Prinz (2006, p. 18) argues that in order for (what he calls) ‘wide’ supervenience to be the case (for 
experience to not just depend on the brain but also aspects of the environment), then it must be 
that experience can change while keeping the brain fixed.  (Prinz is talking about experience rather 
than mental states involved in action causation, but the arguments are parallel, and indeed 
inseparable, as I will argue later in §§5.3.1 Physical Bodies in a Social World & 6.2 Consciousness).  
However, it could be responded, plausibly, that if a change in the environment is to be constitutive 
of a change in mental state, then it would have to be the case that it is registered in some way in the 
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brain.  But, this wouldn’t show that the part of the world in question is not (partly) constitutive of 
the (experienced) mental state it is involved in, merely that a change in the brain is necessary also.   
We can accept that every experience has a neural correlate, while acknowledging that correlation is 
neither causation nor constitution, for we could resist the solipsism inherent in internalism: an 
experience of a cup is only an actual experience of a cup if it is in fact caused by a cup, and so the 
cup can be said to be part of what constitutes the experience, otherwise it is an experience just like 
the experience of a cup, an as if experience that is derivative of actual experiences.  Of course, 
standard, indirect-realist representationalism disagrees with this.  On that account, what we 
experience is the representation, and there is no difference between a veridical and non-veridical 
experience, except for their truth values.  This is equivalent to me showing you a picture that 
represents my table as having a cup on it; in the two possible worlds where the only difference is 
that in one there is a cup on my table and in the other there isn’t, the picture is identical in all 
respects, except in one the situation it represents is actual.  But this relies on a false picture of 
representationalism, one that is vulnerable to homuncular attack.  The representation is not 
between our experience and the world, it is our experience of the world, and if there is nothing to 
come between us and what we experience then we are not trapped in a Cartesian theatre 
experiencing the world only through projections on a ‘screen’; we experience the world directly and 
therefore there is a real difference between experiences that are of things as they are, and those 
that are not.  (See §4.3 Content)   
The disagreement between indirect and direct realist interpretations of representationalism is a 
boundary dispute: where do we draw the line around what counts as constitutive of a 
representation?  We are faced with the same question when we try to say what counts as a local 
property of an object or state in the sense of what constitutes its supervenience base.  This is 
undefinable separately from where we draw boundaries between what is internal and external to an 
object, and deciding this depends on a prior understanding of how to individuate objects, so cannot 
be used, pace Kim, as an argument for reducing said objects to their local, microphysical 
constituents.  To do so would be question begging, as it just assumes that the local, microphysical 
realisation is all there is to being an object of that kind.   
Realisation bases need to be causally sufficient for the realised properties, that is to say, the causal 
properties of the realised state are explained by the causal properties of its realisation base; the 
relationship between the two is not contingent.  This means that the supervenience base must be all 
those parts of the world that are jointly sufficient to realise the supervening object, and, if certain 
kinds of embodied, external cognition are the case, this base will be ‘wide,’ which undermines the 
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kind of ‘narrowly local’ assumption relied on by Kim (see §5.3 Externalism).  Noe (2006) makes 
similar points in his arguments against the idea that there are neural correlates of consciousness, as 
consciousness emerges from the dynamic interplay of neural and bodily action with the world. 
So, supervenience should be understood in a way that is sufficiently broad-minded to allow for the 
emergence of things and states that are not mere aggregates of physical things and states in that 
their properties cannot be synchronically reduced to the physical properties of local physical 
realisers.  On the other hand, it should be sufficiently conservative to satisfy our intuitions regarding 
the kind of explanatory dependence we expect there to exist between mental states and their 
immediate physical realisations.  These two constraints, pulling in opposite directions, result in 
something similar to the internal realism of Putnam (1981), or the position outlined in Mandik and 
Clark (2002): it is realist in that it provides a real connection between mental representations and 
the world out there; it is internal in that the form those representations can take not only depends 
on and is constrained by the way the world is, but also the situated, dynamic trajectory of the 
organism doing the representing.    
One of the constraints may be that a certain kind of realization base may be a necessary condition 
for a particular form to evolve.  It is conceivable that there is a world where organisms are silicon 
rather than carbon-based given that these share the property of easily forming compounds: given 
the kind of flexibility at the molecular level that is necessary to give evolution the variety it requires 
to work, there probably isn’t a world with gold-based organisms.  We can imagine the evolutionary 
history in the carbon and silicon worlds more or less following the same route.  In the case of each 
evolved kind, traits are selected according to the causal powers they have, with reference to the 
micro-properties that sustain these higher-level properties being generally unnecessary, since they 
are invisible to selection: it makes no difference to the process of evolution what element forms the 
basis of organisms, as long as it is suitable, although of course the element that does form that basis 
may make a difference to what traits are possible.  So, if it is possible that human-like brains evolved 
in both the carbon and silicon worlds, and if it is true that in human-like brains there are such things 
as beliefs and desires on which cultural evolution works, description of these mental kinds for the 
purposes of explanation/prediction needs no reference to carbon or silicon.  A suitable realisation 
base is like a near frictionless surface over which the forces of higher-level causes can slide freely. 
Supervenience is a conceptual relation that holds between certain properties and the properties of 
the substance that realises them, but it does not, I have argued, place reductive restrictions on 
ontologically distinct levels of properties that emerge through a process of evolution.  As with causal 
closure, a supervenience relation that is sufficiently strong to form the basis for reducing higher-
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level properties to their local, physical realisation base, is question-begging in that it merely 
stipulates that the local physical stuff that constitutes the mental state is sufficient to fully 
characterise that state.  Loosening supervenience to allow spatially and temporally extended states 
allows for ‘robust’ emergence and downward causation:  
Supervenience is acceptable as a consistency condition on the attribution of concepts, in that if A 
supervenes on B, you cannot attribute B to an individual and withhold A from it…. But supervenience 
does not provide any understanding of ontological relationships holding between levels.  For that 
emergence is required. (Humphreys, 1997a, p. S341)  
Explanations of why and how one kind of property supervenes on another (e.g. functionalist or 
teleological ones) are grounds for supervenience claims, and without at least the possibility of such 
explanations, these claims would be ones of faith.  When we have such explanations for 
supervenience, this has been called ‘superdupervenience’ (Horgan, 1993). Such explanations are a 
physicalistically respectable way of substantiating claims of emergence, which we now turn to. 
 
3.4 Emergence 
Emergence is the key to the metaphysical discussions outlined above.  If objects and states with 
novel properties, novel in not being contained in, or explicable in terms of, the properties of the 
realization base, can emerge somehow, then there will be true generalisations we can make about 
them that will not be reducible to statements about the composing matter.  If higher-level kinds are 
emergent against a background of the matter from which they emerge, then there must be 
something wrong with arguments that purport to show emergence to be impossible.  That may 
seem a strange way to argue, but I think it is a reasonably intuitive starting point.   
Strawson (2006) argues that if we accept mental phenomena are real and distinct in kind from the 
phenomena described by physical science, then either mentality emerges from the physical, or it 
must have always been there in some form.  Given that there are good reasons to reject the latter 
option (see §6.3 Panpsychism & Composition), then we should accept that emergence is possible.  
Therefore, there must be something wrong with arguments that purport to prove its impossibility.  
As pointed out above (§2.2.1 Causal Closure), this may be the use of causal closure principles, the 
proscription against over-determination, or both, and may result in a breakdown of (certain varieties 
of) supervenience.  In this section, I will distinguish various meanings of emergence, and defend the 
one I think most relevant for and true of mental phenomena. 
Firstly, there is no clear reason why the burden of proof should fall on the defender of emergentism 
rather than the champions of reduction, unless the question is begged by a metaphysical assumption 
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about the causal nature of the world, i.e. that all causes are describable by physics, or that physics is 
complete.  But physicalism does not require this; just that there is a natural explanation of how 
objects and states come to have the causal powers they do, through processes that have happened 
to things wholly composed of physical stuff without ‘outside’ intervention from mysterious sources.  
One reason physicalists seem to think emergentists owe them an explanation is that they think of 
that which emerges as being non-physical, and indeed some emergentists are out as dualists.  But 
emergentism can be defended within physicalism, and much of the talk of strict distinctions is a 
hangover from the dualistic past.  The distinctions between what is describable in mental terms and 
what is describable in physical terms is not a strict one; as pointed out above, the relationship 
between the physical and mental is an informative one.  Once the air of mystery about the mental is 
dissolved, we will see that the emergence of the mental from the physical is a natural thing. 
Silberstein (2002) says that both emergentists and reductionists feel that things are going their way, 
and agrees that the burden of proof is not carried by emergentists alone.  In the fight between 
reductive and non-reductive physicalism, both accept supervenience, but differ in their criteria for 
identifying natural kinds of one level with another.  For reductionists, identification depends on the 
presence of necessary links between higher-level and lower-level kinds, whereas for non-
reductionists it depends on whether or not the higher-level property enters into causal 
generalisations that do not follow necessarily from the generalisations of the composing material 
(Silberstein, 2002, p. 104).   
The essential ingredients in the recipe for emergence in a physical world are time and some 
‘looseness,’ in the sense of Cantwell Smith’s (1996) ‘flex and slop.’  He uses this phrase to capture 
the kind of open flexibility that exists in the ‘sloppy’ physical world, in contrast to an imaginary ‘Gear 
World,’ where every atom’s motion is intimately connected to its neighbours in a way that allows for 
no freedom: ‘Moths can fly into the night with only a minimal expenditure of energy, because they 
have to rearrange only a tiny fraction of the world’s mass’ (Cantwell Smith, 1996).  In the Gear World 
there would not really be any individual entities; everything would be intimately connected in a way 
that did not allow for distinctions.   It takes time, plus a little ‘flex and slop,’ for the stories of 
component particles to become so intertwined that they can’t be understood without reference to 
the whole dynamic they are a part of.  This ‘gappiness’ in physical law is what provides the ‘elbow 
room’ for entities to emerge over time, allowing dynamic processes of feedback to forge 
homeostatic wholes.   
Humphreys (1997a, pp. S341-342) gave a number of criteria characterising emergence.  To 
summarise the important ones, an emergent property is novel, in that it is a property that had no 
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instances previously.   An emergent property should also be one that cannot occur at the lower level 
(e.g. liquidity cannot be a property of a single water molecule), and is covered by different laws from 
its constituents.  As in the water example, emergent properties are holistic properties of the whole.  
Finally, emergent properties are the result of nomologically necessary interactions between their 
constituent properties. 
This final criterion, though, is silent on whether it is a synchronic or diachronic condition.  There is a 
difference between the way liquidity emerges from the interactions of water molecules, and the way 
a mature organism emerges from the interactions of the carbon and other atoms that constitute it 
and have been part of its evolution and development.  The latter is essentially a dynamic, diachronic 
process, whereas the former is just what happens when a sufficient quantity of H2O molecules are 
collected together under the kind of conditions normally found on the surface of the earth.  It is 
these necessarily diachronic kinds of emergence that I will focus on, and interpreted in this way I will 
take the following conditions to be necessary and sufficient for such ontological emergence as is 
found in the case of evolved, minded organisms.   
Novelty is not necessary in itself, as it is possible that by coincidence the same property emerges 
more than once, although it will be novel in the narrow sense of being new relative to the process in 
question.  (This is analogous to the distinction between being psychologically creative and 
historically creative in Boden (2004).)  Thus, one of the conditions is nomological novelty: emergent 
properties fall under causal generalisations that do not hold of the constituent parts.  Secondly is 
holism: emergent properties hold of wholes, these being collections of parts bound together by 
being part of a temporally continuous process.  Lastly, the emergent properties should be non-
mysterious, in that their emergence can be explained by reference to a temporally extended 
dynamic process. 
I have argued for the existence of natural kinds in the domain of intentional cognition (§1.8 
Cognitive Kinds), with the understanding that natural kinds enter into irreducible scientific 
generalisations, where these generalisations capture the causal capacities of situated objects.  If this 
account is right, then nomological emergence, where the laws that hold of higher-level entities are 
not determined by those that hold of the constituent matter, must be true.  Mere mereological 
emergence, which applies to the properties of wholes, is too weak.  This is because it cannot account 
for the emergence of natural kinds if natural kinds are defined by their shared causal nature, since 
having a shared causal nature will lead to there being true causal generalisations, i.e. laws in the 
sense argued for above, about such kinds.   
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In the classic account of nomological emergentism known as British Emergentism, e.g. Broad (1925), 
there were still bridge laws between the levels of description, but these laws were taken to be ‘brute 
facts,’ with no explanatory connection that would allow determination of the higher level given the 
lower-level facts.  In this account, there is a relation of strict token identity between the levels, and 
global supervenience is unviolated.    
However, this is not the kind of pluralistic nomological emergentism advocated by Cartwright (1999), 
and Dupré (1993).  In these accounts there are no bridge laws; the physical level provides only 
necessary conditions for the higher-level facts, leading to possible violations of global 
supervenience, because lower-level laws are not sufficient to fix higher-level laws, although the 
average effects of the probabilistic causal capacities of the composing stuff may be consistent with a 
variety of different higher-level capacities.  Similarly, McDowell (1994) talks of the lower level as 
providing necessary but insufficient ‘enabling’ explanations for the higher level.   
I find this account appealing, and amenable to the picture of the inter-level relations I am outlining.  
The lower level explains the possibility of the higher level, without explaining why the particular 
possibility that becomes actual does so.  To fully explain the properties encountered at the level of 
evolved creatures and developed minds a further story of the historical trajectory of those kinds of 
things is needed.  Before fleshing out this account, we should first clarify something about the 
relationship between epistemological and ontological emergence. 
Epistemological emergence occurs when the fact that higher-level properties are novel with respect 
to the lower-level properties is a reflection of our epistemic capacities or limits.  For example, in the 
case of chaotic systems, the properties of wholes cannot be predicted or explained by reference to 
the properties of the parts, and nor can those properties be fully represented using the theoretical 
or representational resources sufficient for understanding the parts.  The higher-level theory having 
a pragmatic advantage over a lower-level theory would be sufficient for it to be emergent in this 
sense.  In these cases neither mereological nor nomological supervenience are necessarily violated.  
This is consistent with the position of ontological reductionism, implying that given a reduction in 
philosophical, theoretical or empirical ignorance the illusion of emergence could disappear.   
This would leave us in the unsatisfying position of believing that the only reason we explain the 
actions of other minded creatures by referring to their beliefs is because of our own cognitive 
lacking.  But it may be that our higher-level explanatory theories are emergent due to the fact that 
the laws of the higher-level theory refer to entities that are ontologically emergent in the sense that 
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the lower-level phenomena (a description of the parts that compose the whole at any one time) are 
necessary but insufficient for the presence of the higher-level phenomena.   
The kind of emergence I take to hold in the case of mental phenomena, in that the causal 
generalisations we cite in explanations and predictions are emergent in the ontological sense that 
they refer to phenomena whose causal properties have emerged through feedback dynamics over 
time.  It is not mere epistemological emergence, since the reason those properties cannot be 
reduced to the causal properties of the composing mater is not just the result of our shortcomings as 
scientists.  However, as argued earlier (§1.2 Are Natural Kinds Found or Made?) it is also the case 
that the categories we use in our explanations are partly dependent on our perspectives and 
interests (there are many accurate maps that can describe a territory), and the choice of explanatory 
schema will depend on pragmatic factors as well as facts about the world.  This is consistent with a 
causal-mechanical model of inter-theoretic reduction that rejects microphysical reduction and 
‘focuses on explanations as characterising complex (nested and interconnected) causal mechanisms 
and pathways’ (Silberstein, 2002, p. 100), rather than nomological explanation.  This allows for 
multilevel descriptions of causal mechanisms (e.g. genetic, biochemical, intracellular, neuronal, 
muscle cell, and environmental levels), that fit with the virtual machine functionalism to be 
defended below (6.1 Virtual Machines).  
The idea that there are different laws at different levels leads to a potential problem: the danger of 
nomological conflict between laws at the emergent and lower level if the former do not reduce to 
the latter.  This problem is only real, however, if the view of causal laws is overly rigid.  If laws at all 
levels are ‘gappy,’ given time and energy, new dynamic wholes can emerge which follow their own 
rules, albeit being constrained by the matter they are made of.  It is these constraints that avoid the 
conflict.   
A more complex picture is emerging, where ‘emergentism and reductionism might form a 
continuum and not a dichotomy’ (Silberstein, 2002, p. 99).  With the rejection of synchronic physical 
causal closure, a time-slice view will fail to capture all the relevant dynamics of entities that have 
evolved over time within particular environments.  Emergent kinds are defined by the composing 
matter, the environments they have developed in, and the history of the interaction of these forces; 
a gene for something is only a gene for that thing in the environment in which it was selected as 
such.  Psychological kinds emerge as a result of there being brained beings around negotiating the 
physical and social environments, and passing on behaviours, beliefs, and so on, to others.  
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If we broaden our notion of supervenience to include the process of the emergence of a thing and its 
causal powers, and weaken causal closure to include such diachronic processes, then it can no 
longer be said that all the causal properties that something has at any point in time is just the 
‘adding up’ of the causal properties of the thing’s constituent particles; they themselves are ‘pulled 
along’ in this process.  The resulting picture is this: a mental state (M) supervenes on physical states 
(P1…Pn) iff there can be no difference in M without a difference in some P within the transitive causal 
closure of M (see §2.2.1 Causal Closure).  This is a very ‘loose’ kind of supervenience claim, i.e. not so 
‘tight’ as to rule out downwards causation through the sort of supervenience argument deployed by 
Kim. 
Strawson’s (2006) argument against emergence (see §6.3 Panpsychism & Composition) relies on the 
supposed impossibility of ‘radical kind emergence’ (Van Gulick, 2001).  This kind of emergence is 
where the properties of the kinds at the lower level do not necessitate the emergence of the higher-
level kinds.  This is contrasted with everyday emergence, e.g. the liquidity of water, where the 
emergent property is wholly dependent on the properties of the parts even though the parts don’t 
have this property individually.  Water molecules are nothing over and above H2O molecules, and it 
is the nature of H2O molecules that when you put a lot of them together at room temperature on 
earth, they will slosh about in containers in just the way we expect liquids to.  Strawson makes it 
clear that he’s not talking about an epistemological notion of emergence, but an ontological one.  
His inconceivability argument against the emergence of the experiential from the non-experiential 
assumes that ‘the experiential divide, assuming that it exists at all, is the most fundamental divide in 
nature’ (Strawson, 2006, p. 15) (this despite his criticism of eliminativists for making a similar bold 
claim; if you assume such a strict divide, of course it will be difficult to bridge).  I will give reasons to 
doubt the strictness of this divide later when we look at experience more closely (§6.2 
Consciousness).  For now, what Strawson wants to convince us of is that for something so radically 
different in kind to emerge, something external and mysterious must intervene, something in 
addition to the matter, which would be a form a dualism instead of emergentism. 
Strawson says that for Y to emerge from X, X must somehow be intrinsically suited for Y-type 
phenomena, and that this intrinsic suitability, in the case of experiential phenomena, must itself be a 
kind of experiential phenomena, a proto-experiential kind of thing.  The former claim is trivial, in 
that it goes without saying that there must be something about X that makes it the right kind of stuff 
from which Ys can emerge (given the right context and history), otherwise no Ys would emerge.  But 
that latter claim is non-trivial, and he admits that it is his unargued for intuition that the wholly non-
experiential cannot give rise to the experiential, just saying that ‘the intuition that the non-
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experiential could not emerge from the wholly experiential is exactly parallel and unargued’ 
(Strawson, 2006, p. 21).   
My intuition is that these two positions are not parallel, since experience is something that comes 
about as a result of complex interactions of matter, but I accept that this is question-begging against 
Strawson’s claim that experience could be a simple thing, in that there may be forms of atomic 
‘proto-experience.’  However, if a convincing story can be told of how experience could emerge from 
complex interactions of matter, involving sense organs, nervous systems, brains, etc., then the 
existence of such a possibility would be enough to make the two intuitions non-parallel; the burden 
of argument would then be on the panpsychist.  I don’t think they do have an argument, aside from 
the fact that those with the opposite intuition don’t have one, so if I give a plausible argument, then 
I would regard that as putting non-panpsychist physicalism in a strong position. 
The argument for panpsychism turns on the notion that the experiential is so radically unlike non-
experiential matter that the former cannot plausibly emerge from the latter except mysteriously.  
However, it is not clear in which respects the experience of a ‘full-blown’ mind resembles the atomic 
proto-experiences that supposedly compose it, and without an understanding of in what ways these 
resemble each other, it is not clear to me how emergence of his conservative kind (from micro-
minds to macro-minds) is any more plausible.  Strawson concedes that ‘human experience or sea 
snail experience (if any) is an emergent property of structures of ultimates whose individual 
experientiality no more resembles human or sea snail experientiality than an electron resembles a 
molecule, a neuron, a brain, or a human being’ (Strawson, 2006, p. 27).  However, we do understand 
the relationship between electrons and molecules, and it isn’t one of resemblance; we do not say 
that molecules emerge from electrons anyway.  Rather, electrons are parts of molecules, and we 
don’t need to say that there is something ‘proto-molecular’ about electrons to understand how, put 
together with other things in the right way, they are part of what makes molecules.  If there is no 
relation of resemblance between the experientiality of the composing matter and that of the 
organism, it is not clear to me what the argument is, or why we should use the word ‘experiential’ to 
describe the properties of stuff that is suitable for putting together such an experiencing system.  
We may not know what it is like to be a sea snail, but we can make sense of there being something it 
is like to be one.  We don’t think there is something it is like to be a grain of sand.   
The thing that is special about the matter that composes organisms like us, I will argue, is not that 
each bit of it is a bit experiential, but rather something about the way it is organised.  If you cut out a 
small part of my brain and put it on the desk in front of me, I will have no problem saying that it 
itself doesn’t experience anything, but when it was in my brain, it was part of a whole system that all 
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together constituted something which did have experience.  Strawson says that every object is a 
process, but seems to miss the importance of this, which is that certain kinds of process can cause 
the emergence of phenomena that are wholly novel with respect to the properties of the objects 
participating in that process.  Moreover, processes happen at various levels, with processes at higher 
levels happening to the objects that are part of those processes, even though, when viewed 
individually those objects are themselves processes with respect to the stuff they are composed.  
Obviously, these layers of processes may influence each other in complex and interesting ways, but 
for the purposes of explanation, it is practical to treat the composing parts as objects with respect to 
the processes they are part of: although molecules of water are themselves ultimately some kind of 
process, from the point of view of the process that is a whirlpool, they are objects.  Experience is a 
kind of process that happens to evolved organisms like us (and perhaps to other suitably organised 
creatures), and viewed in this way, it is not so hard to accept that experiential processes can happen 
to things composed entirely of non-experiential objects.   
Strawson’s mistake, in my opinion, is assuming a synchronic and localist supervenience relation.  He 
is insisting on a scenario where indeed any kind of emergence would be mystical.  But as argued 
above, the kind of processes necessary for the emergence of mental properties require time and 
space to happen.  Strawson admits that his answer to the supposed problem of the emergence of 
the experiential from the non-experiential, i.e. that everything is experiential, faces the serious 
problem of understanding how all these little experiences add up to make one big experience.  We 
will return to this below (§6.3 Panpsychism & Composition), but now I will return to Kim’s 
arguments, and look again at his arguments against emergentism. 
This is Kim’s argument against emergentism: 
“...on emergentism, mental properties must have novel causal powers.... [which] must manifest 
themselves by causing... physical properties or other mental properties. Assume then that 
mental property M causes another mental property M*.... M* is an emergent; this means that 
M* is instantiated on a given occasion only because a certain physical property P*, its emergence 
base, is instantiated on that occasion.... the only viable way of [reconciling M*'s causal 
dependence on M with its causal dependence on P*] is to suppose that M caused M* by causing 
its emergence base P*.” (Kim, 1992, p. 136) in (Humphreys, 1997a, pp. 2-3) 
To paraphrase: since emergent phenomena are necessarily realised by the physical states that they 
supervene on, then in order for one emergent state (or event/property/object) to cause another, 
the preceding emergent state has to cause the physical state that realises the later emergent state.  
He goes on to wield the principle of the causal closure of the physical as a means of severing this 
putative relationship: since all physical states have sufficient physical causes immediately preceding 
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them, then, on pain of overdetermination, the preceding emergent cannot be the cause of the 
physical realisation base of the caused emergent state.  
The mistake in the argument, according to Humphreys (1997b, p. 14), is to say the emergent-level 
phenomena are instantiated ‘only because’ the emergence base is instantiated.  If M* emerges as 
the result of diachronic processes, where causal closure is also interpreted diachronically (§2.2.1 
Causal Closure), both M and P are necessary.  It could be argued (R. Chrisley, pers. corr., 2007) that 
this gets the counterfactuals wrong, because if P* were the case, but not M, M* would still hold.  
But, if P* is a ‘fusion’ in the sense introduced earlier (§2.2.1 Causal Closure), i.e. a whole where the 
parts are no longer seen as independent from the point of view of causal processes the whole is 
involved in, then P* would not be the case if it weren’t for the ongoing process that M describes a 
part of.  That is, we can only pick out the parts of the world that constitute P* by reference to the 
mereological whole it composes. 
I will now briefly outline some of the implications of accepting this view with respect to the issues at 
hand.  Firstly, lower-level theories can be an essential part of the explanation of higher-level ones 
without being a reduction of them, and the emergent phenomena will thereby not be mere ‘brute 
facts’ (Silberstein, 2002, p. 101).  Reduction will be at best a local affair, rather than a grand unity of 
science, with domains forming ‘nested hierarchies,’ overlapping but not co-extensional.  For 
example, we may be able to give a full explanation of how the mental states of humans have arisen, 
but that will not be to reduce mental states tout court to physical states, as those mental states 
could also be instantiated in creatures having physical instantiations that are totally different with 
respect to the properties of the physical parts taken in isolation.  Properties in one domain may be 
necessary but not sufficient for the emergent properties, and the ‘local reductions’ that can be 
performed don’t violate mereological supervenience, with lower-level entities merging into fusions 
in a way that means they are no longer best seen as separate entities (Humphreys, 1997b; Boyd, 
1991).  In such a world, the divisions that are made between levels will depend on the questions 
being put to nature.  This does not mean that the structure of the world depends on us; we discover 
what the levels are once we have defined what questions we are looking for answers to.  This lack of 
a ‘strict’ boundary between levels removes the ‘air of mystery’ around such phenomena 
(Humphreys, 1997a). 
The non-mysteriousness of emergence can be illustrated by the non-trivial examples that exist 
within the physical level itself.  Quantum entanglement is a case where individuals ‘fuse’ in such a 
way that they are no longer really individual, in that the ‘state of the compound system determines 
the state of the constituents’ rather than, as supervenience normally requires, the other way round 
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(Humphreys, 1997b, p. 16).  Such instances emerge ‘horizontally’ rather than ‘vertically.’  Vertical 
emergence occurs where the higher level is composed of lower-level entities without becoming a 
dynamic whole; that is without becoming a causal entity that singular causal statements can be 
made of.  For example, a species emerges from the individuals that compose it, but causal 
generalisations that attach to that kind apply to its instances.  Horizontal emergence occurs where 
the composing parts become a single dynamic whole about which singular causal statements can be 
made.  For example, individual organisms, although composed of parts, are more than the 
generalised causal properties of those parts, and causal statements about those individuals may be 
instances of causal generalisations. 
Accepting emergence does mean giving up on a certain sort of ‘ontological minimalism’ (Humphreys, 
1997a, p. S337).  But, while it is a good thing to embrace pluralism in this messy world, we should 
retain the explanatory power that comes with minimalism.  That is, we should avoid the mistake of 
trying to produce a map with ratio 1:1, as that would be useless, but if you want to navigate your 
way over a narrow mountain pass, a 1:250,000 ratio is almost as bad.  We want a map that captures 
in as neat a way as possible all the features on the ground that we need to be able to negotiate.  So, 
ideally, we should have as few ontological commitments as we can get away with, while making 
enough distinctions to be as accurate as we require.  The implication is that there may be multiple 
valid ways of describing the world in terms of the kinds of things it contains, but that each of these is 
‘tethered’ to reality because of the existence of a causal story that says how those features were 
formed, and what ‘shape’ they are.  Unlike Dennett’s stances, this allows real explanation, rather 
than mere predictive utility.  
Another non-mysterious case of emergence is that of self-maintainant systems, which are systems 
that can maintain themselves in a far-from-equilibrium state through using resources from the 
surroundings, e.g. a candle pulling in fresh oxygen to fuel itself (Bickhard, 2006).  Organisms are such 
systems, and have the further advantage of flexibility, being able to change what they do to maintain 
themselves in the face of a changing environment, like sensing and moving in the direction of 
nutrients.  When explaining the actions of such organisms, we can refer to the functions of those 
parts of the organism that reliably take in information and produce motion.  In such cases, where 
there is dynamic interaction with the environment to maintain a non-equilibrium state, there should 
be a way for the organism to process information about the environment, i.e. representational 
content.  Representations, in this view, are not states of some homuncular viewer of inputs, but 
rather ‘future oriented models of interactive anticipation’ (Bickhard, 2006).   
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This brings us to things like us.  Here, I am going to sketch the landscape that I will spend the second 
half of this text filling in the features of.  We are in contact with a world the features of which we 
differentiate on the basis of presuppositions based on the outcomes of previous interactions.  These 
presuppositions take the form of expectations which may be more or less true or false.  This dynamic 
feedback-based process, which is at the heart of multiple levels of selection (natural, social, 
developmental, etc.), sets up the conditions for emergence.  Representation is an act, an event in 
the process that is our being in the world, an interaction rather than a passive processing of inputs.  
The view of representations given below (§4.2 Representations) is one that is explanatorily grounded 
in the physical mechanisms of the brain and body in the world (a world we have shaped in order to 
ease our interactions with), thus avoiding radical scepticism, and the frame problem (see §4.1).   
Scepticism is neutralised because the representations interact with the world in a way that means 
that errors are detectable by the system in principle.  The frame problem is avoided due to the 
implicitness of the ‘dynamic presuppositions’ in play when we are anticipating our interactions with 
our world (Bickhard, 2006).  In the following, I will be putting flesh on these metaphysical bones by 
incorporating recent work in cognitive science in a way that will result in a coherent philosophical 
narrative of how such things as minds come to be in the natural world, a story that will retain the 
characteristics of having minds that we take to be important, that is, that we can be agents of our 
own destiny.   
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Chapter 4: Kinds of Mental Content 
4.1 Mental Kinds 
Having found our metaphysical bearings, let us now turn towards our objective: the ontological 
status of those kinds of things referred to in the generalisations that underwrite, implicitly or 
explicitly, intentional explanations of action.  There are a diverse range of states that could be called 
mental that are involved in the production of action: phenomenal, affective, intentional, to name a 
few.  Therefore, as a starting point, we will start with the broad ‘folk philosophical’ definition: action 
producing mental states are any that can be referred to in true explanations of actions, such as 
propositional attitudes of the form (‘X believes/desires that Y’, where X is an agent and Y a 
proposition), or affective attitudes (‘X did Y because she was in emotional state Z’).  
If necessary, finer distinctions will be made as we progress, but as a starting point this liberal, almost 
trivial definition will suffice.  A science does not have to define its terms strictly from the outset; we 
can start with ‘folk’ uses and proceed by means of ‘interactive conceptual refinement’ (Sloman & 
Chrisley, 2003, p. 143), where neither our theoretical notions nor the empirical data are given a veto 
over the other, but rather both are in a ‘constructive dialectical opposition.’  As such, we can take 
the folk notions of belief and desire in explanations of action and see how far they get us.  Our vague 
cluster concepts of kinds of matter were refined when we learnt about the ‘architecture’ of matter, 
and the same might happen with our concepts of mental states (Sloman & Chrisley, 2003).  Taking an 
‘architectural’ view, looking at how functional parts are organised into a whole mechanism that 
exhibits the kinds of properties we are interested in, allows us to investigate a space of possible 
ways of building systems like that, rather than attempting to define what mind or consciousness is 
from the outset (Sloman & Chrisley, 2003, p. 163). 
We can start with the observation that the states we are interested in are states of minded entities 
that enter into explanations of action, and add that a condition of being minded could be that they 
enjoy non-epiphenomenal phenomenological aspects (see §6.2 Consciousness).  Third-person 
descriptions of mental activity may overlap with more typically first-person descriptions in some 
instances, for example in describing the affordances given in perceiving the world (Gibson, 1979), 
these being a necessary part of action explanations.  It can be posited that the states in question are 
‘discrete, semantically-evaluable, causally-effective states, possessing component structure, and 
where those structures bear systematic relations to the structures of other, related, thoughts’ 
(Carruthers, 2002, p. 658).  These thoughts may be like bits of language, or could be like images, or 
models, or other representational structures, and the type of structure they have may influence the 
type of effects they have.  We might want to make a strong claim about the role of language in 
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cognitive processes; it may have more than an input role in development and enculturation, 
furnishing the mind with concepts, it also could have implications for building the foundations of the 
cognitive system.   
Before continuing, we need to deal with the idea that the phenomenal properties of experience, the 
‘what it feels like,’ are epiphenomenal.  In many respects, this is the same discussion as the one 
above (§3.2.1 Laws) about the causal efficacy of mental states qua mental states.  There, we were 
discussing different ways of portioning the physical world in third-person terms, and asking whether 
macro-states composed of smaller parts could be ascribed causal properties separately from the 
causal properties of those parts.  Here we are discussing whether phenomenal properties correlated 
with physical states can be said to have causal properties separately from those physically defined 
correlates.  The argument goes like this: since all phenomenal feelings are accompanied by physical 
goings on, and the physical goings on are sufficient for the immediately following goings on, there is 
no causal work for these phenomenal properties to do, given that phenomenal properties are 
distinct from physical ones.  If, in order to avoid redundancy, phenomenal experiences are not 
identified with some physical state, i.e. dualism is accepted, then intractable questions about how 
the non-physical can interact with the physical could be raised. 
Given that these experiential properties seem to be such an integral part of my mental processes 
when consciously making a decision to act, it is worth asking, as with emergentism, why the burden 
of proof is generally seen to be on those who argue for the efficacy of such phenomena.  Again, 
much of the debate seems to be a hangover from the debate between dualists and materialists.  But 
you don’t have to be a dualist to argue against epiphenomenalism; we can see experience, I will 
argue, as a part of the real world that emerges due to physical processes (see Chapter 6: Physically 
Embodied Minds).  Part of the problem with taking phenomenal properties to be a genuine part of 
the world of causally efficacious things, is certain types of properties often associated with 
phenomenal experience, like incorrigibility, ineffability, privacy, etc.  For the moment, I ask the 
reader to suspend these assumptions.  Later (§6.3 Panpsychism & Composition) we will see some 
reasons to doubt that these are in fact necessary properties of first-person experience.  Here I will 
briefly cast doubt on one of the most popular arguments for epiphenomenalism.   
Arguments such as the knowledge argument (Jackson, 1982) seem to beg the question.  This 
argument relies on the premise that Mary knows everything physical there is to know about 
experience of the colour red, but learns something new on experiencing the colour for the first time.  
This is to assume that you can have all the physical knowledge without having seen red, an 
assumption that relies on a deeper assumption regarding the nature of knowledge, that is, a 
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‘discursive assumption,’ that all knowledge can be discursively communicated (Chrisley, 2010).  If 
there are forms of knowledge that are abilities (knowledge-how rather than knowledge-that (Ryle, 
1946)), it could be the case that knowing what it is like to see red is a kind of ability, and therefore a 
kind of knowledge that is not discursively transferable (just as you can’t tell someone how to ride a 
bike).   So, putting question-begging assumptions about the nature of the material and the mental 
aside, there is no reason that the burden of proof must be on the phenomenal realist; quite the 
opposite since epiphenomenalism is counterintuitive; we certainly seem to experience thought 
processes as the causes of actions.   
Now, given that the reduction/emergence debate as I have framed it revolves around the question 
of the existence of natural kinds, the question is whether mental states, perhaps with partly 
experiential descriptions, count as such.  Can they be intersubjectively referred to and are they 
projectable?  I will say yes, given the preceding accounts of the relevant terms. If Sloman and 
Chrisley (2003) are right to say that, as some of the data that enters our explanations of mental 
phenomena are qualitative rather than quantitative, we need an explanatory theory more 
concerned with abilities than predictions and correlations, then the mark of a good theory will be 
that it makes sense of the abilities we find that humans have, rather than it being determinate 
enough to ground quantitative predictions, or its pointing to a particular physical state, the 
properties of which will be discursively communicable, that underwrites mental states.  I agree with 
this in spirit, and think Cartwright’s (1999) capacity account of causation (§3.1 Causation) is suited 
for the job, foregrounding as it does the causal tendencies of kinds of things (objects, states, events 
or properties thereof, including phenomenal ones) in certain contexts.   
McGinn (1978, pp. 196-7) offers a Cartesian argument from Kripke against the possibility of natural 
kinds in the mental realm, based on the conceivability of physical realisers and phenomenal states 
‘coming apart.’  It is an a priori argument regarding the necessity of identity.  In the case of a 
posteriori identities like ‘water=H2O,’ water is baptised ostensively, then its essence discovered 
empirically, with the connection between facts about the physical essence and observable facts 
about water being metaphysically necessary (once we know all the facts about hydrogen and oxygen 
and chemistry and physics, etc., all the facts about wateriness follow).  In the case of phenomenal 
states like being hungry, so it is argued, there is no physical essence to pick out ostensively.  Even if 
we find the physical correlates of such feelings, there is no metaphysically necessary connection that 
would allow one to infer one from the other.  The same holds of the functionalist arguments to 
variable realisation.  That means we cannot point to a paradigmatic example of a proposed mental 
kind, define an equivalence relation for other members of that kind, and provide or discover an 
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acceptably empirical ‘real essence’ of that kind (McGinn, 1978, p. 197).  So, we know a priori that 
mental states are not members of the natural kinds (McGinn, 1978, p. 199). 
My first response to this kind of objection is that it begs the question in one of two ways.  Either he 
is assuming that empirically respectable properties have to be described purely in the language of 
physics, that ‘real essence’ has to be couched in terms of the properties physics talks about, or he is 
assuming there is no physical essence to pick out.  In the latter case, it could just be a familiar case of 
our referential abilities outstripping our understanding.  In the former, he needs an argument for 
why states like being in pain cannot be defined functionally without reference to physical correlates 
and still be empirically respectable properties capable of projection.   
McGinn (1978, p. 202) gives more reasons why functional or dispositional properties are not suitable 
candidates for natural kindhood.  First, because of the holistic nature of mental states picked out by 
propositional attitude statements, each one will not have a causal profile unique to it.  Holism, 
indeterminacy and the rationality constraint separate mental ascriptions from physical ones.  Mental 
states like these mediate between perceptual inputs and behavioural outputs and are individuated 
conceptually by their place within a conceptual scheme, where each item depends on others within 
the system for its definition.  Thus, mental kinds do not fit with a causal theory of reference but a 
descriptive one, and so are not natural kinds.   Similarly, ‘real essence’ must be a property of 
‘internal structure,’ but mental states don’t have one.  The dispositional properties of mental states 
like beliefs and desires are their essences and will not be reduced to physical states; that would be to 
change the subject (McGinn, 1978, p. 201).  Thirdly, specification of causal roles is ‘a priori and 
definitional,’ unlike descriptions of ‘real essences,’ and if essences are not discovered a posteriori 
then they will be nominal rather than real.  Lastly, mental states are attributed on the basis of 
behaviour, but unlike other ways of attributing natural kinds to objects, these cannot be later 
refined and replaced by more essential descriptions (McGinn, 1978, p. 214). 
But, as we have seen, the causal theory of reference may also be inadequate for non-mental kinds, 
as a descriptive element is necessary for referential fixing there too, so this argument is undermined.  
Either we accept that almost all natural kind ascriptions include contextual, holistic, mereological 
descriptions, or we say that there are no natural kinds save for the fundamental things out of which 
everything is composed.  The debate is in danger of becoming a semantic rather than a substantive 
one here, but, if it is scientifically desirable for water and tigers to be natural kinds, which it should 
be on the assumption that our aim is to make generalised statements about things in the world, 
then we should be expansive rather than restrictive, and accept the criteria for natural kinds given 
above (  
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Chapter 1: Natural Kinds).  Furthermore, it is not the case that our definitions of mental kinds in 
cognitive science are immune to revision due to empirical input, if the ‘Cartesian’ insistence on 
absolute incorrigibility is weakened: the first person, together with normative constraints of the 
concepts we use, and our physical realisation, jointly determine the structure of our mind, and each 
of these can influence the others.  
There are mental states which have properties that are most properly picked out using lexical 
concepts, therefore such states are subject to the holism that is a part of the meanings of terms in a 
language, but they can nevertheless form the basis of predictions and explanations.  They rely on a 
social world because they wouldn’t be the states they are if the subject hadn’t been enculturated in 
the linguistic community that he in fact was.  For example, in Turkish culture, among others, there is 
a particular concept of family honour that is connected to the behaviour of the family’s womenfolk.  
If a female member of one’s family has a relationship with a male outside marriage, then the men in 
her family will be in a certain state (namussuzlukta – ‘being in the state of lacking honour’), which 
has, for those experiencing it, a particular phenomenal character, and will lead them to behave, with 
a level of probability, in certain culturally defined ways.  The same set of events would have different 
consequences in other cultures.   
The fact that we ascribe mental kinds on the basis of behaviour, whether that be verbal reportings of 
first-person experience or observed non-linguistic behaviour that reflects mental states of being, 
leads to the problem of distinguishing genuine cases of acting for reasons, and other cases of acting 
as if there were a reason, that is, between metaphorical and veridical uses of intentional 
explanation.  If we can find no hard and fast criteria for the distinction, should we dissolve it?  
Perhaps the intentional level of explanation is a fiction constructed retrospectively to rationalise 
events that are ‘merely’ causal.   
I think this would be throwing out the intentional baby with the dualistic bathwater.  We should be 
able to distinguish usages like, ‘The water droplet wants to hit the ground’ from, ‘I want to hit the 
ground.’  There may be interesting border disputes in the case of simpler organisms (is an 
explanation like, ‘The ant followed the pheromone trail because it wanted to find the food source’ 
metaphorical or not?), but these discussions about where to draw lines are informative rather than 
problematic.  The thing that makes an explanation of my actions intentional is that there is a state 
that has the function of motivating action; it has that function partly because of its causal profile, but 
also because it has been designed for such a purpose by evolution; that is, it is a mechanism for 
which we can give explanations of how it works, how it got there, and what it’s for.   
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What about, ‘The missile wants to hit the ground’?  There may be cases, in the future perhaps, 
where this would be non-metaphorical, and to convince people of this, we would need to give 
similar kinds of explanations as we give in our case.  One thing that most people would say is missing 
in the case of missiles is the phenomenological aspect, which in our case, we are assuming, is part of 
what makes an intentional state the state that it is.  Those aspects are what it’s like for me to want 
something, and, putting epiphenomenalism aside, being like this is part of the state’s contribution to 
the causal situation.  If it is the case that phenomenal states play a causal role qua phenomenal 
state, then philosophical zombies are not possible; they only seem conceivable because of hidden 
assumptions about the natures of the physical and the experiential.  Rather, phenomenology is a 
necessary part of certain states that emerge in creatures like us, and there is no in principle reason 
that such states shouldn’t emerge in machines under the right circumstances (see §6.3.5 
Selfishness).  In fact, they should emerge necessarily, not contingently; it is the intuition that the 
relationship between physical and phenomenological is contingent (because they are so clearly 
distinct in kind) that is responsible for the supposed conceivability of philosophical zombies. 
On the other hand, mental states have more than their phenomenological aspects as part of their 
identity conditions.  Philosophical behaviourists like Wittgenstein and Ryle argued against taking the 
meaning of words that refer to mental states as picking out essentially first-person facts.  Much of 
the vocabulary used to denote mental states develops, evolutionarily, culturally, developmentally, in 
a complex interaction between reflections on inner states and observations of the states of others.  
When we say, ‘X is thinking,’ this seems to imply both internal and external facts.  The external 
aspect might not seem obvious, but we wouldn’t ascribe ‘thinking’ to someone who seems to be 
engrossed in a physical activity that takes complete focused, in-the-moment concentration, like 
climbing the crux of an exposed route (although the minutes of indecision before committing to the 
move could definitely be called thinking).  The combination of causal and descriptive theories of 
reference gives a picture something like this: we learn to apply behavioural descriptions to others 
when learning a language, then we learn definitions and descriptions which we apply to ourselves, 
and subsequently we may learn some detailed science about the brain and cognitive systems in 
general.  This may change slightly the concept we originally learnt when some behaviour was 
pointed out to us, just as our concepts of ‘whale’ or ‘water’ might have changed slightly since they 
were originally pointed at and named.  In both cases, part of that refinement is a conceptual 
endeavour, and part of it empirical. 
Furthermore, intentional concepts like ‘belief’ are not purely first-person, only applicable in our own 
case with certainty, but depend also on dispositions to behave in certain ways in certain situations.  
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Because they don’t rely solely on their first-person content to be the states they are, then it is not 
necessary to be conscious of being in a particular state, or even be so disposed to be so, in order for 
that concept to be correctly attributed.  In the case of ascribing motivational mental states to non-
linguistic creatures, we are assuming that they have mental states sufficiently similar to ours if we 
ascribe, non-metaphorically, mental states to them.  It is not just a matter of whether we can 
successfully predict action, but whether that action is brought about by mental states that deserve 
to be called mental states because of their functional role in a mental architecture that has been 
designed to house such states.  Again, it is the mistake of taking the first-person aspect of intentional 
concepts as being wholly private, etc. that leads to philosophical confusions like the conceivability of 
zombies (Steels, 2003).  As Chrisley & Sloman (2016, in press) have argued, there may be first-
person, indexical concepts that are only applicable in one’s own case, but which are nevertheless 
public.  For example, I have the concept of myself, which only I can use of myself, but I am public.  
The same might be true of first-person concepts of qualia that are only applicable to oneself, but 
which could be ruled on by third persons.  
Davidson (1984) argues that ascribing mental states like the ones we use in explanations of our 
behaviour to animals is a mistake.  He gives the example, ‘The dog believes there is a cat up the 
tree.’  He says that this could only be used to explain the rationality of the dog’s action if the dog 
were a language user, since by substituting co-referential terms we can make another proposition 
that would explain the behaviour just as well, e.g. ‘The dog believes there is a cat up the oldest 
visible tree.’  In other words, the contents of beliefs are more fine-grained than what they refer to, 
so, we cannot be justified in ascribing particular belief contents to animals on the basis of behaviour 
alone.  Davidson (1985) adds that being rational, and thus having your actions explicable by 
reference to propositional attitudes, requires being a user of a system of propositional attitudes, 
understanding what it is for a belief to be true, being able to give reasons that one believes to be 
true, and therefore being a language user.  In the case of non-linguistic creatures, then, using 
intentional explanations is, according to Davidson, metaphorical. 
I think this requirement, that being a language user is necessary in order to have beliefs that are 
reasons for actions and can therefore be used as parts of explanations for those actions, is too 
strong.  There is good reason to think that dogs possess the concepts CAT and TREE, since both are 
recurring parts of the environment that a dog needs to be able to navigate.  We could test for this in 
various ways, like the ability to re-identify, cross-classify, etc.  However, here Davidson has a point, 
as we could never be fully justified in these ascriptions because such behaviour would never be 
sufficient to allow us to distinguish between co-extensional but conceptually distinct content.  
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Obviously, the dog’s concept of ‘tree’ will not be the same as ours, which includes, for example, how 
to distinguish bushes, but then again, most humans get by without holding in mind the fully-fledged, 
latest version of the scientific concept of tree.  Non-scientific humans and dogs have their 
intensional content that they use to act in the world with greater or lesser success, and the 
ascriptions we make of them, or rather, the way we characterise their beliefs in terms of concepts, 
will predict their behaviour with greater or lesser success (Bermudez, 2003), the difference being 
that we can use intentional content (de re as opposed to de dicto) to judge the truth value of the 
contents of human beliefs, because we have a publicly accepted measure in terms of the meanings 
of words.   
This doesn’t mean that dogs don’t have beliefs about the world that can be reasons for actions, just 
that it is problematic to ascribe the content of their beliefs in terms of a that clause.  But there may 
be such cases of non-conceptual belief contents that explain actions, including in animals like us, and 
in those cases, it will not be possible to have thoughts about those contents in the way that is 
required when stating the contents of a belief in a that clause.  Still, it makes sense to say that a dog 
reliably tracks cats, and can track one to a tree, and can therefore be said to believe that there is a 
cat up that tree, because it would be surprised after chasing the cat up a tree to discover that the cat 
had disappeared.  What a dog can’t do is know that it believes there is a cat up a tree; for that, 
language is required, so that the contents of the belief can be stated in a publicly assessable manner 
that the creature in question could take a reflexive attitude towards (c.f. (Malcolm, 1972 -1973)). 
What beliefs and desires may be attributed to an organism is not purely a matter of observer 
interpretation; such attributions are limited, and made true, by ‘architectural’ constraints, that is, by 
the various evolved mechanisms or states that serve the non-trivial needs of the organism (Sloman, 
et al., 2003).   For example, fish probably don’t need an overbearing sense of ennui; it could serve no 
function in their lives, and to interpret its behaviour as such would be anthropomorphism.  This is in 
harmony with Lloyd Morgan’s canon: ‘In no case is an animal activity to be interpreted in terms of 
higher psychological processes if it can be fairly interpreted in terms of processes which stand lower 
in the scale of psychological evolution and development’ (Morgan, 1894, p. 59).  As well as 
behavioural evidence, it is not inconceivable that we could bring neurological evidence to bear.  We 
could investigate the internal mechanisms of dogs and discover neural correlates for tracking cats 
and objects like trees. Then, when we say that ‘the dog believes there is a cat up the tree,’ we are 
not saying that the dog believes the statement ‘there is a cat up the tree,’ rather, the dog believes 
the state of affairs referred to by that proposition is the case.   
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The types of action producing states possible are constrained by the structures of the world and the 
creature.  Rather than talking about beliefs and desires, which may mislead in bringing to mind the 
explicit tokening of propositional thoughts, we can instead talk of belief-like and desire-like states 
(Sloman, et al., 2003), which are mental states that perform the traditional functions of beliefs and 
desires respectively.  Desire-like states function to motivate acting on and in the world in a way that 
serves the needs of the creature (Sloman, et al., 2003, p. 19), for example ‘preferences, pleasures, 
pains, evaluations, attitudes, goals, intentions, and mood’ (Sloman, et al., 2003, p. 20).  Belief-like 
states function to provide information about the world which can be acted on according to what is 
desired, for example ‘beliefs (particular and general), percepts, and sensory information states’ 
(Sloman, et al., 2003, p. 20).  Such states have semantic content in so far as they place truth 
conditions on the world: they can be wrong by misrepresenting the world.   
Some may be purely reactive, some simple ‘what if’ deliberative systems, some reflective ‘meta-
management’ systems (Sloman, et al., 2003, p. 29).  Each ‘architecture’ makes possible certain 
states, which may coincide with or refine our pre-theoretical, ‘folk’ concepts.  We can further 
distinguish reactive (e.g. startle), deliberative (e.g. worry) and reflective (e.g. self-disgust) levels of 
affect (Sloman, et al., 2003, p. 15).  Each will have its own evolutionary history that explains its 
functioning, for example, more purely reactive ones like alarm signals will tend to be older ones.  
The higher cognitive functions of being able to deliberate about mental states explicitly, as we do 
when we explain our actions propositionally, requires the ability to chunk the world into discrete 
classes and to learn generalisations about them in order to predict, plan, and explain (Sloman, et al., 
2003, p. 28).   
This sketch forms a picture of mental states that, I will argue, are not subject to the worries of 
reductionism, elimination, or epiphenomenalism given above.  Mental states emerge from the 
interactions of parts of physically realised virtual machines (see §6.1 Virtual Machines) and 
environments, rather than being discreet, atomic entities obeying their own laws, or being 
composed of such objects.  Minds emerge from brains in bodies in the world over time, but, 
although every mind we know is neurally implemented, minds are by definition implementation 
neutral, as they are defined in terms of the abstract architecture of the virtual machines (Sloman, et 
al., 2003, p. 40). 
The fact that much of the vocabulary used to denote mental states develops, evolutionarily, 
culturally, developmentally, in a complex interaction between reflection on inner states and 
observation of others, leads to another objection to counting kinds of mental states as natural kinds: 
our classificatory practices can affect human kinds in ways they cannot affect natural kinds.  Hacking 
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(1990) says cultural feedback (being classified, or not, a certain way causes people to alter their 
behaviour), and conceptual feedback (the availability of new descriptions makes new kinds of 
behaviour possible) makes human kinds subjective.  For example, if I am told I have ADHD, and I 
accept that diagnosis, this will affect my behaviour in a way likely to cause that diagnosis to be a self-
fulfilling prophecy.  Hacking (1990) takes being a kind to boil down to being law governed, and 
further claims that our classificatory practices can affect human kinds in ways they cannot affect 
natural kinds.  The kind of feedback involved in self-classification means there can be no observer-
independent laws to be taken as the essence of the kind.  In the case of classifying human kinds, 
being classified a certain way can have moral overtones (e.g. ‘pervert,’ ‘normal’), as well as 
institutional benefits or costs (e.g. ‘obese,’ ‘pious’).  This leads to people behaving in ways so as to 
change how they are classified (e.g. ‘person with stapled stomach,’ ‘woman who wears the veil’). 
However, it is also the case that non-human kinds like species are affected by our classificatory 
practices.  Cooper (2004) gives the example of dogs, which we would generally say is a natural kind, 
but which nevertheless has been altered by us through selective breeding and development.  
Hacking replies that the feedback in human kinds is different because it occurs as a result of subjects 
becoming ‘aware of the ways in which they are being described and judged’ (Hacking, 1997, p. 15, as 
cited in Cooper, 2004, p. 78).   
I agree with Cooper that although the case of human self-ascription is different in interesting ways 
from other kinds of classification, this difference is not fundamental in a way that rules out human 
cognitive kinds as being natural.  This is just part of the causal history of these kinds, and as such will 
be part of the information that makes them useful for forming generalisations and making 
predictions.  Hacking argues that the idea-dependence of human kinds makes them subjective, but, 
as pointed out above, all sorts of natural kinds involve some variety of idea-dependency, without 
making them useless for the purposes we require them for.  Cooper (2004) distinguishes two 
different ways things can be idea-dependent: relational and causal.  An example of the former would 
be that our judgements about the aesthetic properties of certain pictures might change due to 
changing ideals of beauty.  Causal idea-dependence is exemplified in cases like changes in ideals of 
beauty causing a woman to go on a diet, or a man to moisturise.  This is an objective effect on things 
in the world, and so is compatible with objective judgements of kind membership (e.g. the kind of 
man who moisturises).    
Hacking claims that the human kinds that result from such feedback from descriptions to behaviour 
are not natural kinds, as they are logically dependent on the existence of those descriptions.  
However, although it may be the case that culturally evolved descriptions can have a causal effect on 
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behaviour, it is not the case that the ability to act in a certain way is logically dependent on that 
description.  Cooper criticises Hacking for following Anscombe’s (1957) account of intentional action: 
‘An action X can be said to be intentional when the actor could respond to the question “Why are 
you doing X?” by giving a reason for acting’ (Cooper, 2004, p. 80).  She says that if the agent cannot 
answer the question, then, on this account, the behaviour would not be intentional, which would 
make being able to answer the ‘Why?’ question a necessary condition for an action being 
intentional.  But this leads to the conclusion that a pre-linguistic human could not intend to do 
anything.  However, we could say that ‘Ug intended his banging the rocks together qua a way of 
making a fire,’ using inference to the best explanation (Cooper, 2004, p. 82).  Some actions may 
indeed be logically dependent on the existence of descriptions, for example taking an oath, but most 
are not.  Though those actions may be causally dependant on those descriptions, they are not made 
possible by the existence of those descriptions: you can still act like a man that moisturises without 
that description being available to explain your behaviour. 
So, an agent need not apply an intentional description to her action for that action to fall under an 
intentional description.  However, I want to sound a note of caution about the priority of certain 
descriptions in the explanatory pecking order.  In the case that an agent is in an explicit intentional 
state, then, I would argue, in the absence of interference, the intentional level of description 
‘trumps’ other descriptions in terms of being the best explanation of the behaviour; that is, the 
intentional explanation is irreducible and more informative.  Moreover, even when the intention is 
not conscious, or not even disposed to be consciously available, the intentional description may be 
best.   
However, despite this irreducibility of the intentional, it is a mistake to ‘build’ from the top down in 
the way many realists about belief/desire explanations do, for example in Fodor’s Language of 
Thought thesis.  The information-bearing states that play the role of beliefs are not like full-blown 
beliefs in many ways, for example they may not conform fully to the rules of compositionality, 
systematicity, etc., like linguistic tokens do.  Such not-quite explicit states may not be ‘inferentially 
promiscuous’ (Hurley, 2003), but that doesn’t prevent them from playing the role of beliefs in 
intentional explanations.  In fact, the case of fully conceptualised beliefs may be quite rare, even in 
the case when we do ascribe the holding of beliefs to ourselves.   
One advantage of seeing the conceptualised self as emergent from the more normal pre-conceptual, 
yet still intentional, self is that there will not be a strict and mysterious discontinuity between us and 
non-linguistic animals or pre-linguistic infants, and that ascribing beliefs and desires to such 
creatures in order to explain their behaviour will not always be metaphorical.  This is not to deny 
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that there is, in the case of certain organisms at certain times, an important and distinct kind of 
reflective self-awareness that requires the development of a self-concept, an ‘I’, and the 
constructing of narratives that that self plays a role in.  But the often precarious existence of 
reflective selfhood should not distract us from the reality of pre-reflective selfhood which exists in 
the everyday coping with being in the world as a creature that navigates that world through sensory 
experience (c.f. Butterworth (1995)).  The conceptualised self emerges from, or floats on top of (and 
often sinks back into) that fluid ‘just-being.’  An advantage of not taking the conceptualised-self to 
be the only true form of being a mind is that some problems that dog the computational 
functionalist, like the frame problem, become less problematic.  The frame problem is the problem 
of framing what parts of a conceptual scheme to update given some new information; to maintain 
consistency every concept in the scheme would need checking against the new input every time, 
putting too high a computational load on the system to be realistic.  In a mental model where full 
conceptuality is a special case, then the chain reaction underlying this combinatorial explosion 
doesn’t have the fuel to get going.  The challenge is to explain how it is that concept use can emerge 
from the nonconceptual in a way that doesn’t just reduce the conceptual self to the nonconceptual 
parts that it emerges from (which was the purpose of the metaphysical arguments in the first half of 
the present work). 
Nevertheless, it is not just trivially true that explicit intentional states, i.e. the ones we can report 
ourselves, must always be ‘couchable’ in a public language; such states rely on language in a more 
interesting and important sense, as it is through a feedback relationship with externally existent 
public languages, and by implication the socio-cultural world, that they emerge developmentally.  To 
investigate the properties of these states, then, it may not be enough to look at what has been 
biologically inherited; we need to also look at cultural inheritance.  Understanding the nature of 
mental kinds means seeing how they result from physical, biological, cultural, social and personal 
processes, which means not just looking at what is in the head (pace Fodor’s (1980) methodological 
solipsism).  We may need to look in the head to explain cases where things go wrong, but when 
looking at mental mechanisms, what they are for and how they are built are both important, and not 
independent (see §§5.2.1 Evolution & 6.1 Virtual Machines).  As well as broadening our view of 
where to look from a third-person perspective, we need to expand, rather than reduce or even 
eliminate, the first-person concept of the mental, such that we understand that the nature of 
experiences may not be fully revealed in experience (Steels, 2003). 
Martin (2007) writes that naïve realism (the claim that the kind of experience we have depends on 
whether or not it is veridical) is inconsistent with two further, commonly held assumptions, namely, 
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‘experiential naturalism’ (that our experiences are part of the causal natural order) and the ‘common 
kind assumption’ (that the same mental event happens in the case of veridical and hallucinatory 
experience).  Naïve realism would say that there is a difference between the experience of a distant 
star, and the experience of an extremely large and distant bright thing that is not a star.  But, if we 
assume that mentally we are the same in the case of hallucinating a star and seeing an actual star, 
and that since our experiences are part of the causal nature of the world there is not enough time 
for any direct causal influence from very distant objects, then the experiences of the star and the 
extremely large and distant bright thing that is not a star must be the same.  Therefore these 
assumptions are inconsistent and we must reject one of them.   
Before making what seems to be the obvious move of rejecting naïve realism, we should ask, ‘What 
is meant by ‘kind’ in the common kind assumption?’  Martin (2007) says that events cannot be 
placed under different kinds just because we tend to describe them differently, but that there needs 
to be some kind of ‘privileged’ description, which, I will assume, is a description that matches the 
causal regularities of the real world.  It seems clear that, if experiences are physical events (given 
experiential naturalism), naïve realism directly contradicts the common kind assumption.  However, 
naïve realism as stated is indeed naïve, and is not necessarily the best formulation of direct realism, 
because it, naïvely, assumes that our experiences are immediately available, or given, to us.  But 
what if there can be a difference in experience that we are not aware of?  This may seem to be 
contradictory on most understandings of what it is to experience something, but later (§6.2 
Consciousness) we will look at cases (e.g. blindsight) that make us question this Cartesian picture of 
experience.  If it is the case that there can be differences of experience without experience of 
difference, then, in the case of experiences of distant stars and not so distant large objects, the 
experiences will be different, even though we can’t tell them apart and they appear to have the 
same causal consequences.  However, the fact that we can’t distinguish them might be a function of 
the fact that we haven’t probed them enough yet.  On that note, in the next section we are going to 
probe the nature of representations more deeply. 
 
4.2 Representations 
Whether the mental states we are talking about are to be thought of as essentially representational 
is a contentious issue.  Some just assume that such states, states that carry information about the 
world to be used as a basis for behaviour, are representations, but recently there have been strong 
arguments put forward by anti-representationalists.  However, I will contend that the view of 
representationalism attacked by the antis is a mostly straw man.  The view presented here contains 
102 
 
representations, but doesn’t interpret this word in the wrong sense as their being the objects of 
direct experience that indirectly re-present the world to a subject, as such interpretations suffer 
from homuncular objections.  Rather, I will use the term in the right sense, of there being internal 
states whose function it is to carry information about the world for use in certain cognitive 
processes, for example, when thinking about aspects of the world ‘offline,’ or when acting fast and 
fluidly, where there is not enough time for collection and processing of detailed information from 
the world itself. 
For a historical origin of representationalist thinking we can cite Descartes and Locke.  Although they 
may have been on opposite sides of the epistemological debate between rationalism and 
empiricism, they shared the picture of perception as being a matter of the world being represented 
to a subject through intermediate internal states between the sense organs and the perceiving 
subject.  For Descartes, this is clear, as the subject is immaterial and receives input from the body.  
For Locke, the world is presented to the mind via the qualities of experience.  Generally, Locke is 
taken as the source of the position known as indirect realism: roughly, the external world causes 
impingements on sensory organs forming representations, and we experience those 
representations.  The advantage of such a view is that it accounts for errors in perception: if we 
directly perceived the world, how could we be wrong about it?  The disadvantage is that we cannot 
be sure we ever perceive things how they in fact are: a ‘veil’ is drawn between us and the world.  
The position has an intuitiveness to it: to say we perceive the world indirectly via our sense organs 
seems trivially true.  But if you ask people to look at a patch of red and point to where the redness is 
located, most people will not point at their head (unless they have studied philosophy).  If the 
redness is in the object, that would be a case of direct perception.  However, in the case of 
phenomena like afterimages, it seems to make sense to say the colour is in the head.  The 
disagreement comes down to whether we take a red afterimage to be of the same kind as an 
experience of an actual patch of red in the external world. 
Arguments against indirect realism have taken many forms, including forms of the private language 
argument.  This argues that it is incoherent to say things like ‘This is what I mean by “red”,’ referring 
to an internal, private representation I am experiencing, because the meaning of the word ‘red’ is a 
public thing, and must be definable by reference to publically available properties.  In other words, 
ordinarily we use the language item ‘red’ to refer to a property of things in the world, not in the 
head.  A similar attack directed more specifically at intentional action is Ryle’s regress (Ryle, 1949, 
pp. 30-31).  Against the common-sense representationalist picture where there are intentional 
states with representational content (beliefs and desires) preceding every action, Ryle says that if 
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having an idea (like believing and desiring a state of affairs) can also be seen as a kind of action, 
which is plausible, then this too must be preceded by ideas that explain that action, and so on.   
Ultimately, such attacks fail as they target a caricature.  We don’t need a private language to refer to 
our internal states, just a personal understanding of a public language.  Indeed, the redness is in the 
object perceived to be red, but there is, nevertheless, an internal state in me that performs the 
function of representing red things, not by standing between my experience and the object, but by 
just being my experience of the colour of the object.  To address the regress argument, not every 
action is preceded by, explicit, conceptualised representational states, just a special subset, and 
having a belief or desire is not necessarily in that subset.  Some of this has already been covered, and 
some will be further clarified below, but there are other contemporary attacks to consider first. 
There has been a move in cognitive science in recent years towards a more direct engagement with 
the world, one that doesn’t require intermediaries to represent the world to the agent, with much of 
the cognitive load placed in the world (enactive, externalist, embodied, embedded theories, e.g. 
(Thompson, 2008)).  Much of this line of thinking accords with the present account, applying as it 
does the principles of parsimony and economy, which are both epistemologically and evolutionarily 
good: it makes sense to ‘use the world as its own representation’ (Brooks, 1991) when possible.  
Why spend resources storing and manipulating complex representations of the world, when the 
world is right there with the information at hand?  There are two questions for such views: does this 
make them wholly non-representational, and are there not circumstances where it does make sense 
to use internally represented information as a basis for action? 
Many cognitive scientists, e.g. Fodor (1983), have treated the mind as modular, with peripheral 
systems (perception, action), and central systems (thinking and planning), each ‘encapsulated,’ using 
a ‘proprietory’ code, basically being multiple black boxes taking inputs and giving outputs.  Recently 
this has been questioned, with some (e.g. Prinz (2006)) claiming that the same representations may 
be used in various mental processes (e.g. both perceptual and motor representations may be used in 
planning), while others opt for a more radical colonisation of the mind by a particular type, e.g. Noë 
(2004), who claims that the mental processes involved in action are used also for perception.  
O’Regan and Noë (2001) ask how representations, traditionally construed, help. For them, seeing is a 
way of acting rather than a way of representing.  The outside world is its own representation: ‘seeing 
occurs when the organism masters what we call the governing laws of sensorimotor contingency’ 
(O'Regan & Noë, 2001, p. 939).  This helps explain phenomena like expectation effects, change 
blindness, etc.: ‘vision is a mode of exploration of the world that is mediated by knowledge, on the 
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part of the perceiver,…. the structure of the rules governing the sensory changes produced by 
various motor actions’ (O'Regan & Noë, 2001, pp. 940-1).   
Despite their arguing against representationalist accounts of perception, they do talk about ‘cortical 
representations’ (O'Regan & Noë, 2001, p. 968), and the ‘lawful’ way they change as we navigate the 
world.  In other words, there are mental states (cortically realised) that carry information about the 
world that we use as a basis for action, and which is based on our understanding of the regularities 
of the world.  So, setting aside the idea of a perceiving subject sitting in the head being presented 
with detailed, image-like representations of the world outside, planning actions and sending 
instructions to the body, it is not clear to me how this is significantly different from the ‘right’ 
version of representationalism outlined in the previous section.  Just because we give up on the idea 
of a detailed internal representation of the world given to us by our eyes, which acts as the direct 
object of perception, as an intermediary between us and the world ‘out there,’ doesn’t mean that 
we should say there are no representations at all, that is, no internal states that are coupled to 
aspects of the external world and that act as stimuli for our actions.  We may use the world as its 
own representation when that is the most efficient way of doing things, but it is not always. 
In fact, I think there is a problem in this way of talking.  The world doesn’t represent itself, it just 
presents itself.  The representations are the mental states that carry that information.  It may be, for 
example, that we don’t represent the positions of all the pieces on a chess board and deliberate on 
the position internally, the chess board is right there keeping track of itself.  But when we pick up a 
piece we use some internal states to coordinate hand and eye, even if this is done by constant 
feedback from the world itself rather than being an action plotted according to detailed inner 
models of the chess board.  Interestingly, though, a master chess player can have a detailed inner 
representation of the chess board on which he bases his deliberations, as shown by the ability to 
play blindfold chess.  Normal people too use constructed models to predict how the world will act in 
situations where we can’t wait for feedback.  When acting fast and fluently, rather than performing 
a movement and getting feedback, which takes time, we predict, or model, the expected outcome of 
an action based on experience, and feed this information forward.  The result of such actions 
informs future similar actions, either by readjusting the models due to failure, or reinforcing it 
through success (e.g. Basso (2006)).  In short, enactivism has a point: some of our way of 
representing the world may be based on possibilities for action; they present the world in ways that 
afford certain behaviours, which is based on the models of the world we build up through 
experience of interacting with it.  But this is still a kind of representation, and it doesn’t account for 
all our ways of acting in the world.   
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As pointed out, anti-representationalists often take representationalists to be saying that mental 
representations are intermediate and detailed.  However, phenomena like change-blindness (Simons 
& Levin, 1997) (where subjects do not see even large-scale changes in a visual scene) tell against the 
simple idea that our representations convey the world to us such a way that the details are 
contained in our representations, waiting for us to pay attention to them, as they show that it can be 
surprisingly difficult to notice changes that should be obvious; it can be quite difficult to locate 
significant changes in a visual scene, even when we are looking for them.  We can take this to show 
that we don’t have detailed, conscious representations, or that, although the detail is there ready to 
be accessed, that access is not a simple matter of just looking.  Looked at this way, change blindness 
may not show that we do not have detailed representations, just that we are not aware of changes 
because we don’t consciously compare all details from one moment to the next: ‘change of 
representation is not representation of change’ (Chrisley, pers. comm., 2009).  Much of the 
misunderstanding goes back to Locke’s idea that there is a relationship of resemblance between the 
representation and the represented, this being what makes the representation about what it is 
about.  But rather than resemblance, what we should focus on is how the information in a 
representation is used.  An internal representation, or model, need not resemble what it is about in 
any way.  The important thing is whether actions based on it are appropriate in the context (Holland 
& Goodman, 2003, p. 79).   
Neither are representations intermediate between the subjects and objects of experience; having a 
representation that is used as a basis for conscious action in the world is just what it is to be a 
perceiving subject; we could call this representationalist direct realism.  Moreover, we use this form 
of representationalism to distinguish things like us, whose actions can be given true explanations in 
terms of mental states, from things that may merely be metaphorically described as acting for 
reasons, through the existence of such complex internal states that stand for aspects of the complex 
world and which are used in the formation of actions. 
 
4.3 Content 
Earlier, I advocated a topographical account of natural kinds, which, I claimed, has the advantage of 
being realist while giving due consideration to how our understanding of the structure of the world 
develops scientifically, and being able to cope with a messy, uncertain world where what makes a 
thing the thing it is depends on more than a pure, internal and eternal essence.  As such, that 
account adverts to the structure of both the mind and the world, and this is doubly so when it comes 
to talk of mental kinds.  As scientists describing cognitive kinds, we depend on a mixture of internal 
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and external facts (pace methodological solipsism); as individuals the experience of tokening a 
cognitive kind depends on more than the brain alone (pace solipsism).  In both cases, a key feature 
of a mental state that plays a role in determining behaviour will be the information carried by that 
state, that is, what it tells the organism about the world, or its content.  It is to this that we now turn.  
Another way of saying that mental states represent is to say that they have content; they ‘say’ 
something about the world in a way that can be judged as accurate or not.  For example, a subject 
may have a belief with the content, ‘There is a red snake in that log pile.’   This may or may not be 
the case, but that informational content may be used to explain the subject’s reaction.  What is the 
nature of that content?  It could be that the vehicles of that content in the mental process between 
perception to action is a mental image that resembles a red snake, just as a photo of a red snake can 
be said to represent a snake by virtue of resemblance (Locke, 1700).  Another possibility is that the 
information is carried in the way that sentences in a language do, with symbols that have semantic 
content and syntactic structure (Fodor, 1975).  A theory of the motivational mental states behind 
action needs to give an account of the nature of the content of these states and how it gets to be 
there. 
There is an important, if controversial, distinction to be made between conceptual and non-
conceptual content.   Roughly, if the cognisor possesses the concept that is used to pick out the 
mental state, it is conceptual.  Possessing a concept means having some mental content that 
satisfies the generality constraint (Evans, 1982), which requires the ability to re-identify objects 
picked out by that concept, and classify together objects that are similar enough to each other to fall 
under it.  For example, an adult human will normally possess the concepts RED and SNAKE, which 
are tokened when they perceive a red snake, meaning they are able to group together other objects 
that fall under those concepts.  In addition, they may be able to infer that an object that falls under 
both those concepts is likely to be venomous, and so should be avoided.   On the other hand, a pre-
linguistic infant will not have these concepts (assuming they are not innate), so will lack the 
classificatory abilities of adults, and also the fearful reaction to potentially venomous creatures.  The 
mental state that represents the colour of the thing in the log pile to the infant does carry 
information about that object, but that information is not correctly named by the linguistic concept 
RED.  If we as observers were to name that non-conceptual content, we might want to give it a label 
that allows us to identify it, but it would have to be something less general than RED, something that 
is ‘narrower,’ in that it refers not to the broad category ‘red,’ but to the specific wavelengths that 
excite that particular activity in the visual system.   
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I will for present purposes purposely ignore the disagreement about whether there is such a thing as 
content that is not conceptual and take both conceptual and non-conceptual content as necessary 
for a science of mental states that can talk about both language wielding and non-linguistic 
creatures, as well as the non-linguistic action of linguistic creatures.  In fact, the distinction is likely a 
continuum rather than a dichotomy, and most of our mental lives are spent ‘…awash in a partially 
differentiated, partially objective, mind-world continuum…. The exercise of a concept is the result, 
both literally and metaphorically, of our ability to find our way in the environment; to stay afloat’ 
(Cussins, 1990, p. 411).   
A related distinction is that between narrow and wide content, that is, between content that 
involves referring to kinds of things and properties in the world, and content that is not involved in 
reference fixing and instead only carries information about the perceptual presentation of 
experiences (Cussins, 1990, p. 379).  To use the example of the concept ELM, you can make true 
statements about elms, e.g. ‘Brighton & Hove has the last surviving population of native elms in the 
UK,’ despite not possessing the ability to identify an elm (the content of the statement does not 
depend on the contents of your head).  But your actions in relation to elm trees seem to rely more 
on your internal resources: in order to say, ‘That is an elm’ while pointing at a tree and be right 
(ignoring the possibility of being right by chance), you need to be able to token a mental state with 
the appropriate broad, conceptual content. 
This is distinct from the question of whether the supervenience base of psychological kinds 
contained in intentional explanations is ‘broad,’ which is a causal rather than an informational 
matter (see §5.3 Externalism).  That is to say, the question of whether our concept of content is 
broad is metaphysical, whereas the question of whether the laws of psychology are broad is 
empirical (Fodor, 1994, p. 24).  A potential problem arises here, in the form of ‘twin’ cases: on Twin 
Earth, where ‘water’ refers to XYZ, watery thoughts leading to actions involving the clear liquid lying 
in puddles will have the same narrow content (ignoring the complication that we might know 
something about chemistry), but different broad content, and so will be involved in different causal 
generalisations, assuming those generalisations are stated ‘broadly.’  If psychological laws refer to 
intentional, broad contents, but their implementations are narrow, Fodor thinks there must be a 
mechanism that causes covariance between the two in such a way as to make twin cases seem 
strange (i.e. not very common) (Fodor, 1994, p. 27).  
The solution may lie in non-conceptual content.  The sameness of the narrow content in twin cases 
depends on not knowing about the chemical composition of water, and this lack means, in effect, 
that the concept of water is not fully realised, as not knowing this will lead to failures of 
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generalisations, as the twin case highlights.  If we assume full possession of the concepts in both 
worlds, i.e. a mental representation that contains sufficient information to avoid failures of 
generalisation, then the narrow content would not be the same, and we should distinguish the 
concepts tokened in watery thoughts in this and that world.  However, if we insist on full concept 
possession in this sense, then our psychological laws will be restricted to a small set of actions of a 
small set of creatures. 
Fodor’s answer relies on the relationship between subjects, propositions, and the world.  In the real-
world example of the concepts ELM and BEECH, informational semantics equates content to the 
dispositions of application (Fodor, 1994, p. 30), so a subject who can’t distinguish between two 
different natural kinds does not possess the concepts of those kinds.  But, the application of the 
concepts ELM and BEECH have different truth conditions, therefore differing in content, leading 
Fodor to conclude that a ‘broad’ psychology fails to see why subjects’ behavioural dispositions 
should be identical in both cases (Fodor, 1994, p. 34).  He states, semantics is about counterfactual 
dispositions and shouldn’t be confused with epistemological questions of what one needs to do to 
check if one’s thoughts are true (Fodor, 1994, p. 37): if one needs to distinguish between an elm and 
a beech one will consult a book; most of the time, it doesn’t matter.  Broad, intentional psychology 
can be true despite such Frege cases if such cases are not ‘systematic,’ that is, if they are exceptions 
that can be handled with ceteris paribus clauses (Fodor, 1994, p. 46).  Nor do we need to fall back on 
narrow contents in the exceptional cases, as propositional attitudes are three place relations 
between a creature, a proposition, and a mode of presentation (Fodor, 1994, p. 47). The content of 
the proposition is broad, but the mode of presentation is different, which explains the different 
desires (and different behaviour) that result.  The fact that an individual’s behaviour is caused by his 
or her narrow, internal, processes doesn’t mean that psychological laws and explanations should 
refer to narrow content, but rather, psychological laws are broad and supervene on individuals, each 
of whom may have a slightly different mode of presentation of the broad content.  Fodor concludes 
that as long as we are reliable devices for arriving at beliefs and desires that permit us to act 
rationally in the world we are in, then those modes of presentation will succeed in their roles, and 
intentional laws will supervene on individual minds (Fodor, 1994, pp. 51-4). 
This view certainly has its merits, but a major problem with it is that it relies on there being an 
attitude taken towards a mental token with propositional structure, thereby excluding cases where 
no proposition-like state is tokened in the mind of the actor, as in non-linguistic creatures and pre-
linguistic humans, and indeed normal adults when they are acting fluently and without conscious 
deliberation.  In such cases we might rely on internalised models of features of the world that are 
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particularly useful, e.g. something like a map, or a list of cues to be followed.  Unless we want to 
take Fodor’s route and posit the existence of proposition-like structures in the minds of non-
language users, we have to have a more liberal understanding of the kinds of mental content that 
can enter our psychological generalisations.  To see how this might be possible, we should first 
review the various accounts of mental content used in scientific explanations to see if any of them 
more naturally allow a place for such content. 
The classical theories of conceptual content are imagism (e.g. Locke (1700)) and definitionism (e.g. 
Russell (1905)), the former being where possessing a concept means having an image of the thing 
the concept is of tokened in the mind, the latter being where it would mean knowing the definition 
that uniquely picks out the thing or things the concept is about.  Imagism relies on the similarity of 
the mental token and the thing it represents, and comes in at least two forms, these being prototype 
(Rosch, 1999) and exemplar (Smith, 1999) theories.  In one, when we perceive something, we 
compare it to stored prototypes, which are sort of average representatives of things, and classify it 
according to its similarity to one of those prototypes.  In the other, we store a set of previously 
experienced exemplars of kinds of things and compare a new stimulus to those to see if it fits.  The 
problem with this is that it relies too heavily on perceptual similarity rather than something more 
fundamental, and so can’t accommodate examples where, despite a lack of resemblance, we may 
want to classify two things as of the same kind for other reasons.   
Definitionism doesn’t have this problem, as the definition will only include how things look if this is 
indeed essential to being that kind of thing.  The problem is that there are few examples of 
unproblematic definitions that succeed in picking out all and only the type of thing they are 
supposed to.  Furthermore, if we have the wrong definition in mind when we use a word, we will fail 
to refer to the thing we think the word names.  A refinement of this is the theory theory (Gopnik & 
Meltzoff, 1997), where concepts get their meanings due to being part of a theory about things, a 
theory that we build like scientists making hypotheses and testing them against experience.  This has 
the advantage of not requiring a specification of necessary and sufficient conditions of application 
for each term, as the defining happens due to the relations that term has to others in the theoretical 
structure.  The problem with this is that since each individual constructs their own theory 
throughout their life, and terms are holistically defined by the whole theoretical structure, it is 
problematic to say that individuals share concepts with each other. 
Fodor’s proposed therapy for these problems for theories of content is atomism, in which a mental 
state gets its content due purely to its syntax, that is, the way it relates to other concepts in the 
system of concepts, rather than being decomposable into semantic parts.  It is a causal notion, 
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where symbols tokened in the brain have the functional role of representing aspects of the world in 
mental processes, and fulfil this if their causal profile is suitable for it to combine with other items in 
the mental language in the right way.  Being purely formal, this fits with classical computationalism, 
where the brain is seen as a computer that operates on mental symbols, with the body providing as 
input and output channels.  One problem with this view is an implausible amount of assumed innate 
conceptual content, as the analysis of propositions into a combination of concepts, and concepts 
into other more basic concepts, has to bottom out somewhere (Clark, 1994).  Fodor seems to accept 
this conclusion, even in his later work (Fodor, 2008), for much the same reason that Plato (Meno, 
81c-85d) thought that learning is actually the eternal soul remembering what it already knew: 
concepts cannot be learnt without already having the ability to token them.  There is also the 
problem of the place of understanding, which is a general problem for any sort of functional role 
semantics if Searle’s Chinese room objection has teeth (see §6.1 Virtual Machines). 
All these theories are ‘full-bodied’ with regard to content, that is, a concept token in the mind 
contains within itself all the resources necessary to determine what it is about.  This fits with Fodor’s 
methodological solipsism: the world provides input, but cognitive scientific explanations need only 
refer to goings on within the brain.  In opposition to this are embodied accounts, which do not rely 
on self-contained symbolic representations (e.g. Barsalou (2009)).  These are such that the role of 
the body and the world cannot simply be ‘bracketed.’  Narrow conceptual contents are kept to an 
economic minimum and much cognitive work can be shared by other, embodied cognitive systems, 
or off-loaded onto the evolutionary and social niches we develop in.   
The result of such a shift in emphasis is a reasonably radical reversal in the role of understanding.  
Rather than being almost a side-effect of the syntactic, and therefore causal, properties of symbolic 
representations, understanding is key in the meaningful actions that play a role in concept formation 
and use.  Thus, implementation of mental processes cannot be internalised to purely narrow 
content; embedded and embodied theories build ‘representations’ up from physically and socially 
situated practices, and the syntactic structure of those states can be seen as deriving from, rather 
determining, what they are about, i.e. their semantics. 
In the case of those contentful mental states involved in deliberate acting, and assuming that we to 
a greater or lesser extent succeed in understanding other folk’s actions in order to predict and 
explain them well enough, when asked, we may advert to beliefs, desires and suchlike in our 
explanations, even though, most of the time, when just acting, we seem to simply read intentions 
directly from behaviour without explicitly reasoning about inferred mental states.  There are two 
interconnected questions about this general picture: What are the contributions of innate mental 
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structures on the one hand, and developmentally inculcated cultural resources on the other, to the 
cognitive abilities we develop? Also: When we use intentional concepts like beliefs and desires in 
explanation, what kinds of processes/events must be the case for those explanations to be true?  
There are two responses to these questions we should be cautious of. 
First, we shouldn’t assume that the only truth makers of intentional explanations must be discrete, 
fully conceptual counterparts to lexical concepts contained in brains.  As mentioned, there also 
needs to be room for other states that are more like abstracted models or maps, constructed with 
non-conceptual content which can nevertheless be called belief-like or desire-like due to the role 
they play in the system.  Second, we shouldn’t assume that since such counterparts are not always 
needed for intentional explanations, then there are no such states in any cases.  It is a mistake to 
look for a single style of explanation; sometimes our behaviour is explicable without positing the 
tokening of conceptual mental contents, and sometimes the best explanation will posit such things.  
The world is a messy place and our theorising should reflect that. 
Part of the reason for the mess may be that when referring to a theory of mind, we could be 
referring to a scientific theory of minds in general, or to the mental module that some scientists 
posit as the evolved mechanism individuals use to understand the behaviour of others.  Whether the 
‘theory of mind’ is an innate module (Baron-Cohen, 1995), or the result of a developmental process 
of hypothesis testing (Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997), whether we understand others through simulating 
their behaviour and understanding it as if it were ours, or indeed if we do all of these things, such 
abilities are founded on more basic, embodied (emotional, sensory-motor, perceptual and 
nonconceptual) practices.  As such, the ‘second-person’ (as opposed to the third-person of 
theoretical approaches) remains our basic mode of understanding others.  Such understanding is 
‘direct and pragmatic’ (Gallagher, 2001, p. 86) because the intention is expressed explicitly in the 
behaviour rather than inferred from it (as it would be in the third-person mode), but that doesn’t 
mean there are no explicit, conceptualised intentions ‘behind’ actions in any case.  In other words, it 
is a mistake to take a certain, advanced capacity and inflate its relevance, assuming that it must be 
like that ‘all the way down.’  Equally, but oppositely, it would be a mistake to say that because we 
‘read’ intentions directly from behaviour, then there are no states we can call beliefs and desires 
causing that behaviour: rather, it is a pragmatic point. 
Avoiding those errors, I would advocate a middle way.  We are not fully abstracted thinkers, 
deliberating dispassionately, uninfluenced by biology; neither are we purely reactive creatures of the 
flesh.  There are at least two interacting dynamics together forging mental states that can be called 
intentional: bottom up (non-conceptual, emotional, perceptual, sensory-motor, etc.) and top-down 
112 
 
(theoretical, conceptual, etc.).  Both these take place in an evolved system and niche, and include an 
assumption of a perspective, a first-person viewpoint.   
Therefore, I accept Cussins’ (1990) statement that a classically computationalist account whose 
causal connections rely on the syntactic properties of semantically evaluable states ‘is unworkable 
because it cannot capture, in a theoretically adequate way, the cognitive significance of indexical 
and demonstrative contents’ (Cussins, 1990, p. 412).  That is, there are explanatorily relevant first-
person facts about the way the world is presented to a subject that are not characterisable as the 
subject’s possession of a concept, because the subject lacks the dispositions necessary, for example 
being able to recognise another instance as being of the same kind.   
However, I wouldn’t accept Cussins claim that, although ‘concept possession would be causally 
legitimated by the scientific levels of a [non-conceptualist] framework…, conceptual 
characterizations of content would play no role in the scientific psychological explanations of the 
behaviour of the system’ (Cussins, 1990, p. 437).  This may indeed be the case in non-linguistic 
creatures: we can say that a dog has a concept-like representation of bones (not the human concept 
BONE) because of the kinds of behaviour towards bones that it exhibits (and its behaviour when 
there are no bones present), without saying that it is manipulating a symbolic representation with 
the content ‘bone’ according to the syntactic properties of said symbol.  But a significant difference 
is introduced in the case of creatures that explicitly use linguistic concepts, where we learn the 
meanings of linguistic symbols, as well as how those symbols combine with others, during the 
process of maturation as a member of a language using community.  This difference may not be 
sharp.  Words are means of pulling oneself up from the reactive to the more reflective, a gradual 
process and one that may require some effort, but one whose benefits, in terms of the 
understanding and the capacities that result, can be passed on to others. 
Concepts are used to refer to what the contents of minds tell the creature about the world, or what 
it knows.  The ‘gold standard’ is knowing that you know, but that is a high bar, and many other kinds 
of cognition count as knowledge.  ‘Know-how’ (Ryle, 1946), like being able to ride a bike, is of course 
a special case.  I may forget that I know how to ride a bike, for some reason, which will affect my 
actions when asked if I would like to go on a ride, but that doesn’t mean I don’t know how to ride 
one.  In terms of ‘knowledge-that,’ I may also know that bikes need oiling weekly if you live near the 
coast, but not act on it because I have not had the fact brought to the ‘front’ of my mind.  When 
someone looks at my rusty chain and reminds me, I may say, ‘I knew that’.   
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So, knowing something is evidenced by being disposed towards certain behaviours in particular 
circumstances, but is explained by there being states with particular contents that may be triggered 
by circumstances.  As always there are caveats: how much prompting is allowed before we say 
someone doesn’t know something?  Thus, if a prompt is needed to remind me of something (‘Isn’t it 
a special day tomorrow…?’), then I can claim I knew it.  But if I require numerous prompts, perhaps I 
can’t say I did.  Moreover, some statements may require little prompting, not because you knew the 
answer, but because the answer is in some way obvious.  The boy in Plato’s Meno, then, cannot be 
said to have known what the length of the side of a square with twice the area of a given square 
was, as it took many leading questions to arrive at the answer.  The answer to each question may be 
self-evident, but someone can’t be said to know it unless they have tokened a mental state with that 
content before, and this has dispositional consequences.  This discussion leads to an interesting 
empirical question: What role does non-conceptual content play in judgements of self-evident truths 
like spatial or mathematical ones?  In other words, what is the role of experience in judgements that 
are generally taken to be a priori (Sloman, 2008)? 
In relation to the discussion on the emergence of intentionality, there are two aspects of the account 
of how non-conceptual content contributes to conceptual contents that are relevant: it is diachronic, 
and results from work done (energy expended) by the subject.  When it comes to concept 
possession, we can take a top-down approach (like Fodor), or bottom-up one (like the 
connectionists).  Sometimes it may be right to take as our starting point the abstraction of language-
like states (to treat these as atoms), e.g. when we want to explore the nature of systems that 
manipulate symbolic token with semantic interpretations, which we sometimes are, ceteris paribus.  
Fodor & Pylyshyn (1988) might have been right, to an extent, that the lower-level details are ‘mere’ 
implementation with respect to such systems.  But, if we want to ask other questions, e.g. about 
how our concepts are formed, the implementation is important, because our concepts are formed 
from non-conceptual parts through time (on evolutionary, cultural and personal scales), these 
accumulations eventually forming generalizable concepts that allow us to group objects together 
usefully in kinds, which can be analysed in terms of topographical regions in conceptual space.   
Much of the rest of what follows will be telling the story of how such concepts are formed, which 
will also function to explain why such mental kinds will not be reducible to statements that refer 
only to their physical realisations.  Part of this story will address the question of what needs to be 
the case for us to say of something that there is something it is like to be that thing (Chapter 6: 
Physically Embodied Minds), and why such creatures are the kinds of things about which true 
intentional explanations are made. 
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Chapter 5: Embodied Agents 
5.1 Rational agency 
Before returning to whether reasons for an agent can be the kinds of causes referred to in scientific 
explanations, we should be clear about what acting for a reason amounts to.  To make predictions 
about the behaviour of those we take to be agents, we assume rationality on their behalf (Heyes & 
Dickinson, 1990, p. 107; Dennett, 1987, p. 185), that is, we take them to be acting for reasons.  This 
assumption is similar to those we make when predicting the behaviour of any object: we assume 
that there is something about the object that makes it like other things of the same kind, and which 
will cause it to behave like things of that kind do.  In the case of rocks that amounts to, partly, 
assumptions about the behaviour of certain minerals in the conditions we find them.  In the case of 
agents, it amounts to assuming agents will act in accordance with the reasons they have and their 
context, including normative standards: taking all your clothes off is irrational in sub-zero 
temperatures, even though it is explicable in the delusional stage of hypothermia.  In this chapter, I 
will flesh out what these assumptions amount to by looking at what we mean by ‘agent,’ by ‘action,’ 
(which bears on which behaviours of agents we are interested in), and finally by ‘rational’ (which 
bears on what we are assuming about agents and their reasons for action). 
An agent is a creature situated in an environment from which it receives information that is used as 
a basis for actions within that environment in order to achieve certain goals the system has (much 
more on this in §6.3 Panpsychism & Composition).  In other people’s words: ‘An autonomous agent… 
is a system situated in, and part of, an environment, which senses that environment, and acts on it, 
over time, in pursuit of its own agenda’ (Franklin, 2003, p. 51); or, ‘Agents actively sense their 
environment, have aims that form the basis for decisions and plans, and act on them’ (Aleksander & 
Dunmall, 2003, p. 8).  What it is to sense the environment and to have that information available for 
use can be cashed out in terms of the tokening of representational states as detailed above (§4.2 
Representations).  The way that this sensing is shaped by the goals it is put to use in achieving, and 
in turn shapes those goals, will be further explored below (§5.2 Feedback and Feedforward).   
If being a performer of actions is part of the definition of being an agent, we need an independent 
definition of action.  Certain behaviours, like eyeball saccades that scan visual scenes to build 
representations of it, are not actions, as they are subpersonal and nonconceptual (Prinz, 2006, p. 
14); they don’t satisfy the generality constraint (Evans, 1982), and are not norm governed 
(McDowell, 1994).  By contrast, behaviours that count as actions are driven by concept using 
mechanisms.  In picking up a cup to drink from it, my behaviour is an action as it uses the 
representation of the cup and its contents, but the particular movements and processes involved in 
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moving my arm, aligning my hand, grasping, bringing the lip of the cup to my lip, etc., are not actions 
themselves.  Whether there are some cases, e.g. animal actions, that can count as actions despite 
being non-conceptual we will return to below (§7.2.1 United We Stand). 
Rationality is also defined in relation to actions, that is, a rational act is one done for a reason, and 
only actions performed for reasons can be called rational.  The agent has mental states that contain 
information about the world, about the goal state of the world, and how to achieve that; what 
distinguishes such actions from triggered reactions is the normativity constraint: the agent’s reasons 
can be wrong, for example having mistaken beliefs about how to bring about the goal state.  Being 
based on faulty reasoning doesn’t make an action irrational; the possibility of being wrong is 
necessary to being rational.  For triggered reflexes, it isn’t clear we can say they are wrong when 
they are triggered, since evolution may design them to be oversensitive if the costs of a certain 
proportion of ‘false positives’ are lower than those of a proportion of ‘false negatives.’   
Thus, behaviour that results from subpersonal, automatic causal processes is not rationally 
evaluable.  Salivating caused by seeing and smelling food is not an action based on decisions of the 
agent’s that can be said to be faulty.  The drives behind actions, whether evolved or ‘programmed,’ 
act as ‘motive generators’ (Sloman, 1987), and may themselves be judged to be rational or not 
depending on whether they fit with other, broader goals of the system.  So, given that a person has a 
shoe fetish, obtaining shoes is rational, in that it achieves their desire for shoes.  But sexual desire 
related to shoes could be judged irrational in that it does not serve the broader aim of reproduction.  
Putting that aside, in deliberating, we imagine possible situations and actions and choose between 
them.  Consciously deciding in this way is engaging in ‘voluntary’ action (Baars, 1997, p. 131).  The 
success or failure of actions brought about as the result of conscious deliberations will inevitably 
inform future deliberations in relevantly similar situations. 
For an action to be rational the beliefs behind it must be sensitive to the causal consequences of the 
action (Heyes & Dickinson, 1990, pp. 108-9). This means that simple observations of behaviour alone 
are insufficient warrant to attribute intentionality to creatures (Heyes & Dickinson, 1990, p. 112), 
and bars us from counting thermostats and other simple homeostatic mechanisms as intentional 
(Heyes & Dickinson, 1990, p. 113).  There is a relativity here, though: the actions we perform 
become habit, and may not be immediately sensitive to changed environmental contingencies, but 
can still be said to be rational.  We need to include a ‘reasonableness’ condition: a state is a belief if 
the creature would change it under conditions accepted as adequate to cause a change. 
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There is a difference between this position and Dennett’s intentional stance: ‘Whenever one can 
successfully adopt the intentional stance toward an object, I call that object an intentional system’ 
(Dennett, 1981, p. 238).  He says that in order to predict the behaviour of certain systems we 
assume they are rational, and being liable to be so described is all there is to being intentional.  
There is a vagueness here regarding how well and for how long a system has to behave in the way 
we would expect a rational system to behave, but let’s say that we can, in the spirit of Turing, decide 
on a procedure, and let’s call this passing the Dennett Test.   
However, this still leaves us unable to distinguish between something’s being rational and 
something’s acting as if it were rational.  In fact, it makes it meaningless to say that something is 
merely imitating rational behaviour if it does it well enough for long enough.  In the case of the 
thermostat, Dennett assumes that taking the intentional stance towards it would not succeed in a 
sufficiently broad range of circumstances to count as a ‘successful’ adopting of the stance.  But any 
organism, or robot, or cloud of interstellar gas that passes his test, just is rational.  The same 
reasoning is used to dismiss the conceivability of philosophical zombies: anything that acts as if it 
were conscious, just is conscious.   
Is it not conceivable that a simulation of conscious behaviour could be good enough to fool enough 
people enough of the time without actually being conscious?  At what point does saying of a chess 
playing computer that it is trying to capture my queen become a literal rather than a metaphorical 
statement?  There must be criteria for distinguishing the metaphorical from the metaphysical claim 
independent from the instrumental adoption of the intentional stance, with the instrumental being a 
guide to what we might apply those criteria to, but not a diktat about what to count as intentional.  
Whatever Turing-esque test we apply, there is always a chance that something will, by chance, pass 
it.  The probability may be vanishingly small, so small that in real life it can be ignored, but in the 
world of thought experiments, this possibility is enough to say that we need other criteria to say why 
something is or is not truly rational. What such criteria may be will be looked at below (Chapter 6: 
Physically Embodied Minds); for now, we will continue to assume that it is having reasons that 
makes a rational agent, this ‘having’ being the tokening of the ‘right kind’ of mental state. 
Hurley (2003) argues that it is in the realm of action rather than abstract, conceptualised, inferential 
thought that reasons are to be located.  We can act for reasons that are not fully generalizable and 
not fully thought through, but are context bound, existing in little ‘islands’ of rationality rather than 
in the open ‘space’ of reasons (Hurley, 2003).  Reasons are not, fundamentally, for justifying beliefs 
about what to do, but rather for guiding intentional action, and consequently, we should think in 
terms of conceptual abilities rather than conceptual content (Hurley, 2003, p. 232). 
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As mentioned, to be conceptual is to satisfy a generality constraint, which in terms of reasons for 
actions requires that the reasons satisfy normative constraints that apply generally, rather than to 
the immediate context alone (Hurley, 2003, p. 233).  A creature has reasons it can call its own if, 
from its perspective and relative to other intentional states these could combine with due to the 
holism of such states, its action is reasonable given its context and the normative constraints in play.  
These normative constraints include some specification of the circumstances under which a creature 
should, if rational, alter its beliefs or desires. 
There is a spectrum from pure stimulus-response, to context-free, ‘inferentially promiscuous’ 
rationality.  Stimulus-response relations are invariable, and relatively insensitive to counterfactual 
changes in stimulus-response relations once conditioned, whereas intentional action is based on the 
holistic and normative relationship between means, ends, intentions and perceptions (Hurley, 2003).  
The fact that such flexibility is not all or nothing leads to the conclusion that creatures can act in 
ways that sufficiently satisfy the criteria of holism for intentional action, but who fall short of the 
fully flexible abilities required to be a true concept user.  This leads one to ask how much flexibility is 
required to be said to have a concept, and how often, if ever, we achieve that level.   
The Wason selection test (Wason, 1968) indicates that we don’t naturally operate at the level of the 
fully general.  This test shows that while we intuitively know how to check if a rule of social 
obligation is being violated, this ability does not generalise to checking violation of the same rule 
presented in a way devoid of social context.  Take the social rule, ‘If you help make the bread, you 
can help eat the bread.’   We know that to check for violation of this rule we check that those who 
are eating it have helped to make it.  But to check a rule like ‘If a card has a picture on it then the 
other side will be blue,’ which has no social connotations, many who have not studied formal logic 
will check any non-blue cards despite the fact that the appearance or not of a picture on the reverse 
side of such a card has no bearing on the rule.  We may not, as Hurley (2003, p. 241) says, always 
exercise our conceptual abilities in a fully flexible way, but if we conclude from that that we should 
not really count ourselves as fully-fledged concept users, then the term would be robbed of its 
meaning.  Therefore, we need a less strict definition of what it means to be rational. 
As we noted, normativity requires the possibility of making mistakes, of not correctly applying a 
general rule that has been abstracted from previous instances.  We have to be able to say that the 
agent mistakenly acted for a particular reason, rather than merely reinterpreting the reason to 
explain the action.  In order to do this (i.e. to solve the rule-following problem of Kripke (1982), after 
Wittgenstein), we need criteria of correctness external to the organism that was acting (Hurley, 
2003, p. 241).  Complex organisms like us, which use representational feedforward and feedback 
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control mechanisms (see §5.2 Feedback and Feedforward), are embedded in an environment and 
have a teleological history (biological and social) that underpins functions and thus normativity 
(Hurley, 2003, p. 243).  Reason and action take place in the world; we perceive the world and our 
actions in it, and the effects of these actions feed back into an updated perspective.  In the case of 
fast, expert action, we create expectations to complete the loop internally.  Such ‘forward models’ 
may also be used to predict what other modules may do, and what other agents may do, thus 
favouring a simulation model rather than a theory of mind to predict the behaviour of others 
(Hurley, 2003, p. 243).  These kinds of simulation-driven processes are relatively context bound due 
to their being more a case of having skills rather than knowledge, know-how rather than know-that 
(Hurley, 2003, p. 251). 
To be said to act for a reason and not just be describable as acting in agreement with reasons, that 
reason must be the cause of the action. Reasons don’t have to be things that we are conscious of 
having, but they are still at the personal level, as they are normative and holistic, which provides a 
‘coarse recombinant structure’ (Hurley, 2003, p. 234).  Rather than existing in a ‘space of reasons,’ 
where all contents are laid out and the interconnections between them laid bare, there are ‘islands 
of reasons emerging from a sea of causes…. language provides the bridges that finally link these 
islands together’ (Hurley, 2003, p. 253). 
In the coming sections we will add to this outline of mental kinds, filling in details of the story of how 
this process of emerging happens, and what conclusion this leads us to regarding the place of mental 
causation in a material world.  A recurring theme will be that of feedback, this being a dynamic at 
the centre of many processes involved in the emergence of cognition.   
 
5.2 Feedback and Feedforward 
This section highlights the centrality of the circular causal dynamics of feedback.  There are two ways 
to look at feedback in cognition: firstly, diachronically over biological, cultural and developmental 
timescales; secondly, synchronically, in lived experiencing of the world when acting in it, where the 
phenomenal character of our present experience is partly formed by the accumulated deposits of 
our experiences, individually, culturally, and biologically.  This is in contrast with a naïve view of 
perception which takes the input as given and then applies knowledge to this input in processing.  
Rather, we see that the input is often formed by these contingencies, it comes as an experience of 
something, rather than being pure information that is discovered to be about something, post 
processing. 
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 …our capacity to relive or rekindle contentful events is the most important feature of 
consciousness…. this echoic capacity is due in large part to habits of self-stimulation that we pick up 
from human culture… the Joycean machine in our brains is a virtual machine made of memes. 
(Dennett, 2005, pp. 171-2) 
An important feature of the kinds of feedback in play in cognition, I will argue, is that they lead to 
emergence of the kind that blocks reduction without violating physicalism.  Feedback based on small 
differences, changes at bifurcation points, leads to the emergence of one thing rather than another.  
In the case of physical systems like fluids, small, random events, plus the background constraints of 
the surroundings, may lead to the emergence of phenomena like whirlpools.  We can make general 
statements about the causal powers of whirlpools, and even though we may not be able to predict 
their emergence due to the indeterminism of the initial random event, we can explain those causal 
powers in terms of those of the individual particles caught up in that dynamic.  However, in 
biological, cultural and cognitive systems, the explanation of why one form emerges rather than 
another is not purely physical, I will claim, due to the selective forces that act on them.  The causal 
powers that evolved systems have are explicable in their own terms; once the mutation event 
causes a new kind to be born, the causal powers this kind of thing has ‘slide over’ the top of the sea 
of physical causes from which they have bubbled up.  This allows us to distinguish metaphorical uses 
of intentional statements like ‘The whirlpool is trying to pull me under’, from literal uses in the case 
agents trying to drown you for some reason.   
 
5.2.1 Evolution 
The processes of evolution have built cognitive systems like us over a long period through the 
diachronic feedback that is natural selection.  Understanding how this works, and the implications it 
has for our understanding, is key to the project of naturalising intentionality, by which I mean, telling 
a convincing story of how natural processes could result in beings like us, thus lancing the boil that is 
the air of mystery that generally surrounds conscious cognitive states.  If each step on the journey 
from there to here is unmysterious, then we can conclude that there is no mystery regarding how 
we got here, even though, when looking back, we might wonder how we arrived in this place.  This is 
nothing more than to say that we are on a continuum with other animals, which should lead us both 
to have more respect for animals, and to be less arrogant about our own position in the cognitive 
hierarchy (not that we are not at the top, just that we may not be so far above those below). 
An important fact is that human kinds are subject to the triple interplay of biological, cultural & 
individual evolution.  We inherit, among other things, genes from our ancestors, beliefs and 
artefacts from our cultural forebears, and memories from our earlier self.  These processes create a 
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dynamic landscape of possibilities, analogous to three body dynamics in classical mechanics: simple 
parts creating complex and chaotic patterns.  Joint attention is an example of the biological 
underpinnings of cultural evolution: we have evolved to be able to, and to want to, notice what 
others, particularly care-givers, are paying attention to, and to direct our attention to it (Heal, 2005).  
As a result, we learn important things about our surroundings, reliably, without needing to have that 
knowledge innately given.  Furthermore, it may be that our attention is drawn to an aspect of the 
environment that we change in some way to suit us, and that with experience we might improve 
that manipulation and pass this on to those we come to care for.  This is the hominid speciality of 
cumulative downstream niche construction (Clark, 1997).  We inherit an environment that has been 
altered, and sometimes we inherit behaviours or artefacts that serve to construct an environment. 
This leads to the question of what the correct units of selection are (Lewontin, 1970).  Are they 
genes, traits, organisms, organisms together with their environments?  Evolution works if something 
can produce copies of itself, which may vary to some degree, and which may lead to differential 
success in further copying.  There is good reason, I believe, not to be reductionist about evolution, 
thinking that there is one unit of selection, namely chunks of DNA.  Not only is it not so easy to 
identify bits of DNA with genes for traits, it is impossible to specify what genes are for independently 
of an environment: the same bits of DNA could lead to different traits in different environments, and 
the same traits could be realised by different strands of DNA (Hull, 1972).  Moreover, there are many 
other kinds of things that satisfy the three conditions just given, a learnt behaviour being just one.  
All such processes involve a reproduction of something variable and selection pressures acting on 
them.  These are feedback mechanisms, which set up attractors in the dynamic landscape, where 
the initial bifurcation may be based on a random factor.   Anything that is a reliably recurring 
developmental resource (Mameli, 2004) can become part of this process, including an environment 
which is itself transformed through niche construction.   
Selective processes are inherently hierarchical, in that the competition to produce more copies of 
something may happen at different levels, but that some levels are more basic in that they are 
necessary for the higher levels (Brandon, 2007).  For example, an idea can be copied, can vary, and 
can lead to more or less copies of itself, but this can’t happen without already existing means of 
storing, communicating and acting on ideas.  If ideas are subject to evolutionary processes, and 
assuming ideas are realised in various ways in different organisms, then the best level of description 
for the causal process of evolution will be at the level of the thing being copied.  If we described only 
the physical level processes that occur when teaching an AI an idea, the idea itself would be missing.  
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Sometimes the natural unit of selection may be an allele of DNA, the whole organism, a kind of 
behaviour, or even broader social structures, where there may be no independent measure of 
similarity among the units apart from that high level of description. Brandon (2007) goes on to say 
that the environment (which may be a social structure) cannot be considered as part of what is 
selected as it is not copied, but rather it is part of a constant background in which evolution 
happens.  However, this distinction may not be as clear as it seems.  Our language is part of our 
environment, but could be said to be subject to its own evolutionary process.  The tools we use are 
reliably occurring developmental resources, but we copy and improve them.  Sometimes, we inherit 
behaviours or artefacts that serve to construct an environment, and as this is then a stable part of 
the normal development of organisms like us, which can be copied with variations that lead to 
greater or lesser success, then that is subject to selection along with other traits of an organism. The 
distinction between environment and units of selection is interest relative in the same way as that 
between a cause the background conditions.  As explained above (§3.1 Causation), the distinction 
between background conditions and causal processes depends on our explanatory interests.   
Mameli (2004) tells a story to illustrate the idea that what gets copied may not just be bits of DNA: 
that of the lucky butterfly.  Imagine a species of butterfly that lays its eggs on a particular kind of leaf 
so that its offspring have a good food source when they emerge.  This is achieved due to a 
mechanism that imprints on the kind of leaf a young butterfly first encounters, allowing it to re-
identify the right kind of leaf when it comes time to lay its own batch.  Sometimes, random errors 
enter into such processes, and occasionally eggs are deposited on the wrong kind of leaf.  Most of 
the time this would probably be a disaster for the hatchlings, leading them to not flourish and so not 
to have any descendants.  However, if by chance the eggs land on a leaf that is more nutritious than 
the original kind, the descendants of this butterfly will flourish, and they will now be imprinting on 
the new kind of leaf.  This could be called a speciation event, as the descendants of this lineage may 
be quite different merely due to the difference in nutrition, pigmentation, etc. that they receive 
from this new kind of leaf, and this in turn may lead to significant differences in behaviour.  In this 
case, the environment is not just a given background; the genes of the new species have not altered, 
the imprinting mechanism is the same: what has been selected is the kind of leaf. 
Similar arguments about externalising the units of selection apply in the case of cultural evolution.  
Culture contains developmental resources that get passed on, like the knowledge of what to eat and 
how to get it, which are a form of extragenetic inheritance.  As cultural creatures, we have the 
mechanisms (e.g. mindreading, expectation) that allow us to take advantage of this, and which, 
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because of their lack of content, permit the evolution of new behaviours and construction of new 
niches (Mameli, 2001, pp. 601-9). 
These abilities have an evolutionary advantage over genetic selection.  In social animals that have 
evolved the ability to learn behaviours from their conspecifics, advantageous behaviours can rapidly 
spread through a population without needing to wait for random genetic mutation to hit upon the 
solution.  Moreover, given that a new, advantageous behavioural trait that an organism develops in 
interaction with its environment becomes entrenched, those that can learn it more quickly and 
accurately will be more successful, and in time genes and/or cultural resources that help in this 
process may be selected for.  This is the Baldwin effect (Baldwin, 1896), where selective pressures 
work on a general learning ability so that possible behaviours can be tried out and passed on.  This 
will lead to the need to have a means of communicating the content of one’s domain general 
cognition, e.g. language.  If this is the case, then Lamarck was not so wrong: although giraffes cannot 
pass on longer necks to their offspring from a lifetime of stretching, humans can pass on a method of 
climbing smooth trees to get at the honey, and an ability to learn it. 
The possibility of non-genetic inheritance, and the multiplicity of selective mechanisms this opens 
up, means that evolution can act on many levels, and also that there can exist a variety of property 
types that have an ontological status comparable to that of the properties of ‘traditionally’ evolved 
biological organisms.  Moreover, the ‘essence’ of many of these properties may not reside in purely 
individual, internal facts, but in facts about the social environment.   One internal fact must be true 
though, and that is that we have evolved to be the kinds of creatures that are fundamentally flexible, 
so that our culture can determine how we develop.  This is one reason for having a long maturation 
process: to allow time for the process of individual development to shape us. 
We are plastic people.  Our success as a species depends on our ability to become functioning adults 
no matter which of the earth’s environments we are born in, and to be able to rapidly spread 
innovations horizontally through and among populations, which then improve on them, and so on 
(this is Tomasello’s ratchet (Tomasello, 1999)).  This view of humans is another refinement in the 
rationalism vs. empiricism debate.  I take it as rebalancing the argument in support of the empiricist, 
against rationalist cognitivism’s rejection of behaviourism.  Not that we are born as ‘blank sheets,’ 
the genetic inheritance is necessary, as are environmental factors; rather than a painter with a blank 
sheet, we are like an environmental artist working with the materials at hand, constrained by our 
tools and materials, but free to create new and interesting objects from those.  A good reason to be 
excited about this way of viewing human’s place in nature, is how it allows analytical, scientific 
philosophers to take seriously more interpretative, social treatments of human nature, like 
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Vygotsky’s idea of the importance of internalising cognitive structures in the process of learning 
within a culture (Vygotsky, 1978), or Bourdieu’s notion of ‘habitus’ (Bourdieu, 1980), this being a 
social organisation which determines what positions we may take and shapes our self-concept.  
Once again, feedback plays a central role in how we develop our behaviour as individuals, both 
diachronically through positive and negative feedback, and synchronically through the way we 
experience the world. 
Organisms that can respond to their environment flexibly can succeed in environments that change.  
Sense organs that respond to a narrow range of stimuli in a fixed and fast manner linked directly to 
particular actions are obviously very useful.  But, if an organism has multiple sensory channels, and 
needs to coordinate these inputs in a way that is flexible rather than reflex (and assuming it has the 
luxury of time to think things through), it needs an ability to put these inputs together in a less 
domain specific way and decide which action to take.  There must be a space for general reasoning 
which is not linked automatically to any particular action, and which can represent aspects of the 
environment ‘offline,’ without the presence of stimulus to the senses.  This requires the ability to 
have in one’s head representations for things in the world, and the ability to generalise, i.e. the 
capacity to have concepts.  Dennett’s ‘Popperian’ creatures are such that they are able to use 
information to form models that allow them to think through possible actions before committing to 
them, thus giving them an adaptive advantage over creatures that have to rely on the genetic 
feedback of trying actions and seeing who survives (Dennett, 1996; Clark & Grush, 1999).  Moreover, 
this information may come in the form of linguistic communication from others.   
Carruthers (2002) argues that it is unlikely that language is necessary for complex, domain general 
thought (problem solving abilities that can be used in various contexts), since pre-linguistic infants 
and non-linguistic animals exhibit such abilities, although to a limited extent.  Furthermore, he says 
that it is the domain general thinking skills that evolved first, language being a later refinement that 
required the pre-adaptation of the domain general cognitive abilities.  But he also says that being a 
language user is necessary for cross-modular thinking, which is where the processes of peripheral 
modules not normally accessible to other processes can be brought together.   
There seems to be a ratchet effect between domain general thought and language use that makes it 
difficult to separate them and say which one is necessary for the other.  Some kind of domain 
general conceptual abilities may be necessary for language to start, but learning a language itself 
moulds our minds into general reasoning machines in a way that wouldn’t happen without exposure 
to it during development, and as these abilities become more important in our evolutionary niche, 
there is selective pressure to be better at picking up language and domain general cognitive skills.  
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What genetic resources we have at the present stage of our evolution that grounds these learning 
abilities is still an open empirical question. 
To explain the causal properties of biological and cognitive kinds, we need to refer to the process of 
variation, reproduction and selection that produced them.  These processes may be happening on 
multiple, interacting levels, e.g. biological, social, and developmental.  These are feedback 
mechanisms, which set up attractors, where the initial bifurcation is based on a random factor and 
an environment which is itself transformed through niche construction.  Anything that is reliably 
recurring and plays a role in development (not just genes) can become part of this process (Mameli, 
2001, pp. 614-617).   
Therefore, despite the fact that biological and cognitive systems are wholly composed of physical 
stuff, descriptions on the purely physical level will miss the patterns describable at the higher level.  
Evolved organisms have the causal powers they do because of the accumulation of selection events, 
and things that owe their design to the same selective forces will have similar causal powers, 
allowing us to make general statements about things of that kind.  These causal powers are 
emergent properties of the whole situated organism, constrained by the physical stuff they are 
made of and surrounded by, but not definable by reference to the physical stuff they are made of 
alone, due to the multiple-realizability of those causal properties, and the fact that the same, 
narrowly described physical embodiment might have different causal properties in other contexts.  
This is not to say that there is anything non-physical happening, just that the only way to draw the 
line around those parts of the world that are relevant to a particular explanation is to do so using 
categories that are not part of physical science; the objects referred to will not be defined by shared 
physical essences.  Evolutionary explanations (Darwinian or otherwise) are like this.  An explanation 
of cake eating behaviour in someone with no need for more sugar in their diet, for example, will 
refer to mechanisms that evolved in a low-sugar environment.  This explanation may be 
supplemented by other levels of understanding regarding the physical realisation of the mechanism 
and how it functions, but those lower-level, micro-explanations will not be ‘bound together’ without 
the higher-level explanation. 
5.2.2 Expectations 
Of the kinds of feedback more immediately involved in our phenomenal mental lives, expectations 
(first person predictions) have received a lot of attention recently (e.g. (Chrisley, 2009; Clowes & 
Chrisley, 2012; Clark, 2016)).  In standard models of cognition, the line of causation from perceptual 
input to experience and ultimately to action is one-way, where the mind is active in performing 
inferences on the information in the input.  In systems that actively use predictions, the perceptual 
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input is shaped by information from within us in the form of expectations, therefore causation is 
partly circular.  An implication of this is that the conceptual maps we create to refer to when 
navigating the world may result in changes being brought about in the world due to our actions.   
In this way, expectations can be self-fulfilling (Mameli, 2001, p. 609).  This makes it impossible to 
cleanly disentangle the causal lines between the world and our understanding, which may lead some 
to the anti-realist conclusion that the concepts used to refer to significant features on our maps are 
a product of the mind rather than the world (Gärdenfors, 2000).  I disagree, for, none of this means 
that there can’t be a determinate answer to the question of how the world needs to be in order for 
our judgements about it to be true, even if there were other possibilities for how our judgements 
would be, and how the world would be given that our expectations could affect it over time.  Before 
giving details to support this assertion, I will clarify the concept of expectation in use. 
Expectation is, grammatically, a state; like: being of an opinion, hoping for something, 
knowing something, being able to do something.  But in order to understand the grammar of 
these states it is necessary to ask: ‘What counts as a criterion for anyone’s being in such a 
state?’ (States of hardness, of weight, of fitting.) (Wittgenstein, 1953, p. 572) 
We are not necessarily referring to the state of being expectant, like when you are waiting 
for something.  Of such states, we can ask, ‘What makes the statement “The dog is 
expecting a bone” true?’  We might answer by saying that for it to be true, the dog requires 
a representation of the bone which can be used to imagine a future situation that contains a 
bone, and that it would be able to recognise as a bone a variety of possible instantiations of 
the type.  In this case, it could be said to, at least, possess the recognitional concept of bone.   
I am more concerned, presently, with the way our moment-by-moment experience is partly 
determined by expectancy effects.  The idea that our understanding of the world, possibly in 
non-conceptual form based on either experience or innate resources, may affect how we 
experience the world to be, is not new, but it has recently had a lot of attention paid to it.  
Gibson (1979) introduced affordances to modern cognitive science, but this idea had long 
been of interest to phenomenologists (e.g. Heidegger (1927)).  Ryle (1946) was talking about 
such skilful knowledge of the world when he distinguished ‘knowing-how’ from ‘knowing-
that.’  More recently in cognitive science is the enactive approach, which sees our 
perceptions of the world as including the possibilities for action, or ‘sensory motor 
contingencies’ (O'Regan & Noë, 2001).  This makes evolutionary sense, since this allows us, 
through learning a skill, to set up automatic routines that are quick and efficient (until the 
world turns out not to live up to expectations); we become ‘coupled’ to objects in a way that 
negates the need to go through chains of inference from perception to action, or indeed the 
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need to internally store information about the behaviour of kinds of objects or aspects of 
the world (O'Regan, 1992).  Knowledge of such aspects of the world may not be stored in 
terms of propositions, but they are internally stored in such a way that this knowledge is 
available to guide our actions.   
However, I don’t want to endorse a radically enactive position that sees everything in terms 
of ‘action potentials.’  Such ‘enactive machines’ that are either internalised through 
development, or hardwired through evolution, are but a part of mental architecture that 
determines our experience of the world and our actions in it.  For one, if all action were 
performed in such tight couplings with perception there would be no room for deliberation; 
everything would be reactive, driven by input.  Of course, over time there is room for 
negative and positive feedback to influence the forming of future expectations, but 
deliberate action is a more immediate break in the loop.  Furthermore, enaction seems to  
require that parts of the world are causally involved in our interactions with them, but this 
requires them to be causally proximal.  If we are considering thoughts about things that are 
remote, or even not present, we still need to rely on internally stored, representational 
resources.  Similarly, if we are removed to an environment radically unfamiliar to us, we 
need to have a way of experiencing and acting on the world not guided by expectations 
alone.  (Having no correct expectations about events in your surroundings may be what 
accounts for the state of being in culture shock.) 
Having said that, an important and relevant upshot of the kinds of feedback and feedforward 
systems involved in ‘normal’ action in the world is that they may provide an explanation for the 
existence of conscious awareness of mental states.  Feedback is where information which tells the 
system its current state informs decisions about what actions to take to try to reach a desired state, 
which is then fed back into the system and checked again, in a loop.  Feedforward is quicker, merely 
taking the current state (including environmental factors) and, projecting a future, desired state, and 
calculating what needs to be done to reach that state.  Visual feedback is too slow for rapid body 
movements, so a feedforward model, based on learnt contingencies, must be used.  ‘Efference’ 
copies of the action are sent to other brain systems for various uses.  Both require ‘models’ of the 
system and any aspects of the environment that affect control; Holland & Goodman (2003, p. 80) 
call these ‘adaptive model-based predictive controllers.’   
Consciousness may have the evolutionary role of checking actuality against expectations, the results 
being fed back into future expectations: ‘the internal feedback made possible by the efference copy 
routes is a vital feature of the neural processes underlying consciousness’ (Cotterill, 2003, p. 32).  
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Also, efferent copies may trigger memories of previous outcomes of such actions without the actions 
being carried out (imagination).  Interestingly, the neural routes involved in this appear to be the 
same as those involved in directing attention.  Short-term memory of where the creature is within 
the virtual landscape of possible actions is necessary for navigating the options afforded, patterns 
emerging in these closed-loop circuits as chaotic attractors, self-organising patterns that are 
structurally stable (Cotterill, 2003, p. 42).  So, consciousness may be this ability of a creature to 
model itself and its relation to the world, where there is a clear difference between representations 
of the inner and the outer (Holland & Goodman, 2003, p. 86).  Its evolutionary advantage is to be 
able to vary behaviour so as to bring about desired outcomes.  Models can be used by a creature to 
distinguish what it could, should and would do, that is, what is possible, what is best, or what may 
need to be deferred (Holland & Goodman, 2003, pp. 98-101).  This critical self-awareness is achieved 
through a form of re-entrant feedback where we can focus attention on the contents of our 
perceptual systems and other cognitive processes (Stuss, 1991).  There are multiple such 
mechanisms for focussing on what our brains are doing, and learning from this.  For example, vision 
receives input from higher areas, such as knowledge representation (Edelman, 1989), which can lead 
to a phenomenon well-known in the philosophy of science, namely the theory-ladenness of 
observation (Kuhn, 1962).  We build our sense of self though this critical process of inner attention, 
this selfhood then becoming part of the critical process of development (Steels, 2003, p. 183). 
Also relevant to the current account are the implications of this for the nature of mental causation, 
in that it includes, essentially, a historical element in the form of past experiences and thoughts.  Of 
course, this experience is somehow realised in the physical brain, but referring merely to the 
physical instantiation will not enable us to answer all the interesting ‘why’ questions about mental 
states.  Firstly, as mentioned, we are talking about structurally stable, emergent patterns, and small 
physical changes do not generally make a difference, thus the micro-causes relevant to the realising 
parts are not normally relevant to the causal properties of the whole.  Agents like those we are 
discussing are multiply realisable, which means we should look to the level of what is being 
implemented in order to find causal generalisations.  What is being implemented is a way of making 
the past bear on the present, and to understand why a particular action was carried out, we need to 
understand the way in which past experiences form present inner reality.   
 
5.3 Externalism 
We have seen hints in previous sections that the supervenience base of mental states may not just 
include the brain.  This is the externalist hypothesis, another word beginning with ‘e’ that says 
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something about the constitutive relation between brain, body and environment, situating cognition 
in space and time rather than viewing it as an abstract computational process the implementation of 
which is unimportant.  Above, I have been arguing that cognitive states supervene on spatially and 
temporarily extended portions of the world, and so the physical embodiment, as well as the social 
embeddedness, of these states is important to understanding their causal properties.  My aim has 
been to show how this broadening of the supervenience base of mental states blocks the kind of 
argument Kim uses against emergentism. 
Enactivism claims that experience emerges from tight, skilled coupling between a subject and an 
environment, rather than being a matter of having abstract internal representations.  Noë (2006) 
claims that perceptual contents, e.g. detail, three-dimensionality, colour, are present in experience 
not as represented, but rather as available. In this sense, experience has the content it does at a 
moment in time only as a potentiality: perceptual experience is a temporally extended activity of 
skilful probing of the world. The world is available to our reach, given our skill, and experience, being 
comprised of aspects of mind and world. Experience, it is claimed, isn’t something that happens in 
us, it is something we do. 
Noë (2004) uses the concept of the ‘virtual’ to clarify the way in which the world is present in our 
experience of it, by which he means the world is available given the ‘sensorimotor contingencies’ of 
the subject.  So, something that is not in view, like the backside of a tomato, is virtually present in 
our experience of the tomato because we know that if we go to pick it up it will be roughly spherical.  
Moreover, it is not the case that you could separate the virtual content from the directly given 
content: ‘Experiential presence is virtual all the way in’ (Noë, 2004, p. 216). The world is present in 
experience virtually thanks to our online, dynamic access to it, and qualities are available in 
experience as possibilities and potentialities, but not as givens. Experience is a dynamic process of 
navigating the pathways of these possibilities, and as such our current visual representation of the 
world is not a function of just the information being sent to the brain down the optic nerves: my 
phenomenal experience expands my immediate horizons and takes me beyond myself to the world. 
This is, according to Noë, a pervasive feature of our perceptual lives.   
A couple of upshots of this view are immediately apparent.  As cognitive systems emerge through 
tight coupling between the brain and the world, and these dynamic systems are not to be 
understood as the rule based manipulations of mental symbols between inputs and outputs, they 
are relational rather than internal and abstract, thus avoiding the ‘symbol grounding problem.’  This 
is the problem faced by computationalism, raised by Searle (1980), that, if cognition is the 
manipulation of symbols according to syntactic rules, then they do not carry with them any real 
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meaning for a cognisor to understand, and if understanding is supplied by an interpreter of symbols, 
an infinite regress threatens (this is another kind of homuncular objection).  Another upshot, and 
one we will return to (§6.2.1 The Feeling of Things), is that not being abstract and self-contained, but 
rather constituted by patterns of bodily action in the world, the form of embodiment will determine 
the type and character of cognition.  Before exploring these claims, I will clarify some terms used in 
the debate. 
 
5.3.1 Physical Bodies in a Social World 
When it comes to giving reasons for action, externalism requires not just internal facts but also 
‘exogenous constraints’ to be present (Hurley, 2003, p. 243).  The words embodied and embedded 
(or situated) denote cognitive theories that see mental states as arising from the physiology of the 
brain and body, rather than the body just providing the channels through which information enters 
the computational system that is realised by the brain.  Moreover, embodiment theorists see the 
interaction of brain, body and the world as being essential components in the emergence of 
intelligent behaviour, rather than external facts being the background against which actions happen 
(Clark, 1997; Brooks, 1991; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999; Varela, et al., 1991).   
As an illustration: the cognitive processes involved in riding a bike are embodied due to the tight 
coupling between brain, body and bike.  A classical computational cognitivist approach would posit 
something like an internal model of the body on a bike which is used to compute the next action 
given the information being received about the bike through the body.  Rather than this input-
process-output picture, embodied cognition sees the cognitive process as involving brain-body-bike: 
after learning to ride a bike (which requires getting on a physical bike; being told or shown won’t 
work), you gain a skill in which the bike becomes an extension of you, and is a proper part of the 
description of the cognitive processes involved: you form a dynamic unity with the machine.  In 
other words, a detailed representation of the bike is not a part of the processes involved; the bike is 
there to play the role of storing information about itself used in the process of being ridden.  
Information about, for example, the position of the gears is available in the bike, not represented 
internally. 
Cognition may also extend into the world in terms of being culturally embedded (we saw an 
illustration of this in §4.1 Mental Kinds).  Sometimes actions can only be fully explained by reference 
to the social structures that give them meaning.  These will have been internalised as model-like 
structures to some extent, but understanding them will require referring to the process of 
enculturation, and other causal factors that exist outside of the subject, within his or her cultural 
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world.  Such actions rely partly on the internal motivational factors common to humanity, like fear of 
being shamed, that are driven by the importance of maintaining a certain position within a group, 
but the particular form they take may require active motivating, triggering and moulding by other 
actors in the group, or even symbolic prompts. 
Wilson (2002) has a useful list of properties taken to hold of cognition according to the embodied 
approach:  
1) Cognition is situated: it happens in the world and involves perception and action.  
2) Cognition is time-pressured: it needs to be understood in terms of what can be done 
with the available resources in the time given.  It uses ‘cheap tricks’ to achieve ends, 
such as rough-and-ready rules of thumb, rather than costly computations.  
3) Cognitive work is off-loaded onto the environment: we design the environment to 
cue us, or store information in it for use when needed.  
4) The environment is part of the cognitive system.  Parts of the environment 
participate in the flow of information in such a way that they are best seen as part of 
the cognitive system, rather than merely as a source of inputs, so if we want to 
understand the organisation and function of cognitive systems, we need to include 
the environment.  A system is something more than a mere aggregate; the 
properties of the parts must be affected by their participation in the whole.  
Cognitive systems have properties of both facultative systems (temporary 
arrangements of matter with vague, interest relative boundaries (e.g. ecological 
systems)) and obligate systems (more permanent arrangements relative to the 
lifetime of their parts) particularly as we move from one context to another.   
5) Cognition is for action: the subsystems (e.g. vision and memory) must be understood 
in terms of how they contribute to situation specific behaviour.   
6) Off-line cognition is body based: it is based in mechanisms whose function is to 
guide action in the world, e.g. sensory processing and motor control.  
There are clarifications required for some of these points, particularly the distinction between 
facultative and obligate as this seems relative to the interests of the observer, too.  We will return to 
this in the following, but for now, let me reiterate the purpose of putting forward 
embodied/embedded cognition in the context of this text: if it is the case that ‘empirical 
externalism’ (to contrast it with content externalism) is true, that is, if, in order to make sound 
generalisations about the actions of human agents it is necessary to include facts about processes 
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and events not spatially or temporally local to the brain of the subject, then the arguments put 
forward by Kim in favour of physicalist reductionism do not go through. 
Later (§6.2.1 The Feeling of Things), we will see that viewing cognition as embodied also explains 
important features of phenomenology, but the major motivation behind embodied theories is 
economic.  Since cognition ‘in the wild’ is time-pressured, and geared toward action, cognitive work 
is off-loaded onto the environment.  In itself, this may not be something that should necessarily 
worry someone who sees cognition as a fully brain-based activity, as it could just be seen as part of 
developmental psychology, leading to an interesting reconfiguration of what we think goes on in the 
brain (e.g. the effects of expectation and attention on what is represented), rather than a radical 
new way of looking at how cognition itself happens.  For a more wide-ranging change to our view of 
cognition, the environment should be seen as part of the cognitive system in a constitutive way, 
rather than just as something that is occasionally used in cognitive processes (not just as a tool, but 
as a proper part).  
What does it take for something to be a proper part of a cognitive process?  Inputs are not 
traditionally seen as parts of cognitive processes (remember methodological solipsism).  These 
words are inputting concepts into your cognitive system: you extract the information represented in 
them using your knowledge of English; this causes tokenings of concepts which are then available for 
cognitive use.  When concepts are tokened due to internal processes, like a chain of thought, this is 
different: there is no equivalent of reading to decode the information contained.   
This distinction between being inside and outside the mind makes sense to the extent that it allows 
us to see ourselves as spatio-temporally located beings without ‘over-extending’ ourselves into the 
world.  But, we should not be too ready to equate the proper parts of cognition with the brain itself.  
After all, the brain is just a certain arrangement of atoms like the rest of the world.  It may be that 
some parts of the brain are only inputs to cognition proper, and that some parts of the world are not 
merely sources of inputs, but parts.  Think of the visual system: it can go without detailed internal 
representations since the environment can serve as a repository of information about itself if it is 
immediately accessible.  It is possible that our experience depends not only on what is represented 
in our brains, but on dynamic interaction between brain, body and environment.  
Before continuing we should distinguish two ways the mind can be seen as being ‘stretched’ into the 
world.  Vehicle externalism is the idea that objects in the environment that are utilized in cognitive 
processes in a habitual and reliable way count as a proper part of cognition rather than just an input 
to it (Clark & Chalmers, 1998).  Content externalism is the position that the contents of at least some 
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of one's mental states are dependent in part on their relationship to the external world (Burge, 
1986).  Here we are mainly concerned with issues regarding causal properties of mental states and 
how they are physically realised, rather than issues of pure content alone. 
Clark and Chalmers (1998) investigate our intuitions about what counts as inside the mind through 
the case of Otto and his notebook.  Otto cannot form new long-term memories (anterograde 
amnesia); instead he uses a notebook to keep information he thinks might be useful.  So, when 
someone asks him if he knows the way to the museum, he can get out his notebook, find the 
information, and answer, ‘Yes.’  The question being asked through this thought experiment is 
whether there is a principled difference between Otto’s case, and that of a taxi driver with the 
Knowledge.  Clark claims that if the action of reaching for the notebook is automatic and the 
information readily accessible (Clark & Chalmers, 1998, p. 17), then the notebook works like memory 
and so should be counted as a proper part of the cognitive process of recalling something one 
knows.   
However, there seem to be good reasons for distinguishing the kind of access to the information in 
each case.  Getting the information from the notebook requires finding the book, opening it at the 
right page, recognising the symbolic description and decoding it using learnt linguistic abilities, etc.  
In the case of mental memory, the information should just be there, ‘at hand,’ when needed.  
Admittedly, information stored in memory does not always reveal itself so readily; sometimes 
mental effort is required to access it.  Moreover, remembering might not be an innate skill, as we 
can learn techniques that allow us to improve our ability to retrieve information.  The distinction 
nevertheless seems real and meaningful.   
The difference is not just that one process happens inside the skull and the other doesn’t.  We can 
imagine replacing a part of our normal brain with a ‘box of tricks’ located outside the body but 
hooked up to the brain ‘in the right way,’ so that the phenomenology of using that box is 
indistinguishable from the normal processes.  Conversely, we can imagine an organ located inside 
the brain that would nevertheless count as outside the mind, like toes are.  The difference, then, is in 
the immediacy of the experience of retrieving the information: normal remembering doesn’t involve 
a process in which the information is coded and decoded, as in when it is written on and later read 
off a page.  Such coding/decoding processes are necessary when the ‘bandwidth’ of the channel 
through which the information passes is not sufficiently wide.  When systems are connected via 
sufficiently high bandwidth information channels, then ‘new systematic wholes’ (Clark, 2008, pp. 32-
3) can be formed. 
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Below (§6.3.4 In Two Minds), I will expand on these thoughts while looking at the case of split-brain 
patients, who have had the connective tissue between the two cerebral hemispheres (the corpus 
collossum) cut.  The role of the corpus collossum is to be a sufficiently high-bandwidth 
communication channel between the hemispheres, and here we have evidence for the fact that 
entities that could be regarded as separate subjects (the individual hemispheres) can become 
composite subjects, and we have an explanation of how this can happen: through their being 
connected by sufficiently high bandwidth information channels into ‘systemic wholes.’  In order to 
judge that the two hemispheres come together as one distributed subject, and indeed that the 
separated hemispheres can be subjects in their own right, requires an account of what it is to be a 
subject, which we will also return to below (§6.3.4 In Two Minds). 
Husserl said we can understand others as subjects because we experience their body as a living thing 
(Leib) rather than a mere object (Körper) (Zahavi, 1994).  Merleau-Ponty (1945) also stated that we 
don’t infer the intentions of others from observations of their behaviour, rather, we find those 
intentions in ourselves when prompted by the observation of the actions of others.  Gallese’s (2001) 
work suggests that we are designed to respond to the goal-directed actions (and not just particular 
physical behaviour) of others specifically, and to mirror that behaviour, through the use of 
simulation (efference copies used in forward models), utilising so-called ‘mirror-neurons’ (Gallese, 
2001, p. 43).  Simulations are used in understanding others by ‘putting ourselves in their shoes’ 
(Gallese, 2001, p. 42). We don’t need to construct theories (as in the ‘child-as-scientist’ view, 
(Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997) using propositional attitudes in computational processes, or to have this 
‘theory of mind’ in an innate module (Baron-Cohen, 1995).  In contrast, accounts that rely on 
embodied empathising rather than theorising is ‘direct and automatic,’ not inferential (Gallese, 
2001, pp. 42-44).  
Gopnik and Meltzoff (1997) talk about an innate body schema that enables us to interpret the 
actions of others by mapping them to one’s own motor systems.  In support of this, evidence is given 
by Meltzoff and Moore (1977, 1994, cited in Gallagher (2001, p. 87)) that infants can sense what 
things in the world are similar to themselves, and map the behaviour of those things onto their own 
body schema in order to imitate them.  This is not simulation, as we do not represent the body of 
the other to ourselves and infer intentions from that model, we experience others intentions directly 
through a shared body schema that maps perceptions to motor behaviour, without the need for an 
intermediate mental state.  Rather, the body schema is ‘a set of pragmatic (action oriented) 
capabilities embodied in the developing nervous system’ (Gallagher, 2001, p. 87).  
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Gallagher (2001) claims that the kind of direct, primary intersubjectivity he is advocating is not 
merely the developmental starting point out of which mature (inferential or simulation driven) 
mind-reading abilities develop, but is the primary way we continue to understand the intentions of 
others in our everyday lives.  Furthermore, he argues that not only in understanding the actions of 
others, but also in acting ourselves, we may be driven by the practical, habitual knowledge that ‘the 
situation is just such that this is the action that is called for,’ rather than a ‘well-formed’ mental state 
(Gallagher, 2001, p. 95). 
By ‘well-formed’ mental state I take him to mean an explicit belief.  However, even if we grant him 
this, we cannot conclude that actions are not driven by such mental states, or that we don’t have the 
more abstract ability to understand others in terms of their mental states, through forms of indirect 
inference, given enough time for reflection and the tools with which to understand them.  In fact, 
this higher-level ability may be necessary as a way of communicating more complex mind-reading 
abilities, and as such could form the foundation of scientific attributions of mental states that 
explain actions by classifying those states according to generalisations in law-like statements.  In 
fact, it may be that this level of understanding, less direct, more reflective, is necessary to 
counteract the negatively habitual interpretations of others that we are prone to pick up as 
members of a society, thus itself playing its role in the cultural evolution of learnt mind-reading 
abilities.  
Those pernicious habitual social attitudes, like prejudice, that flourish when passed on unreflectively, 
though, are rather like our appetites for salt: the consequence of an adaptation that was 
advantageous in the environment in which it evolved, but which now has some negative 
consequences.  Cognition is ‘scaffolded’ by the socio-cultural environment, which follows its own 
evolutionary dynamic and which we internalise during maturation, and this is an efficient way of 
creating niches that nurture the cognitive capacities necessary to flourishing.  As social creatures, we 
form a dynamic system where we observe and learn from others, forming a self that in its turn 
affects others (c.f. Mead (1934)).  In the hunter-gatherer past, where positions in the group were 
clear and groups were in competition for limited resources, the ‘othering’ of people outside one’s 
own group was probably adaptive: these attitudes sustained the kin-group, and the kin-group 
sustained the individuals, and the kin gene-line was maintained. 
In the complex society that now forms an essential aspect of our developmental environment, we 
need an understanding of the causal influence this has on our cognitive processes, which requires a 
metaphysics of causation that has a place for upward, downward and historical causation, to allow 
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for the causal influences that the social roles we occupy exert on our action through the inculcation 
of dispositions to behave in certain ways:  
…the relational or structural approach that [the concept of the field] introduces is associated with a 
dispositionalist philosophy, which breaks with the finalism, allied to a naïve intentionalism, which sees 
agents as rational calculators seeking not so much the truth as the social profits accruing to those who 
appear to have discovered it. (Bourdieu, 2004, p. 33) 
Society defines the roles we can take in it, and we internalise the possibilities for action afforded by 
being in that role: ‘A scientist is a scientific field made flesh, an agent whose cognitive structures are 
homologous with the structure of the field and, as a consequence, constantly adjusted to the 
expectations inscribed in the field’ (Bourdieu, 2004, p. 41).  This structure is reproduced through us, 
utilising the ability we have to learn concepts, which bring with them generalising powers and (self-
fulfilling) expectations: ‘…power relations are set up and exerted in particular through cognitive and 
communicative relations… [and] can be exerted only on agents who possess the categories of 
perception necessary to know it and recognise it’ (Bourdieu, 2004, p. 55). 
The investigation of this social-evolutionary development, and the mental structures through which 
it is maintained and exerts its influence, is beyond the scope of the current text, but I think this is 
another exciting space for a rapprochement between the structuralist sociology of the continental 
tradition and the analytical tradition that led to cognitivism.  Having argued that the environment 
that provides the conditions for our development as individual cognisors includes the social as well 
as the physical, and that the first-person experiencing subject is central to the question of what is 
properly a part of us as cognitive beings (given that our understanding of others, which feeds back 
into our understanding of ourselves and therefore how we act, is not knowledge that is extracted 
through abstract inference), I will return now to the issue of how to determine which portions of the 
physical world are to be counted as constitutive of cognition, and which are background conditions 
that may have a causal influence on cognition, but do not count as part of the embodiment of the 
individual experiencer.  For the answer to this question clearly has a bearing on the matter of mental 
causation.   
Honderich (2006) has a radically externalist claim about the relationship between experience and 
the physical world.   He puts forward some interesting arguments, using assumptions some of which 
I endorse, and others which, in my opinion, are shown to be problematic through his following them 
to his conclusions, these assumptions being ones used, sometimes implicitly, by the main targets of 
this work, namely intentional reductionists.  Firstly, he claims that neurons (or by implication other 
physical substrates) are not part of my experience, because my experience is fully ‘transparent’ to 
me and I cannot be mistaken about what is and is not part of my experience: ‘with respect to 
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consciousness, there is no difference between appearance and reality’ (Honderich, 2006, p. 5).  Next, 
he denies that intentionality is the mark of the mental: ‘There wasn’t a relationship of intentionality, 
aboutness or directedness in your consciousness of the page’ (Honderich, 2006, p. 5). For him, being 
perceptually conscious of something is not a matter of there being a mental state that represents 
that thing, but rather for ‘an extra-cranial state of affairs to exist — for there to be a spatio-temporal 
set of things with a dependence on another extra-cranial state of affairs and also on what is in a 
particular cranium’ (Honderich, 2006, p. 6).  Both parts of the world, inside and outside the skull, are 
needed for there to be consciousness of something: ‘There is not much of a liberty taken in speaking 
of there being pages in both a world of perceptual consciousness and in the perceived physical 
world, and indeed in referring to each of a related pair of things as a page’ (Honderich, 2006, p. 7).  
Honderich says his radical externalism denies the ‘worn story’ that the brain contains causally 
sufficient conditions for perceptual consciousness, instead claiming that neural facts are merely 
necessary (Honderich, 2006, p. 8).  
Much of this is unobjectionable: for there to be perceptual experience of a page, there has to be a 
page and an experience; the same neural events without the page would be a hallucinatory 
experience of a page (I am ignoring for simplicity the claim that hallucination is a kind of perception).  
But it is problematic to speak of there being a page formed by the relationship between the pages in 
consciousness and in the physical world.  It is more natural to assume there is the perceptual 
experience of a page, and there is a perceived page in the world, and nothing more.  What 
difference to the perceptual experience of a page would the removal of the physical page from the 
picture make?  It would make it a non-veridical perception, but that is a matter of judgement from 
outside the experience.   
The false premise in Honderich’s argument is, in my opinion, the assumption of the transparency of 
our experience.  It may be that two experiences that appear to be the same to the perceiver, could 
in fact be different experiences.  That doesn’t mean that in the two cases there aren’t aspects of the 
experiences that in principle one’s attention could be drawn to that would show them to be distinct; 
but if this is done, then the experience is not the same anymore, so this does not show that the two 
experiences were in fact always different.  There may be parts of my experience that I am not aware 
of, and I may be wrong about what I think I am experiencing.  In other words, how my experience 
appears to me might not be how my experience really is.  To argue a priori that this is self-
contradictory is to beg the question, and only seems to be a reasonable reply because of the 
Cartesian heritage.  But Descartes thought that the idea of an unconscious idea was self-
contradictory. 
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Manzotti (2006) uses rainbows to show that consciousness extends into the world using a different 
argument, in some ways opposite to the above: rather than the objects of experience being partly 
constitutive of the actual experience, it is consciousness that is partly constitutive of external 
objects.   Rainbows require particular conditions to occur in the atmosphere and in the observer.  
The rainbow example is supposed to show that the existence of the thing that causes the experience 
(the collection of reflecting drops taken as a whole) is abstract and un-unified until the effect has 
actually occurred in the observer.  Therefore, causal properties depend on the causal network as a 
whole, rather than being located in a particular external and independent object; causes and effects 
become different ways of looking at processes. 
As with the previous argument, much of this is unobjectionable, particularly the idea that picking out 
causes and effects depends in part on the point of view an observer takes towards a process, but I 
think he puts too much weight on the example of the rainbow.  Rainbows depend on the point of 
view of the observer in a way that objects proper don’t: rainbows are optical phenomena rather 
than things.  Whenever sunlight hits air filled with water droplets, light gets scattered, reflected and 
refracted.  An observer will see the spectrum painted in an arc because of the way this light and her 
position interact, even though light is going in all directions.  Another observer stood next to the first 
will also see a rainbow, but there seems to be little reason to say that he is seeing the same rainbow 
as her, as his rainbow is in a slightly different place.  This becomes clearer the further apart the two 
observers are.  It could be argued that the same is true for any distally perceived object; after all, we 
are just seeing the reflection of light from molecules loosely bound together.  However, the parts 
that make up the rainbow are much less bound to each other than those of a distant object, say a 
wildebeest.  The parts of the wildebeest have a history, and a future, irrespective of being observed.  
It munches its grass and is chased by lions whether or not we watch; it is subject to processes that 
define its identity in a way that rainbows are not, that is, independently of an observer. 
Although the above arguments are, if I am right, unsound, they help us focus on some important 
questions, which can be taken forward into the rest of this discussion of what counts as part of the 
mind’s physical substrate.  Firstly, the phenomenal: What must be held constant for the same 
experience to happen, remembering that we shouldn’t assume that phenomenal difference is 
automatically given in awareness? Secondly, the intentional: What gives a mental state its content, 
keeping in mind that we have to account for cases of non-veridical but nevertheless contentful 
perceptions?  Thirdly, the causal: How do we distinguish, in the case of physically realised, conscious 
mental states, between what causes the state and what is constitutive of it?  I will address the last 
first. 
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One way of approaching this final question is to deploy the concept of supervenience.  Earlier (§3.3 
Supervenience & Realisation), we said that if A supervenes on B, then one cannot attribute B to 
something and withhold A from it.  So the question becomes, what physical conditions have to be 
the case so that some mental state must be attributed to that portion of the world?  This is where 
we must be on guard against the ‘causal-constitutive error’ error, that is, ‘objecting that externalist 
explanations give a constitutive role to external factors that are ‘merely causal’ while assuming 
without independent argument or criteria that the causal constitutive disjunction coincides with 
some external/internal boundary’ (Hurley, 2006, p. 4).  What constitutes the mental state is its 
supervenience base, that is, what must be held constant physically for the mental properties to 
remain unaltered.  There is no principled reason to draw the causal/constitutive boundary at the 
skull; some parts of the brain may be more correctly seen as causal rather than constitutive of 
conscious mental states, and some parts of the body and world may be constitutive rather than 
causal.  There must be a ‘border’ somewhere, perhaps one that is not as fixed as a cranium.  If, as 
sometimes happens when neuroscientists talk loosely, everything is taken to be causal, then either 
the mental is constituted by nothing physical, forcing a retreat to dualism, or the mental is 
eliminated.  Neither option is appealing for reasons given earlier (§2.1 Reducing Reduction).   
The example of split-brain subjects (see §6.3.4 In Two Minds) is again useful to consider in this 
regard.  In normal brains, the two hemispheres pass information between each other via the corpus 
collossum, in such a way that both hemispheres form one unified consciousness.  When this 
connective tissue is cut, subjects normally continue to function as unified subjects even though 
information is no longer being passed between the hemispheres ‘internally,’ as the information is 
shared ‘externally,’ for example by objects in the hands being visible to the visual fields of both 
hemispheres.  If the corpus collossum is taken to be partly constitutive of the experience of the 
subject due to its function of coordinating the hemispheres, why not take the parts of the external 
world that perform the same function in the case of the split-brain subjects to be internal to their 
mind?  Moreover, if this is plausibly the case in split-brain subjects, it might be that such ‘external’ 
information sharing channels are utilised in the normal case too. 
Internalist intuitions rest on supervenience thought experiments (STEs) that hold internal factors 
constant while varying external factors (Hurley, 2006).  The classic example is of brains in vats, which 
has us imagine that everything you think you are perceiving now is actually the result of inputs being 
fed to a disembodied brain in an evil cognitive scientist’s lab.  The conclusion we are led to draw is 
that the conscious mental states would be identical in both the real and experimental scenarios if 
the input is the ‘same,’ so mental states supervene on facts internal to the brain alone.   
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However, for this to be a conceivable experiment, explanatory separability is necessary, that is, we 
have to be able to imagine ‘unplugging’ the brain from the world.  If internal and external factors are 
not ‘unpluggable,’ but vary together, then there are no valid STEs of the brain-in-vat variety.  In 
complex, non-linear, dynamical systems non-separability is common (Hurley, 2006, p. 7), 
undermining the sense in which certain factors causally explain the system’s behaviour while others 
are merely background conditions, particularly when we see ourselves, evolutionarily and 
developmentally, as part of such a dynamic (§5.2.1 Evolution).  Furthermore, even if some sort of 
‘narrow’ mental content does not vary if the relevant internal factors are duplicated across different 
environments, meaning that a certain kind of content supervenes on those internal factors, this is 
not sufficient, only necessary, for those internal factors to be reductively explanatory of the ‘broad’ 
mental state as involved in worldly action.  This is due to the impossibility of keeping the internal 
factors constant while varying the external factors, as required for a controlled STE. 
Even if we could somehow set up a controlled experiment along these lines, we would have to be 
cautious about drawing conclusions about brains outside the lab, since we would be building a 
nomological machine a la Cartwright (see §3.1 Causation).  We could set up an experiment with a 
brain in a vat, thus shielding it from interfering influences, and perform experiments on it, but this 
would only tell you some things about isolated brains in vats.  Not that this would be without 
interest, just that it would not warrant general conclusions about actual, embodied and embedded 
brains in ‘the wild.’    
Given this, there are two ways for internalism to fail: because, granting internal supervenience, 
external factors are needed to explain intuition about content (content externalism), or, because 
mental states cannot be ‘unplugged’ and ‘replugged,’ that is, they supervene on more than internal 
factors (extendedness).  In a dynamic system, where the agent is involved in multiple feedback loops 
with the environment through constant ‘probing and sampling,’ then unplugging will not be possible, 
and in order to explain the agent’s actions it will be necessary to include some of the environment; 
the internally simulated portion will not be sufficient (Hurley, 2006, p. 141).  This extension of the 
mental state in space is due also to its extension in time: mental states as emergent parts of a 
physical, dynamic system are necessarily diachronic (see §§2.2.1 Causal Closure & 3.4 Emergence).  If 
the environment ‘scaffolds’ the mental state, meaning it couldn’t occur without some part of the 
world to play its part in creating the conditions for that state, then those parts of the world are part 
of the supervenience base of the mental state: the mind cannot be ‘unplugged’ from the world it is 
an ongoing dynamic relationship and remain the same internally. 
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In response an internalist might claim that scaffolding is a supporting role and that such extended 
dynamics are causal rather than constitutive, part of acquiring the capacity to have full, ‘quality 
enabling’ mental states (Hurley, 2006, p. 142).  However, this would be to make the ‘causal-
constitutive error’ error: it should not just be assumed that such extended ‘tuning and maintenance’ 
processes are not an essential part of the functioning and subjective quality of experiential states. 
Internalists might answer by asking about cases of non-veridical experience, where the external 
portion is not present, as in illusions and dreams.  The thought is, if we can experience a glass both 
when there is no glass and when there is a glass, and it makes sense to categorise those experiences 
together in terms of the subjective quality of the experience, then the quality of experiencing a glass 
cannot depend on there being a glass there.  But, given the multiple-realizability of mental states, 
it’s conceivable that in veridical cases the realisation base of the experience is extended, whereas in 
non-veridical cases it is not.  In fact, it is plausible that extended cases explain how we come to have 
the ability to simulate the experiences internally at all.  Internal simulation of experience is partial 
and reliant on the full version that includes the world as experienced: ‘What the world we are 
interacting with is like can be part of what enables us to experience what it is like’ (Hurley, 2006, p. 
146). (See §3.3 Supervenience & Realisation) 
If we distinguish the cases of veridical and non-veridical experiences which are nevertheless 
experiences with the same content (they both tell us there is a glass in front of us), this is a kind of 
disjunctivism.  This might seem irrelevant to the case of mental causation, since it doesn’t matter 
whether what the mental state is about is actually the case, just whether believing it to be the case 
is what matters when it comes to causing actions.  But, there is a distinction between cases where 
having a belief depends in part in on-going interaction with the world, and cases where the part of 
the world the mental state is about is too far away to be part of a feedback loop with the 
experiencer.  In the latter case we can say the object of the experience is genuinely a cause of, 
rather than constitutive of, the mental state that is about it.  In the case of the physical world we can 
act on, however, since embodied, extended accounts are also externalist, we do have to consider 
the state of the world outside the head, if that part of the world is ‘in the loop,’ in that direct 
feedback from the object is part of a spatio-temporally extended action process.   
Wilson (2002) provides some reasons for scepticism regarding the embodied and extended 
approaches to cognition.  She accuses them of not respecting our intuitions about the nature of 
concepts, and of not providing science with a tractable subject matter.  In a version of Fodor and 
Pylyshyn’s (1988) attack on connectionism, her first point is that concepts, such as those involved in 
stating the beliefs of a subject in order to explain an action, should be recombinable in infinitely 
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many novel ways, but that if concepts are rooted in contexts, which are necessarily finite, they 
cannot be.   
However, as we saw (in §5.1 Rational agency), the view of concepts as fully generalisable is an 
idealisation.  Some, rarefied and perhaps rare, concepts that have been fully abstracted from their 
contextual roots may meet this condition, but generality can come in degrees.  This generalisability 
is not something that comes automatically with a concept, but is something we have to work at to 
achieve.  A concept is not conferred generality from the moment of ostensive baptism, as the first 
usage of a term will have its own contextual baggage (see §1.3 Rigidity).  The work involved in 
making a concept general is both conceptual and empirical, and the fruits of this labour may then be 
passed down to others. 
Wilson’s second, and related, point is that the objects of science are ‘obligate’ systems (ones that 
retain their identity over time) and not ‘facultative’ ones (that are one-off and soon dissolve as parts 
change) (Wilson, 2002).  Since science explains obligate systems, the cognitive processes science is 
interested in should be general and not tied to specific, temporary configurations.  She contends 
that distributed cognitive systems will be facultative as they contain aspects of the environment in 
an arrangement that will never be repeated.  Such systems, she says, have vague boundaries that 
can only be drawn relative to the explanatory interests of the observer.   
As with the previous criticism, this seems to apply an idealised standard for objects suitable for 
scientific discourse, one that the objects of many sciences (e.g. biology, meteorology) would fail to 
reach.  If generality comes in degrees, and if the boundaries of objects referred to by the concepts 
deployed by a science are permitted to be vague and interest relative (e.g. in the study of ecological 
systems), then this is not a fatal flaw of a science of extended cognition; rather it is just the kind of 
problem that all sciences face.  Her criticism would only be a problem for a strict essentialist theory 
of natural kinds that insists on sharp boundaries, but not for one that allows for some vagueness and 
observer dependence (see §1.2 Are Natural Kinds Found or Made?).  Described in physical terms, 
mental states will be overly facultative, since mental kinds are radically multiply-realizable, and as 
such they will not form projectable kinds.  But described intentionally they will be reasonably 
obligate, at least enough for us to use in relatively successful explanations and predictions.  We can 
still use the belief that there is a glass of water is in front of me to explain my picking it up when 
thirsty, even though that belief may supervene on an extended portion of the world including my 
brain, body and the glass itself. 
142 
 
It is worth mentioning Rockwell (2007) as someone who takes a position that supports the one 
defended here, claiming it is a mistake to assume that the brain embodies the mind.  This mistake is 
caused, according to Rockwell, by the fact that neuroscience finds the ‘pragmatic causes’ of mental 
phenomena in the brain, and assumes that the brain thus embodies the mind.  By pragmatic cause 
he means the immediate, synchronic physical cause, but he questions that this justifies the drawing 
of the supervenience boundary at the surface of the brain.  He argues that not only intentional 
thoughts, but also feelings and sensations, must be seen as supervening on the entire ‘brain-body-
world nexus.’  We feel what we feel because of impingements on our bodies together with personal 
histories, and these have as much right to be called embodiment as brain cells do.  He says brain 
activity is necessary but not sufficient for every mental state and that the borders of the 
supervenience base are a function of the goals and purposes of the various sciences, the distinction 
between the intrinsic and the relational being context dependent, thus varying from science to 
science.   
We use our various sciences to predict the actions of individuals, for which we need to understand 
the social structures they are part of.  These structures may be partly internalised in the individual, 
thus giving us the ‘pragmatic’ cause of behaviour, but these internalised portions may be insufficient 
to fully explain the action, as it may be that the agent is not fully aware of the whole structure they 
are a small part of, and the internal triggers may rely on the reliable presence of cues in the 
environment in order to bring about the ‘correct’ action.  To quote Bourdieu (2004, p. 58): ‘By 
constructing the objective structure of the distribution of the properties attached to individuals or 
institutions, one acquires an instrument of forecasting the probable behaviours of agents occupying 
different positions within that distribution.’  A good example is the social structure that is science, 
and the individual scientists within in.  This is not to ‘relativise’ scientific reason in the way that 
certain sociologists of science of the so-called ‘strong programme’ may want to: reason can be saved 
without transcendental arguments, 
…by describing the gradual emergence of universes in which in order to be ‘right,’ one has to put 
forward reasons, demonstrations recognised as consistent, and in which the logic of power relations 
and struggles of interest is regulated in such a way that the ‘force of the best argument’ (as Habermas 
puts it) has a reasonable chance of winning. (Bourdieu, 2004, p. 82) 
This is cultural evolution in action, where ideas are adaptive given that they survive the selection 
pressures of peer review, Q&A sessions, or viva voce examination: ‘Objectivity is an intersubjective 
product of the scientific field’ (Bourdieu, 2004, p. 83).  
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Chapter 6: Physically Embodied Minds 
6.1 Virtual Machines 
In the previous chapters, the ground has been prepared for laying out a position on the relationship 
between the physical and mental that is not vulnerable to Kim-style reductionistic arguments.  Now 
we turn to describing that position, namely Virtual Machine Functionalism (VMF).  Due to constraints 
of space, this is not intended as a comprehensive account of that position, but rather a brief 
statement of why VMF is a position that satisfies the desiderata of being physicalistic without being 
reductionistic, or non-reductionistic without being dualistic.   
VMF is a version of functionalism not susceptible to reductive arguments that use supervenience 
and causal arguments, because it is not just a ‘black box’ theory, which standard functionalism tends 
to be.  This is because, to count as a cognitive system of the same kind as us, it is not sufficient for us 
to talk about the property of having the property of transferring particular inputs into particular 
outputs, nor to talk about fulfilling a causal role without any specification of how that role is fulfilled.  
Rather, the output has to be achieved in a certain way, in the case of human cognitive kinds, the way 
we do it, for example through the mental manipulation of intentional states.  That is because, unlike 
atomic state functionalism (Block, 1980), VMF does not simply say that non-physical states 
supervene on physical states, leaving the relationship between the two levels a purely conceptual 
necessary identity condition.  Rather, by ‘state’ in VMF we are referring to a state that a machine can 
be in; a state that is complex, holistic and diachronic, as machines are made of many parts that work 
together in processes with purposes, for which they have been put together, and as a result of which 
they have real causal powers about which we can make generalisations to be used in explanation 
and prediction. 
Virtual machines, then, are very real, being virtual in that they are ‘machines created mainly by 
programs running on other machines’ (Sloman, 2013).  Moreover, such machines could not exist in 
any other form, since their operation requires a speed and flexibility of function given finite 
resources that necessitates the components being able to be created, rearranged, modified, 
discarded and replaced in a way not possible with purpose built physical machines (Sloman, 2013).  
Being real, they are physical, therefore their causal powers are non-mysterious: 
Virtual Machine Functionalism (VMF) attempts to account for the nature and causal powers of mental 
mechanisms and the states and processes they produce, by showing how the powers, states and 
processes depend on and can be explained by complex running virtual machines that are made up of 
interacting concurrently active (but not necessarily synchronised) chunks of virtual machinery which 
not only interact with one another and with their physical substrates (which may be partly shared, 
and also frequently modified by garbage collection, metabolism, or whatever) but can also 
concurrently interact with and refer to various things in the immediate and remote environment (via 
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sensory/motor channels, and possible future technologies also).  I.e. virtual machinery can include 
mechanisms that create and manipulate semantic content, not only syntactic structures or bit 
patterns as digital virtual machines do. (Sloman, 2013) 
An implication is that the so-called Turing ‘test’ is misconceived (not by Turing himself I should add).  
Answering questions in a way that is sufficiently similar to a human to fool a human is no criterion 
for the presence of human-like intelligence.  Let’s assume this could be achieved by ‘brute force,’ 
using computational power to search through a look-up table of all recorded exchanges.  What 
would be missing here is any kind of semantic processing of the type we engage in.  For the same 
reason we don’t say that a chess playing machine is intelligent in any sense.  This is also because it 
cannot take that ability and use it flexibly in other contexts.  As I will argue below (§6.2 
Consciousness), what gives us this ability may be the reflexivity granted by being conscious.   
In virtual machines, where a machine is ‘a complex whole made of interacting components,’ what is 
manipulated is information, in the form of, for example, belief-like states about the environment 
that allow the machine to control its behaviour in appropriate ways given its goals.  The rules 
governing the interaction of these components will not be the same as the rules governing the 
interaction of physical entities (Sloman & Chrisley, 2003, p. 145), because they are mechanisms 
instantiated by physical systems which are not themselves best described in physical terms, but 
which do support counter-factual causal claims (Sloman, et al., 2003, p. 11).  Each state of a virtual 
machine is defined by its causal relations to other states of the system and to the environment 
(making them externalist, see §5.3 Externalism).  These causal relations may be probabilistic, given 
that it cannot be shielded from perturbations from ‘below and about,’ which is why Cartwright’s 
conception of causation (§3.1 Causation), where causal statements refer to dispositions to behave in 
certain ways given a context, is the most suitable for modelling mental causation.  
Key to the operation of the kinds of virtual machines that make up the kinds of minds like ours is 
that they are designed to develop ‘an ontology for describing its sensory contents,’ based on 
previous experiences, by virtue of which it could ‘discover within itself something like what 
philosophers have called “qualia”’ (Sloman, 2007).  Conscious, phenomenal experience, then, is not 
something that happens automatically through a simple activation of sensory ‘surfaces,’ or a taking 
in of information from the environment and processing it in order to produce an appropriate output.  
Rather, ‘qualia’ is the result of complex processing including the application of some kind of 
knowledge to the incoming information provided through the sensory channels. 
This will undoubtedly seem as unsatisfactory as any other physical explanation of qualia to many.  
Why, after all, does that process feel like this?  However, the account in question does seem to 
accord with how we experience the world, even if it may not always match how we think we 
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experience the world.  However, as mentioned in relation to several points made earlier, our 
experience of the world might not be as we naïvely assume, that is, the properties of our 
experiences may be impenetrable to various, and variable, degrees.  This seems problematic from 
the naïve standpoint because, in line with a simplistic atomic state functionalist view, the 
experiential is taken to be an intrinsic property of certain processes, and since nothing can explain 
why that kind of process has this kind of intrinsic, felt quality, it seems inextricably mysterious.  It 
can be doubted, however, that experiential properties are in fact intrinsic, rather than relational (see 
§6.3.5.1 In a relationship).  This is the phenomenal elephant in the Chinese Room that needs to be 
tamed before showing how VMF can help us find our way out. 
 
6.2 Consciousness 
Unlike standard computationalist approaches to cognition, which rely on algorithmic manipulation 
of symbolic representations according to syntactic properties, the causal properties of which are 
given by their ‘shape’ (physical instantiation), the approach being advocated in the present work 
gives the qualitative aspects of experience a central role to play, as the kinds of mental states being 
considered as causally efficacious parts of the cosmic machine whose patterns are visible to 
scientific enquiry, have a necessarily experiential aspect to them, as argued in the previous section.  
As a corollary, this approach to cognition also renders philosophical zombies inconceivable.   In this 
section, I will defend this realism about qualia in a way that accords with the physicalism I have been 
defending, and show how this account avoids the pitfalls of other attempts at bridging the 
difficulties of the material/experiential divide.   
If everything real is physical (§2.2 Physicalism), since phenomenal properties are real, they are 
physical.  Most thought experiments that push us towards concluding that the phenomenal is 
something extra-physical beg the question by building in dualistic assumptions (see the discussion of 
the knowledge argument in §4.1 Mental Kinds).  The dualistic intuition, that the experiential is 
different in kind to the physical, behind these assumptions is so strong and seemingly natural that it 
can be hard to shift.  But, we do also have strong intuitions to the effect that our subjective, felt 
experiences actually cause things, at least sometimes.  If the feeling itself plays no causal role, i.e. if 
it is epiphenomenal, then it seems hard to understand why it is universally present (if it is).   
One way of arguing for phenomenal properties being causal properties is to appeal to evolution.  If 
they were mere epiphenomenal side effects with no influence on the course of events, then why do 
we all seem to have them?  (I’m ignoring for the moment the eliminative option that they are a 
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‘grand illusion’ and should be eliminated from our theory of mind – see §6.2.1 The Feeling of 
Things.)  They could be ‘spandrels’ (Gould & Lewontin, 1979), that is, the inevitable results of our 
architecture (Sloman & Chrisley, 2003; Sloman, et al., 2003), without actually being selected for.  But 
this doesn’t mean they are not causal; many (most?) traits start off as ‘unintended consequences’ of 
design, but then find a role.  If phenomenal properties result from the interplay of information 
actively gathered through navigating the world and the accumulations of previous experience, and 
those properties are ‘visible’ to selection, then they must be part of the causes of our adaptive 
actions.  This is verging on being a viciously circular argument (they are causal if evolution can see 
them; evolution can see them if they are causal), but it’s one that can be escaped from if we can tell 
a convincing ‘just so’ story for the evolutionary emergence of phenomenal properties by explaining 
what advantage having them confers.  This would turn the argument from a logical circle into an 
emergent spiral. 
One possibility is that first-person, phenomenal experience is necessary for the kind of reflexivity 
needed for deliberative reasoning in complex and novel environments.  Moreover, being social and 
relying on cultural inheritance to establish adaptive ‘meme lines’ gives group-level adaptive function 
to the ability to reflect on one’s experience.  The ability to make a plan, and the ability to control 
one’s behaviour and not be purely reactive, are all examples of selective pressures for organisms like 
us (Sloman & Chrisley, 2003).  The storing of partially conceptualised representations of objects and 
properties, apart from allowing us to predict what the next experience will be (and thereby play a 
part in forming it (see §5.2.2 Expectations)), also allows ‘off-line’ reasoning processes about those 
things.  It seems plausible that this kind of reflection plays a role in the formation of a self-image, 
something of vital importance to social animals which need to understand their role in a partly 
cooperative, partly competitive group, this being something that cannot be innately given, but which 
emerges as the result of many interacting factors.   
These are speculations that will not be developed here, their aim being to make it at least plausible 
that phenomenal properties, including those that accompany belief-like and desire-like states, are 
visible to selective forces.  Before continuing, let me reiterate that, in this picture, phenomenal 
experience outstrips introspective awareness: our introspections can be mistaken, not just about 
what experience is representing as being the case, but also about what we take it to be 
representing.  That is, as well as being wrong about the dress being gold, I can be wrong about 
experiencing the dress as gold.  Perhaps this is most clearly seen in the case of ‘blindsight,’ where a 
person who lacks conscious visual awareness can nevertheless perform certain physical tasks to a 
level that demonstrates that some visual information is available to use (Milner & Goodale, 1995).  
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Another example is colour constancy illusions (Adelson, 1995), where a patch of colour can be 
experienced in different ways depending on its context, even though in terms of the ‘narrow’ 
experience of patches of colour, the same colour experience is being had.   
     
We can be more or less aware of aspects of our visual experience.  Sometimes, we consciously think 
about the objects around us and may form propositions as part of the act of thinking through an 
action.  At other times, our actions are guided by a more practical kind of knowledge of the world, 
the exercising of mastery and imagination.  This doesn’t mean that it is false to describe such actions 
propositionally.  Science describes aspects of the world using language, and such statements are 
true if the terms in them refer to aspects of the world that can be said to fall under that category by 
sharing similar enough relations to other parts of the world.  Dogs don’t form propositions about 
bones, but it can nevertheless be true of a dog that it thinks the bone is buried behind the tree 
(Chrisley, 1995). 
In the following section, I will present an argument against an argument against a position I do not 
support: namely panpsychism.  This is a case of ‘my enemy’s enemy,’ our common foe being 
epiphenomenalism: 
Full recognition of the reality of experience… is the obligatory starting point for any remotely realistic 
version of physicalism….  It follows that real physicalism can have nothing to do with physicSalism…. 
unless it is supposed – obviously falsely – that the terms of physics can fully capture the nature or 
essence of experience….[W]e have no good reason to think that we know anything about the physical 
that gives us any reason to find any problem in the idea that experiential phenomena are physical 
phenomena. (Strawson, 2006, p. 4)  
The attack I will defend panpsychism against, the combination problem, however, will ultimately 
undermine the argument for panpsychism in another way, that is, through making conceivable the 
emergence of the phenomenal aspects of mental states from non-phenomenal parts.   
 
In this version of the 
‘checkershadow’ illusion, the 
‘black’ and ‘white’ squares 
seen above and below the 
wooden block, are actually 
the same grey, as can be 
seen when they are joined 
by a line of the same colour. 
https://www.itp.uni-
hannover.de/~zawischa/ITP/introcol.html 
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6.2.1 The Feeling of Things 
The question ‘What is consciousness?’ can be given the straightforward (Louis) Armstrong-Block 
answer: ‘If you gotta ask, you ain’t never gonna get to know’ (Block, 1978, p. 281).  This reply 
captures the spirit of the immediate reaction to a philosopher questioning consciousness.  It’s right 
there, transparent to me, nothing about it seems opaque; one thing that I know more intimately 
than anything else is what it is like to be me.  This is part of the Cartesian certainty, used not only as 
a basis for our understanding of the mental, but of mathematics and science.  I clearly and distinctly 
perceive a patch of colour, and I cannot doubt that I am perceiving that colour.   
We should take Descartes’ method of doubt further than even he did and question the seeming 
clarity and distinctness of our ‘inner’ experiences (it may be true that I can’t doubt that I am 
thinking, but it can be doubted that I know what I’m thinking).  When we refer to these private 
experiences, how can we do so without using terms the meanings of which rely on publicly 
accessible meaning?  I’m not denying that we have experiences, obviously, just saying it might be 
fruitful to apply a measure of methodological scepticism to what seems to be a given: ‘There seems 
to be phenomenology, but it does not follow from this universally attested fact that there really is 
phenomenology’ (Dennett, 1991, p. 365).   
Strawson accuses Dennett of being ‘so in thrall to the fundamental intuition of dualism… that [he is] 
prepared to deny the existence of experience’ (Strawson, 2006, p. 5).  That is, Dennett is accused of 
assuming that since experience is of such a different nature to the material, and since everything 
real is material, then the experiential cannot be real.  Strawson, on the other hand, says, ‘For there 
to seem to be rich phenomenology or experience just is for there to be such phenomenology or 
experience’ (Strawson, 2006, p. 9).  But, as we will see, Strawson is himself in thrall to dualistic 
intuitions, as he relies on the ‘never-to-be-reconciled’ distinction between the experiential and the 
material in his argument against emergence, which is a major premise in his argument for 
panpsychism. 
Nagel gave voice to the common intuition: ‘It is difficult to imagine how a chain of explanatory 
inference could ever get from the mental states of whole animals back to the proto-mental 
properties of dead matter’ (Nagel, 1979, p. 194).  Despite this, we also have the intuition that if 
conscious mental states have physical effects, then they must, in some sense, be physical. Is it that 
our intuitions regarding the physical are incorrect or incomplete, or our intuitions regarding the 
experiential?  It will be my conclusion that the experiential resides in ‘virtual’ processes (in the sense 
discussed in §6.1 Virtual Machines) instantiated in but not reducible to the material. 
149 
 
Aleksander & Dunmall (2003, pp. 9-10) offer a set of axioms that give minimal necessary conditions 
for the presence of consciousness.  These are: 
1. Perception: having depictions of the world. 
2. Imagination: recalling such states and fabricating states that resemble them, the 
intentionality of which is ‘inherited’ from experience of the thing ‘out there’ that they are 
derived from. 
3. Attention: being able to direct attention to certain aspects of the world, this being made 
necessary by limited bandwidth of perceptual channels. 
4. Planning: being able to use imagination to contemplate and plan actions. 
5. Emotions: having affective states that evaluate and motivate/veto actions.   
Now, the question is whether the kinds of mechanisms that need to be present for the agent to have 
a sense of its own presence in the world, as well as the affordances for action open to it, are also 
sufficient for consciousness.  Aleksander & Dunmall say we can assume a one-to-one mapping 
between sensations of consciousness and the neural mechanisms that underpin the functions set 
out in the axioms, but that the science of consciousness should only concern itself with this 
functional description, leaving the subjective sensations alone (Aleksander & Dunmall, 2003, p. 15).  
Notice that the identity relationship assumed here is not between mental and physical kinds, but 
mechanisms described functionally and mental kinds.  Similarly, Franklin (2003) says a creature has 
‘functional consciousness’ if it possesses states and mechanisms that make it aware of dangers and 
opportunities in the world and allows it to navigate and manipulate the world in accordance with its 
needs, but distinguishes this from phenomenal and self-consciousness.   
Can we separate and scientifically side-line the subjective quality of experience, or is this a necessary 
part of the causal story of the world?  Global workspace theory (Baars, 1988) claims that 
consciousness is what happens when otherwise unconscious, specialised cognitive processes ‘form a 
coalition’ to solve a particular problem, possibly recruiting other processes to the task as 
appropriate.  There is competition for attention, but unopposed ideas will be acted on (cf. James’ 
(1890) ideomotor theory).  This would give a special causal role to consciousness, if it is seen as 
necessary for performing this function.  But what is it about that kind of function that merits a 
phenomenal rather than a functional description when it comes to scientifically analysing the causal 
processes? 
This question is of the same form as the one discussed earlier (§2.1.1 The ‘Special’ Debate) about the 
possibility of taking physically realised mental states to be causal, and therefore as having downward 
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causal influence despite supervening on the physical states.  There (and later in §3.4 Emergence) it 
was argued that physicalism does not rule out emergent causal phenomena, within the constraints 
of the physical.  Furthermore, talking of the causal powers of mental states in purely functional 
terms does not exclude an explanation of how those causal roles are actually cashed out, in this case 
in terms of the functional role of consciousness.  The aversion to cashing out functional talk in these 
terms seems to me to be something like a kind of scientific taboo at mentioning the ‘c’ word, which I 
think is a result of implicitly accepting the ‘mysterian’ view that the relationship between conscious 
states and physical ones is intractable (McGinn, 1993), and therefore the subject is best avoided by 
‘serious’ scientists.  However, it seems to me that if we can tell a coherent, natural story of how 
conscious states come to be, and what they are for, then we should not be embarrassed to talk 
about it.  Indeed, if, as I am arguing, we can’t make sense of the causal properties of mental states 
without referring to the perceiving subject that has them, then we are obliged to include them in our 
scientific discussions. 
Opposed to the mysterians, are those who do not find it inconceivable that the relationship between 
the phenomenally conscious aspects of the mind and the physical states that realise them should be 
beyond our ken:   
…every phenomenal kind M is identical to some P that is generally similar to the kinds currently 
recognized by the physical sciences…. [W]hen we have established such M=P identities, then we will 
therewith have ‘fully captured the nature or essence of experience’ in physical terms, in that the 
relevant physical term will refer to nothing other than the phenomenal kind M. (Papineau, 2006, p. 
101)    
However, this might be too strong, if it is interpreted as implying a type-identity (see §3.3 
Supervenience & Realisation).  If VMF is right, there may not be such identities, as the explanatory 
work will be done by the ‘design’ of the machine, with the physical components being necessary but 
not sufficient for explaining the causal properties of the VM.     
If there were some intrinsic properties of some physical kinds that explain consciousness, and if our 
brains are the seat of our consciousness, then there is some intrinsic property of neurons that is a 
conscious property.  But neurons are not individually conscious; it is only when they are part of the 
system that is the brain (plus body and world), that they become part of a pattern that has 
phenomenal properties.  Thinking that neurons contain a little bit of consciousness due to their 
intrinsic properties is akin to the panpsychist thought that everything does, and suffers from the 
same problems.  Rather than being an identity between mental and physical kinds, consciousness is 
better seen as the result of a certain kind of information processing.  For this reason, I can conceive 
of a robot as having consciousness if it is suitably hooked up to the world and processes information 
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about the world and its own internal states in the right way, but I cannot conceive of a rock having 
consciousness, as I don’t think it processes information about its environment, or monitors its own 
state. 
Our form of embodiment partly determines how the world appears to us, through directing our 
attention to aspects of the world relevant to us, meaning the information from the environment is 
to an extent ‘pre-processed.’  A ‘pure’ information processing understanding of mental states 
sometimes advocated by traditional computational functionalism, for example the ‘sense-model-
plan-act’ framework, is too abstract and insufficiently dynamic.  It would be computationally 
intractable if all the information needed processing so as to select the salient patterns, and from this 
a detailed model of the world had to be constructed for use in planning actions.  An embodied 
approach means we don’t need to solve the processing and model building problems, as the 
information is presented to us in a structured, meaningful way.  Cognition is ‘scaffolded’ by the 
socio-cultural environment, which has an evolutionary dynamic and which we have evolved to 
internalise as part of our development.  For this reason, embodiment theory takes phenomenology 
seriously: how you perceive yourself and how you perceive are related in a self-sustaining feedback 
dynamic, and an understanding of this first-person perspective, of how the world is presented to 
subjects, is an integral part of the scientific project of understanding mental states and their causal 
propensities. 
One problem with this discussion is that old, disembodied ways of thinking are embedded in the 
language, so deeply that it affects even the prepositions we use.  Our experience is not something of 
which we are aware, rather it is something with which we are aware of the world (Rowlands, 2002; 
Clark, 2002).  The mistake of thinking that what we are directly aware of is our experience leads to 
the Grand Illusion Illusion: we are led to scepticism about our experience because we know our 
phenomenal experiences can be misleading, but that scepticism is misplaced: rather than our 
perception seeming to be a particular way, it is the world that seems to be a particular way 
according to our perceptual mechanisms that have developed to do their best with the information 
at their disposal.  So, although we may not have full colour experience at the edges of peripheral 
vision, despite the fact that it seems that we do, this does not mean that we are mistaken; the things 
in your peripheral vision seem to have colour, and indeed they do.  We experience them as coloured 
because of expectations we have developed through experience (see §5.2.2 Expectations).   
Of course, under certain circumstance our expectations can lead us astray and then we would be in a 
state of illusion, but not a grand one, just a normal one, where we are misled by out-of-the-ordinary 
situations.  Our expectations are based on what has gone before and the generalisations we have 
152 
 
formed as a result of recognising patterns and abstracting from experience.  This is a process that 
takes place over (at least) three different timescales: phylogenetic (we developed the perceptual 
mechanisms to make sense of the world we find ourselves in); ontogenetic (we build up a lifetime of 
experiences); pragmatic (visual saccades build up a picture of our immediate environment).  It is not 
surprising that these processes have produced mechanisms that are not always accurate, after all, 
they are evolutionary, and so imperfect in the materials at hand to build them, as well as needing to 
be economical (§5.2.1 Evolution).  
The Grand Illusion hypothesis finds support in much work on perception in recent years, e.g. change 
blindness.  It’s a form of the classical sceptical argument: given that we are wrong about some 
perceptions, we might be wrong about all of them, and is a symptom of the disembodied approach 
to cognition that places too great an emphasis on internal representations rather than seeing 
perception as intimately connected to the possibilities of action in the world (O'Regan & Noë, 2001).  
However, although there is merit in the enactive approach, it ties perception too closely to 
immediate action routines and fails to see the much longer term processes involved in building up 
perceptual routines (Clark, 2002).  So, the embodied account of perception needs supplementing 
with the idea of cognitive mechanisms that function to ‘fill in’ the relatively sparse information 
available at any moment from the outside world.  This is a top-down process of feedback from 
experiences, which is fed forward into action, in conjunction with immediately available information 
on sensorimotor contingencies (§5.2 Feedback and Feedforward).  ‘Radical’ enactivists seem to be 
forced to concede that any device that uses information in the formation of actions would count as 
an experiencer, including a thermostat, unless they want to add architectural conditions to rule out 
such devices, in which case they are not radical anymore.   
Another example where subjective phenomenal experience and physical action seem to be 
mismatched is the Ebbinghaus illusion, where two circles of the same size appear to be different 
sizes because of the relative size of a surrounding circle of circles.  Although the inner circles appear 
to be different, this information does not result in a difference in motor behaviour when reaching to 
grasp the circles (Goodale, et al., 1991).  On a more everyday level, our rapid reactions to things in 
the world, like small objects moving towards our eyes, happen too quickly to pass through higher-
level processing and decision making procedures.  In Goodale and Milner’s (1992) account, there are 
two separate neural pathways that process information from vision.  One is the older system for 
guiding skilful action, the other is newer, for object recognition based on knowledge and memory.  
This newer system is used to classify things seen in the world into kinds based on our conceptual 
schemes, which may be updated through receiving new information, and which could be used for 
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the deliberative forming of decisions to act.  Here our first-person perception of the world comes 
together with the scientific project of describing kinds in the third-person in order to explain and 
predict.  Feedback from these higher centres may be necessary for visual awareness of certain types 
and certainly affect the contents of perception, and may be involved in action selection (Pascual-
Leone & Walsh, 2001).  This is a different sort of action than that resulting more automatically and 
fluently in our habitual actions, like that of walking.  The difference between these two mechanisms 
of action is shown by the interference that can happen when deliberative thought is applied to 
habitual actions; think of the feeling of awkwardness and lack of coordination that results from 
becoming aware that you are being watched while walking, and consciously trying to walk normally. 
There are different terms of art used in the literature to refer to conscious experience, which I have 
been using without much discrimination so far, e.g. ‘qualia’ (Lewis, 1929; Nagel, 1974) or 
‘phenomenal consciousness’ (Block, 1978).  These bring with them assumptions about the essence 
of experiential states, for example that they are intrinsic, ineffable and incorrigible etc.  These 
assumptions may be a source of theoretical problems rather than statements of truths we should 
automatically assent to.  This doesn’t mean that we should assume the opposite, that we are misled 
in thinking that conscious decisions are real, or that they are stories we tell ourselves to maintain a 
fiction of ourselves as a unified subject (Dennett, 1992).  We can have veridical experiences of 
ourselves acting on our deliberations without assuming properties like intrinsicality, etc.   
The intuitions captured by the philosophical concept of qualia are, however, deep seated and not 
easily dispelled.  The feeling that there is a gulf between physical and phenomenal explanations is 
not bridged by statements of identity, even if true.  Let’s say that it has been adequately empirically 
shown that the physical correlate of pain is C-fibre firing.  Some, e.g. Papineau (2006), would say that 
such an identity is an a posteriori necessity just like ‘water = H2O,’ and that the intuition of an 
‘explanatory gap’ (Levine, 1983) is just an illusion.  The nature of water is not given to us directly a 
priori, and neither is the nature of pain; both refer to what they do by virtue of certain causal and 
historical facts (Papineau, 2006, p. 102).  The illusion of the gap stems from confusing merely 
‘mentioning’ a conscious state and ‘using it.’  When we make an identity statement between a 
phenomenal concept and its physical correlate, we are just referring to kinds of states in the world 
that we have discovered are identical in extension; the phenomenal concept doesn’t ‘capture’ some 
deeper essence: ‘Scientific talk of relevant brain states picks out states which are in fact essentially 
conscious, but does not a priori display those states as conscious’ (Papineau, 2006, p. 106).  When 
mentioning a mental state with phenomenal language, ‘the conscious referent seems to be present 
in the thinking itself,’ and this apparent transparency seems to give us direct access to the essential 
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properties of that mental state, which don’t include the physical properties, leading us to mistakenly 
conclude that the physical state is not identical to the mental one.  However, phenomenal concepts, 
just like other intentional concepts, ‘gain their referential powers from causal and historical 
relations, and those referential relations can leave many essential features of the referents opaque’ 
(Papineau, 2006, p. 105). 
Papineau argues for physicalism on a causal-explanatory basis, and says the ‘brute intuition’ that 
‘straightforward’ physicalism cannot be true is just an illusion that would continue even if it were 
proved to be false.  He equates the intuition to that of the earth standing still, in that even when we 
understand inertial forces we still feel ourselves to be standing on a stationary surface.  I think there 
is a difference, though, which is that we can make sense of the feeling of being still given the laws of 
physics, whereas the anti-physicalist intuition stems from the fact that knowing the physical laws 
‘underneath’ experience doesn’t seem to explain what it feels like to be in that physical state.  The 
problem is not that the concept of a physical state excludes consciousness, but that it doesn’t seem 
to necessitate it.   
It seems ‘completely open what it would feel like to be a purely physical being with firing C-fibres…. 
Why suppose it must feel like nothing?’ (Papineau, 2006, p. 101).  As mentioned, Papineau relies on 
the argument that many necessary identities are established after the fact, like ‘salt’ and ‘sodium 
chloride.’  However, earlier we saw reasons to doubt a straightforward causal theory of reference 
that assumes we can label parts of the world without using assumptions about the nature of those 
parts, leaving us free to investigate those natures later when we have the conceptual tools to do so 
(see §§1.2 Are Natural Kinds Found or Made?, 1.3 Rigidity).  But, if baptisms are not as conceptually 
blank as pointing, and require prejudices about the nature of the parts being pointed at in order to 
actually succeed in referring, then it might not be as simple as just investigating a posteriori what 
physical parts of the world are identical with the mental parts we have picked out with phenomenal 
concepts.  If so, we couldn’t simply ‘allow that the term C-fibres firing fully captures the nature and 
essence of Pain’ in the same way that ‘the term sodium chloride fully capture the nature and 
essence of table salt’ (Papineau, 2006, p. 102).  This is because we cannot assume that all natural 
kinds have micro-physical essences that we can point to with a name, said name being a placeholder 
for whatever it is that micro-physically determines all the other properties associated with that kind 
of thing.  Part of the essence of some things is determined by how they are related to other stuff in 
their environment, by the role they play in wider processes, roles that might be realised by virtual 
machines. 
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McGinn (2006) wonders if Strawson’s assertion that experience ‘just is’ physical is substantive, or is 
just a synonym for ‘concrete,’ as Strawson doesn’t say in what respect it is physical, for example, 
being spatial, causally connected to non-experiential facts, or something you can bang your head on: 
‘We need to be told in what respect experiences are like molecules before we can assess whether 
the class constitutes a genuine natural kind….  He simply wants to call experiences physical – just as I 
may want to call ocean waves spiritual’ (McGinn, 2006, p. 91).  This seems a little unfair, unless 
McGinn is saying this in light of an ontology that claims all real things are spiritual and waves are 
real, and then he would need to back up this spiritualist position, but he wouldn’t have to say in 
what respect waves were spiritual.   
McGinn’s second objection is that Strawson’s use of the term ‘physical’ is a ‘flagrant violation of 
common usage’ (McGinn, 2006, p. 91).   But can we say that a philosophical term has a ‘common’ 
usage?  Moreover, if we think that there is a fundamental misunderstanding entwined in the 
common understanding of a term, then we should be able to challenge that usage.  This is in effect 
what Strawson is doing, by taking physicalism as saying that all concrete phenomena are physical, 
since by common understanding, many things are not physical, for example, feelings.  McGinn claims 
that physicalists believe that ‘experiential facts all supervene on non-experiential facts…, and that 
the causal powers of [experiential] facts…, are specifiable in entirely non-[experiential] terms’ 
(McGinn, 2006, p. 90).  However, some physicalists would deny this for a number of reasons: they 
might not accept supervenience (e.g. Cartwright (1999), Humphries (1997a)), or could deny 
reduction ism by saying, as I am, that the causal powers of experiential states are not specifiable in 
non-experiential terms.   
After characterising physicalists the way he does, McGinn says, ‘…they seem to miss out the very 
essence of what an experience is’ (McGinn, 2006, p. 90), and concludes that Strawson should drop 
the physicalist terminology, since it is just playing with words and doesn’t help answer questions like 
how the mental and the physical are related: ‘By his methods we could extend the reach of 
physicalism still further, by declaring that ‘physical’ is a natural kind term for such things as bodies, 
minds and numbers!’ (McGinn, 2006, p. 92).  Could we extend the physical to abstracta?  They exist 
in the mind, but not as concrete things.  It seems far from trivial to claim that all concrete 
phenomena must be at base physical.  Strawson’s problem is to reconcile the physicalist motivations 
with experiential facts that are ‘totally different in kind’ (McGinn, 2006, p. 91).   A possibility is that 
this difference comes about as a result of differences in descriptive perspective, i.e. the first- and 
third-person descriptions of the same events.  However, Strawson denies that a first-person 
perspective can emerge over time in physical systems, so ends up needing to assert that all things 
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describable in third-person terms also have some sort of first-person properties too.  In the next 
section, we consider this argument for panpsychism. 
 
6.3 Panpsychism & Composition 
Panpsychism states that there must be some fundamental property of matter that disposes it 
towards constituting experiential states, and that this property must itself be, in some sense, 
psychical.  That is not to say that each particle has conscious experience in the way that we 
understand consciousness from our own experience, just that there is some intrinsic property, 
separate from those properties described by third-person physics, that is responsible for collections 
of matter like us having first-person experiences.  This view relies on a supervenience claim about 
the relationship between macro-experiential states (like we have as subjects), and micro-
experiential states (seen as intrinsic properties of constituent particles).  Even if it is accepted that 
such micro-experiential states could exist, there is a problem faced by this view, namely, it seems 
clear that, as subjects of experience, we are singular and unified; there seems to be one experiencer 
present in each of us rather than many.   How are macro-experiential states supposed to emerge 
from their micro-experiential components?  In the case of the emergence of liquidity, both the 
component parts and the macro-state have causal descriptions that can be explanatorily connected, 
but it doesn’t look like micro-experiential states could explain macro-experiential states in the same 
way (Papineau, 2006).  
 
 
6.3.1 The Living Dead 
The conceivability of philosophical zombies is taken by many, e.g. Chalmers (1996), to show that 
experiential properties are not physical.  A zombie-you, being physically and causally identical to 
you, could be sitting reading this, frowning, expressing frustration, but nevertheless lack any 
experience or feelings.  The zombie lacks conscious awareness of its place in the world; it is just a 
bunch of cells, adding up to no more than the sum of its parts.  If this is conceivable, so the 
argument goes, experiential properties are not physical as they are in addition to all the physical 
goings on of the zombie, so physicalism is false.  However, an unfortunate side-effect of this is that 
your conscious, experienced thoughts are epiphenomenal; they are not the causes of your physical 
behaviour, since the zombie-you’s frown was caused in just the same way as yours. 
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Panpsychists attempt to eliminate the gap between the material and the mental, and thus avoid 
epiphenomenalism, by installing experiential properties with physical ones in the building materials.  
As mentioned above (§2.2 Physicalism), Russell (1927) pointed out that physical science only 
captures the extrinsic, relational properties of matter, and thus is silent on the intrinsic nature of 
matter, and later said, ‘We know nothing about the intrinsic quality of physical events except when 
these are mental events that we directly experience’ (Russell, 1948).  Another such position is 
Chalmers’ (2003) panprotoexperientialism.  This leads Strawson to ask, ‘Why then… do so many 
physicalists simply assume that the physical, in itself, is an essentially and wholly non-experiential 
phenomenon?’ (Strawson, 2006, p. 11).  He claims that the idea of the non-experientiality of the 
physical is at odds with the thesis of realistic physicalism, that experience is a real concrete 
phenomenon and every real concrete phenomenon is physical (Strawson, 2006, pp. 11-12).  
Strawson accepts that ‘experience is ‘really just neurons firing… [but that] certainly doesn’t mean 
that all characteristics of what is going on, in the case of experience, can be described by physics and 
neurophysiology…” (Strawson, 2006, p. 7).  Given that emergence is not an option (see below), and 
that in the case of experience there is no real distinction between reduction and elimination, if 
experience can be reduced wholly to the non-experiential, then it doesn’t exist. 
Strawson’s argument is a kind of inference to the best explanation.  Given the obvious reality of 
experience, and the fact that everything real is physical, and given that experiential properties 
cannot be derived from those found in physics, then there must be properties that are not described 
in the language of physics.  These psychical properties have either emerged somehow from a non-
psychical background, or they were there from the start.  Since radical kind emergence (as opposed 
to ‘moderate,’ epistemic emergence, as in that of liquidity) is untenable, then all fundamental 
particles must have psychical properties.   
This untenability, though, is based on the same assumptions about the nature of experience that 
created the problem in the first place.  That is, it is claimed that, since experience has these special 
properties, then it can’t come in degrees; it’s either there or not.  It can’t just ‘pop’ into existence, 
and it isn’t necessitated by the right combination of non-experiential parts, so it can’t emerge.  We 
will return to emergence shortly, but first we should focus on the main problem for panpsychism, 
namely the composition problem: given the unified nature of an experience, it cannot be composed 
of many smaller experiences.  I will claim that there is a solution to this problem, but that solution in 
fact gives us reason to believe that emergentism is tenable, and so emergence is the better 
explanation after all. 
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6.3.2 The Mind-Mind Problem 
A problem that panpsychist theories face in placing minds like ours in a physical world is that it is not 
immediately clear how lots of little minds can add up to one big one.  How can ‘smaller’ minds be 
related to each other in such a way as to lead to the emergence of a ‘larger’ unified mind?  The 
problem can be approached from two directions: the ‘bottom’ or the ‘top.’ 
The former is a metaphysical enquiry into wholes and parts.  James (1890, p. 160) called it the 
derivation problem.  Composition is unproblematic for particulars like a bath-full of water: it is a 
collection of water molecules the properties of which explain, together with the context, the 
properties of the whole.  In the case of experiential properties the same cannot be said: if a feeling is 
composed of a hundred other feelings, then, since the feeling to be explained exists in addition to 
the collection of feelings that are supposed to explain it, there are 101 feelings in existence, and we 
still need an explanation of the extra feeling.  The whole is greater than the sum of the parts, as the 
micro-subjects don’t have the right properties to explain the properties of the macro-subjectivity in 
a way analogous to how facts about molecular structure explain liquidity.  If a new feeling comes 
into existence when the 100 feelings are put together, then this is a case of ‘radical’ emergence, and, 
if that is acceptable, there is no need to posit panpsychism at all. 
The ‘top down’ approach is based on phenomenological considerations.  From our point of view, we 
seem to be unified subjects.  There may be many different things happening in one’s mind, but they 
are all happening to one: there is one subject having these experiences.  These arguments rely on 
the privilege of first-person authority, but not in a problematic way; even if we doubt that we are 
unified subjects, we still have to explain the sense of self we do have.  Some just state it as an a 
priori fact that subjects can’t compose, for example the principle of ‘no summing of subjects’ (Goff, 
2009, p. 302), which is based on a simple disanalogy between objects and subjects (objects can sum, 
subjects can’t).   
There seems to be a singular thing which is our selfhood, which does not appear fully-formed but 
comes to be through the coming together of parts over time, but this is at odds with the intuition 
that a self is neither composed of ‘part-selfs’ or non-experiential physical parts.  But, if we can 
answer ‘easier’ questions (Chalmers, 1995) of cognition, e.g. how the visual system works, and we 
can take such systems to have mental properties, then we have to face the question of how these 
combine to form a whole self, without falling back onto implicitly inserting a homunculus to bring 
them all and in the mind bind them.  I call this question the Mind-Mind Problem. 
To explain how subjects come to be through natural, spatio-temporal processes, either these 
processes involve non-experiential or experiential parts; in the first case, we have to bridge the 
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‘explanatory gap’ between non-experiential descriptions of physical processes and experiential 
descriptions of subjective states; in the second case, states of subjects seem to be unified in a way 
that cannot be explained by decomposition into constituent ‘semi-subjects.’  The solution is to see 
that this seeming impossibility of decomposing subjectivity is an illusion, thus allowing that two or 
more ‘semi-subjects’ can come together to form a subject.  This is not to deny the existence of 
selves, as some would (e.g. Metzinger (2003)), but to enhance our understanding of what subjects 
are.  Moreover, this does not constitute support for panpsychism, but for physicalism, as it attempts 
make the emergence of subjectivity from non-experiential parts conceivable, and in the process 
bridge the explanatory gap.  Before presenting the argument, we should examine the self, to be 
clear about what we are trying to explain. 
 
6.3.3 Feeling Things 
Seeing experiential properties as intrinsic properties of subjects leads to the ‘hard-problem’ of 
explaining why cognitive processes are accompanied by the subjective feelings that they are (in 
contrast to the ‘easy problems’ regarding the mechanics of particular cognitive processes) 
(Chalmers, 1995).  In the following, I aim to show that the existence of answers to the ‘easy’ 
questions may add up to an explanation of everything that needs explaining. 
The assumption that experience is an intrinsic property of certain brain processes means that there 
can be no external explanation of why a particular neural event has the felt quality it does.  It follows 
that the extrinsic, relational descriptions of the physical sciences will never capture these intrinsic 
properties.  Moreover, we can never be wrong about how things appear to us because these 
intrinsic properties are just there for us; we can’t be wrong that we are experiencing the world a 
particular way, even if we are wrong that the world is the way we are experiencing it to be.   
Both the panpsychist and unitarian (those who see the mind as a simple, uncomposable unit) accept 
the inconceivability of the emergence of the mental from the physical.  Emergentism comes in 
ontological and epistemological varieties (§3.4 Emergence).  Strawson accepts the latter, but denies 
the possibility of the former, because ‘only like can emerge from like’ (Strawson, 2006, p. 15).  His 
argument against ontological emergentism is based on the thought that ‘it seems plain that there 
must be a fundamental sense in which any emergent phenomenon… is wholly dependent on that 
which it emerges from’ (Strawson, 2006, p. 15). For example, liquidity from collections of H2O 
molecules at room temperature near the surface of earth.  Of course, this assumes the mental is 
fundamentally unlike the physical.  
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Despite the fact that many take this account of the nature of phenomenal experience to be clearly 
and distinctly true, it can be doubted.  What does it mean for these intrinsic properties to be ‘just 
there for us’?  It isn’t clear to me that these ‘felt properties’ are purely intrinsic and immediate, and 
we have seen examples from cognitive science that should lead one to question assumptions as to 
the incorrigibility of first-person experience (§6.2 Consciousness).  In the case where two patches of 
colour appear different but can be shown to be the same, we are forced to ask which of the 
experiences was intrinsic to the physical happening being caused by light from those patches hitting 
our retina and being processed.   The light that goes to your retina from that patch of colour does 
not change, and neither do any of the intrinsic properties of the neural processes that are associated 
with perceiving just that patch of colour.  But top down processes that utilise relational properties, 
do affect how that patch appears to us.  Which one is the ‘real’ experience? 
Rather than see consciousness as a fundamental property of matter like panpsychists, or even a 
property of particular types of biological matter (e.g. (Hameroff & Penrose, 1996; Searle, 1992), it is 
more useful, I would argue, to think of it in terms of particular kinds of processes: feeling an 
emotion, attending to a flash of colour, expressing ones thoughts, and so on.  The mistake, it seems 
to me, is to think that there is an emotion, colour, or thought that exists separately from the feeling, 
attending, or expressing.  This way of thinking fits naturally with the idea of the brain being divided 
into specialised, functional parts in which particular processes take place (Steels, 2003, p. 173).  The 
question, then, is where the self is among these processes.  The self can’t be a ‘homunculus’ 
experiencing these processes; the processes are the experiences.  But in that case, if there is no 
experiencer separate from the experiences, how do these experiences add up to make a self?  This 
position faces similar epistemic and phenomenological problems of composition to panpsychism.  
The epistemic problem is that if a subjective state of mind is composed of other states of mind, it 
seems the macro-state cannot be explained merely by summing together those other states.  The 
phenomenological problem is that I feel like a unified self, the centre of my mental world; I don’t 
feel like a fragile and fragmented collection of separate mental states (most of the time). 
My strategy in the following is to give empirical support to the idea that selves (and therefore the 
experiences they have) can combine to form other, ‘larger’ selves, but then to argue that rather than 
supporting panpsychism, this supports the idea that selves can emerge given the right kinds of parts 
connected in the right kind of ways.  Since it is not mere summation of subjects (not just sticking 
them together), but rather connecting them in ways that mean they can function together in the 
real world, the derivation problem is solved.  However, since it is solved by showing emergence to 
be conceivable, panpsychism is undermined. 
161 
 
6.3.4 In Two Minds 
Corpus callosotomy is the procedure of cutting through the tissue that connects the cerebral 
hemispheres and which functions to pass information between them, effectively dividing the 
subject’s brain in two (Gazzinga, 1970).  Under normal circumstances, where the hemispheres can 
share information by perceiving the same world, for many split-brain subjects, everything seems 
more or less normal in terms of behaviour and reported phenomenology.  However, when the 
information each hemisphere receives varies in meaningful ways, interesting phenomena arise 
which, I will argue (pace Nagel (1971, p. 409)), should lead us to say that there are two subjects 
present under the experimental conditions, which compose to make one subject under normal 
conditions.  If this is the case, then we have reason to say that our intuitions about the composability 
of subjects should be revised, and furthermore that our intuitions regarding the nature of conscious 
experience, namely its intrinsicality (and the resulting ineffability, indivisibility, incorrigibility, etc.), 
should also be challenged. 
In Gazzinga’s experiments, subjects whose corpus collosa had been severed had different 
information presented to each hemisphere by showing different images to the visual fields of the 
respective hemispheres.  In the most striking cases there can be conflict between the hemispheres.  
In a case described in Nagel (1971, pp. 400-1) the right hemisphere is shown an image of a pipe, and 
the left hand tasked to write the word.  It struggled to do this as language capacity tends to reside in 
the left hemisphere.  After haltingly managing a ‘P’ shape and the down stroke of the ‘I’, the left 
hemisphere appeared to get frustrated with the ‘dumbness’ it was observing, took control of the 
pencil, made a guess that the other half was trying to write ‘PENCIL,’ and finished off the word.  
Then the right hemisphere, seemingly irritated, took control, scribbled out the word and drew a 
pipe.   
Many examples of such interhemispheric conflict in split-brain subjects have been documented 
(Wolman, 2012).  Long-term studies have shown that, for some split-brain patients, each 
hemisphere can have has its own sensory-motor interface with the environment, as well as different 
memories, cognitive and linguistic abilities and repertoires, including distinct personalities and 
preferences (Zaidel, 1994).  Split brains might also be common in nature.  Birds, for example, have 
no corpus collosa, making them natural subjects for studying conflict between the hemispheres 
(Ünver & Güntürkün, 2014).  In the case of conflict between the hemispheres in birds, one 
hemisphere takes control, but in humans we witness conflict.  When a person whose hemispheres 
are in conflict is asked to explain his or her actions, the subject will generally rationalise events in a 
way that preserves his or her sense of self: a confabulation.  Nagel gives the example of presenting a 
picture of a naked woman to the right hemisphere of a male subject, who exhibits a typical 
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physiological response; when asked why he is excited, the left hemisphere, interpreting this 
excitement in terms of what it can see, replies, ‘Wow, that’s quite a machine you’ve got there’ 
(Nagel, 1971, p. 401). 
What does this show us about the nature of subjecthood?  Nagel (1971, pp. 402-3) gives us five 
options (although he talks in terms of ‘having a mind,’ I take this as equivalent to ‘being a subject’): 
1) Split Brain Subjects (SBSs) have one mind, constituted by events in the left hemisphere, the 
events in the right hemisphere being non-conscious. 
2) SBSs have one mind, constituted by events in the left hemisphere, the events in the right 
hemisphere being conscious but not belonging to a unified subject. 
3) SBSs have two minds, one of which is dumb. 
4) SBSs have one mind constituted by events in both hemispheres but which is less unified than 
normal minds. 
5) SBSs have one mind which sometimes splits into two in certain circumstances. 
 
The case for 1) & 2), locating the mind in the left hemisphere, rests purely on the fact that we can 
communicate with that hemisphere and it doesn’t seem to be aware of what’s going on in the right.  
Unless we want to say that the ability to use language to communicate is an essential property of 
being a subject, there seems little reason to accept these, particularly since we generally accept that 
non-language using animals and human infants are subjects.  Option 3) is problematic because SBSs 
often appear to be normal in non-experimental conditions, both to themselves and to others; they 
act like a unified subject in all the ways that usually would cause us to count something as a subject.  
4) doesn’t seem to describe a subject that would fit the conditions of normal subjecthood, that is, 
the experiences this subject has, when in the experimental conditions, is too disconnected: we 
would normally think of a subject as being able to compare two distinct visual impressions.  Finally, 
5), according the Nagel, is an ad hoc move that only accounts for the phenomena being investigated, 
neglecting the fact that there will be other experiences had by the SBS at the same time which are 
not separated by the machinery of the experiment and should thus count as being experienced by a 
single subject: there can’t be both two subjects and one (Nagel, 1971, p. 408). 
Nagel concludes inconclusively, saying that what is true of SBSs is also true of ‘normals,’ as we are 
made of two cooperating hemispheres too, and since there is no definitive answer as to whether 
SBSs have one or more minds, there is no definitive answer whether we have either.  He speculates 
that future scientific discoveries might render the question meaningless, by showing the whole idea 
of a unified subject to be ‘quaint,’ although we may find ourselves ‘unable to abandon the idea’ 
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(Nagel, 1971, p. 411).  We are in the future now, and there are people in both camps; those who 
reject the notion of a self as a fiction or illusion, and others who would say that what we have learnt 
informs our concept of self, rather than eliminating it.   
The position being advocated here is that such data should change our concept of self and 
subjecthood without leading us to reject those terms.  Our idea of the self has definitely been 
informed by science since Descartes’ day, when it was inconceivable that the conscious self could be 
a physical thing (and this intuition is, as we have seen, still exerting its force).  We have to let go of 
the idea of an idealised self as the ‘central experiencer in chief.’  The self is more distributed and 
fragmented than that, perhaps more so than we like to admit, and understanding this may be the 
therapeutic benefit of cognitive science.  But neither is it so fragmented as to render it meaningless 
to talk about the self as something that has an identity in space and time, one that science can make 
meaningful statements about.   
‘Normal’ selves made of closely cooperating parts are clearly useful, both for the person involved 
and any scientists trying to make general statements about them.  Two people closely cooperating 
are not a single self, as they don’t behave in a sufficiently unified fashion, because they don’t share a 
mental life: if asked you could get two different answers to the question, ‘Why are you doing that?’  
The hemispheres of some SBSs do sometimes seem to be sufficiently disunified to be thought of as 
two separate subjects.  The most interesting cases, for my purposes, are those who only exhibit this 
disunity under experimental conditions, seeming normally at one with themselves the rest of the 
time.  If we take a subject to be a ‘locus of experience and action’ (Nagel, 1971, p. 405), in other 
words, something that can take in information about the world and use it to produce intentional 
behaviour, then it seems that both hemispheres of split-brain subjects should be counted as 
separate subjects when the information they are receiving at a time is different.  After all, if a person 
loses the left hemisphere but survives, we would treat the remaining person as a subject worthy of 
ethical consideration. 
Is there anything more we can say about what makes a collection of parts a single subject beyond 
behavioural evidence, including subjective self-reporting?  After all, a closely cooperating group of 
organisms, like ants or football fans, can act as if they were an intelligent agent, and subjective 
reports are unverifiable without further criteria of correctness.  Furthermore, a football crowd might 
well report their feelings regarding, for example, the referee’s abilities.  Anyway, the ability to report 
on one’s experience can only be a sufficient condition, so does not warrant deflating the mind to the 
hemisphere that can report its feelings to us (also, in Nagel’s example, the right hemisphere did 
seem to express its feeling of frustration when it scribbled out the word ‘PENCIL’).  The productions 
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of my right hemisphere are normally taken to be within me; I don’t have to ‘listen’ to it, ‘read off’ 
from it, or otherwise make an informational effort to gather its contents, for example to understand 
the spatial arrangement of objects around me: I will be looking at the room, not into my right 
hemisphere.  Normally, both my hemispheres are responsible for my mental life.  Although there 
may be a sense in which, under special circumstances, SBSs can be seen as having two separate 
experiencing subjects in their brains, under normal circumstances, where hemispheres share 
information though the corpus collosum, there is a single subject.  If this is the case, when moving 
from experimental to ‘normal’ situations, two subjects become one because of the shared 
informational world they inhabit.  Thus, I take Nagel’s 5th option, and this can count as empirical 
support for the possibility of combination regarding subjects of experience. 
6.3.5 Selfishness 
The claim that two ‘small’ minds can become one ‘larger’ mind by changing how information is 
shared by them is a conjecture in need of more support.  What makes the halves parts ‘inside’ the 
whole, rather than each of counting as ‘input’ to the other; what makes them constitutive of a mind, 
rather than each being causal with respect to the other?  After all, when someone stands on my toe, 
a signal is sent to my brain and I feel the pain in my toe, but that kind of informational connection is 
not generally taken to justify counting the toe as part of the mind.  What is it that makes the 
somewhat disparate pieces that make up a mind feel like a self, or, what makes some body selfish? 
The first reason may be connected to what it is to be a representation, or to be represented.  Given 
the above account of representations (§4.2 Representations), in which representations are states of 
our internal, virtual machinery that function to stand in for parts of the external world in processes 
where those parts are not themselves available, if the parts are causally ‘close enough’ for 
information to be exchanged with sufficient speed and fidelity, then those parts can be constitutive 
of a virtual machine performing a mental task, and so be part of a mind.  Furthermore, as we saw 
above (§6.1 Virtual Machines), what makes something a virtual machine has something to do with 
the historical process of how the parts were engineered over evolutionary and developmental 
timescales.   
What makes things ‘close enough’ is of course relative.  In rapid physical actions, feedforward 
models are used as there isn’t enough time for a feedback loop to be useful in coordinating action, 
even though the thing represented might be at hand (§5.2 Feedback and Feedforward).  Distant 
objects need to be represented as they are too far away for events in the object to be parts of a 
mental operation as they happen (§4.2 Representations).  Sometimes, the border between inside 
and outside may shift: given a slow process that becomes habitual, something that was external 
165 
 
could become internal (see 6.3.5.1 In a relationship below).  Something counts as in the mind, then, 
to the extent that the information is carries are immediately available to experience given the right 
kind of attention (see §6.2.1 The Feeling of Things).  They must be immediate in the sense that we 
need go through no further inferences to be able to report on the experiences we are having: ‘to 
engage in qualia talk’ (Chrisley & Sloman, 2016).     
When it comes to how the two hemispheres are related, the corpus collosum acts to transfer 
information so the virtual mechanisms embodied in the brain don’t need to represent what is 
happening in the other in order to function.  This division of labour is obviously efficient, and 
continues to operate in cases where subjects have followed a normal developmental trajectory and 
both hemispheres can access the same information through having access to the same portions of 
the environment.  When they receive different input, in effect, they become different minds, as they 
no longer share information between processes distributed between them.  In cases where humans 
are born without the connective tissue between the hemispheres, e.g. Kim Peek, then the 
mechanisms would develop separately.  In Peek’s case, it seems he did develop language processing 
function in both hemispheres, and could read two texts at the same time (Brogaard, 2013).  
If what matters is being organised in the right kind of way so that information that represents a 
relevant aspect of the world is immediately available for use by the subject, then anything capable of 
being organised in such a way will be capable of helping constitute a subject.  That is, some kinds of 
matter (it’s an open question whether this is a broad or narrow category) have the property of being 
susceptible to being so organised.  This property of being able to help constitute subjects through 
being organised in such-and-such a way and involved in ongoing, dynamic processes, explains how 
mental states can be emergent (irreducible in that they are more than the additive result of the 
causal properties of the physical parts at any moment - §3.4 Emergence) without violating 
supervenience (interpreted in a sufficiently broad-minded, liberal manner - §3.3 Supervenience & 
Realisation).  
6.3.5.1 In a relationship 
Intentional mental states, as involved in explanations of actions, have an experiential aspect to 
them, even if that experientiality is not always immediately given in awareness (§6.2 Consciousness).  
The orthodox understanding of conscious experience is that those experiential properties are 
intrinsic properties of whatever has them, e.g. a brain (§6.2.1 The Feeling of Things).  The account 
being advocated here maintains that experiential states are not intrinsic but relational, in that they 
depend on organisation and functionality. 
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Some indications that the felt properties of experience might, despite appearances, be relational, 
come from work on sensory substitution (Bach-y Rita, et al., 1969; Bach-y-Rita & Kercel, 2003).  In 
this work, information about the environment that we normally get through the eyes is substituted 
with information taken though a device (e.g. sonar) and provided to a subject through another 
modality, e.g. touch.  In the original experiments, a sensor was worn on the face and the information 
about the world was relayed through an array of pins arranged on the abdomen.  Subjects report 
that at first they feel a strange prickling on their abdomen, but that later they learn to interpret this 
as information about the world.  Eventually, they no longer feel pricklings on the abdomen, but 
report having a sort of visual experience of the world (Poiriera, et al., 2007).  This indicates that the 
way something feels to us is at least partly to do with the way the information is used by the system, 
that is, its extrinsic, relational properties.   
This description of the feeling of mental states being (at least partly) determined by how that 
information relates us to the world and is generated by our actions brings to mind the idea of active 
perception: ‘Visual perception can now be understood as the activity of exploring the environment 
in ways mediated by knowledge of the relevant sensorimotor contingencies’ (O'Regan & Noë, 2001, 
p. 943).  Noë gives the work on sensory substitution as evidence for the enactive view that 
perception and action are inextricably bound; that perception is not merely a passive registration of 
information arriving at the sensory surfaces, but the result of the actions we perform in order 
navigate the world.  If using tactile sensations for actions involved in navigating a space lead to the 
type of spatial experience usually associated with vision, then how we experience the world depends 
on the kinds of actions perceptions are used for, rather than being intrinsic to the sensory organs 
that are stimulated. As Prinz (2006, pp. 5-6) points out, though, the behavioural evidence (learning 
to negotiate spaces) is not sufficient to say that the experience is visual rather than tactile, and if a 
person who has been blind from birth reports vision-like experiences, it is difficult to give such claims 
much credence, as they have no experiences of vision on which to base such a claim. 
Other evidence that how we experience the world depends on how the information we get about it 
is used, comes from perceptual adaptation, where subjects adjust to wearing glasses that turn the 
world upside-down visually, through a process of acting in that upside world, until eventually the 
‘upside-down’ world seems the ‘right’ way (Richter, et al., 2002).  Phenomena like this may be 
explained by cross modal expectancy effects, that is, the way we experience something could also 
depend on information from other sensory modalities, if it is used to help form expectations about 
what we will experience.  For example, the McGurk effect, where visual information affects audition 
(McGurk & MacDonald, 1976).  Likewise, expected motor responses can influence how we perceive, 
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but this is not to say that the processes involved in motor responses are constitutive of visual 
experience (Prinz, 2006, pp. 5-6).   
What this evidence points out, then, is not that all experience is based on mental processes involved 
in action, but that feedback over time from our actions in the world constitute expectations that 
play an important role in forming representations of the world, which are used as the basis of 
actions, and which partly constitute experience. This is a causal, dynamic process, with multiple 
mutually influential streams.  Motoric action and its possibilities is one of those influences, and one 
deeply entrenched evolutionarily.  However, it may actually be the ability to not have action directly 
linked to perception and action routines, to think off-line, to visualise, simulate, and plan, that 
marked a significant moment in the evolution of intelligent creatures like us (Prinz, 2006, p. 11). 
It may be the case that we develop the ability to have thoughts about objects in the world without 
those objects being there to participate in that thought, but the fact is that it wouldn’t be the 
thought it is without in the first instance being constituted by a kind of relationship between mind 
and world.  The internal portions of these experiences of the world are used in feedforward, 
expectational systems, and in the cognitive processes involved in planning, forming and performing 
actions, but this does not mean that when we are having an actual experience that only that inner 
portion is involved in our experience.  We are not experiencing that inner state; we are experiencing 
what it is related to, which involves that inner state.  In the case of misperceptions, where the thing 
we think we are perceiving is not there, we are tokening the inner mental state that is usually 
tokened when the thing is there, but we are not perceiving the thing itself, rather we are perceiving 
the world as if that thing were there.  This misperceiving depends on the cases of actual perceiving, 
and actual perceptions depend on more than just the tokening of the inner state. 
If it is possible that minds can be divided in two and (re)combined given the way information is 
shared and used, there seems to be no reason why more than two ‘proto-subjects’ could be so 
combined.  Does this lead to a slippery argumentative slope to a form of panpsychism?  We can 
head off this challenge by putting certain conditions on what makes something the kind of thing that 
can be a mind.  The division of a mind into parts that have the potential to have experience has to 
‘bottom out,’ so we should be able to say something about what kinds of things can be minimal 
experience producers.  If being a subject is not a matter of having a single place where all the 
intrinsic properties of experience come together, what is it that makes us feel like a single self?  In 
the view being presented here, we are using the notion of a ‘virtual machine’ to do so (Sloman, 
2011a).  The mind is composed of multiple virtual machines, which taken separately are simple 
individual processes, but which together form an experiencer (c.f. Minsky’s (1986) Society of Mind). 
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To restate the claim made at the start of this chapter in light of the above, recasting the relationship 
between mental states and the physical stuff in which they are instantiated in terms virtual 
machines has several clear advantages over more traditional functionalist accounts.  Virtual Machine 
Functionalism (VMF) doesn’t require the identification of a ‘single well-defined state of the system, 
or a collection of states’ (Sloman, 2013) with the relevant mental state.  Instead there may be 
multiple, overlapping (e.g. sharing informational resources) mechanisms that come into existence, 
form coalitions, and go out of existence.  These can utilise neural, bodily and environmental 
resources, with information flowing in and along multiple channels, rather than following a linear 
route through a step-wise process.  Instead of abstracted mental states realised in discrete physical 
states, where these physical states have the appropriate causal properties to fulfil their functional 
role in transforming the preceding state into the consequent state in a linear, input-output process, 
VMF explains the causal powers of a system by referring to ‘a multi (virtual)-machine architecture in 
which several enduring states with their own causal histories interact causally with each other and 
with the environment’ (Sloman, 1992).  Thus, causal explanations refer to states of these machines 
and how they relate to each other, without assuming that the ‘real’ causal story is happening at the 
‘bottom’.  The function and operations of virtual machines are implementable physically, but not 
definable in the language of physics (Sloman, 1992), and in terms of the metaphysical theory here 
outlined about the relationship between levels of description, requires reference to the temporal 
causal trajectory of the mechanisms.  Causation can go ‘upwards, downwards and sideways in virtual 
machinery’ (Sloman, 2013).  This fits with the picture of causation outlined above (Chapter 3: Levels 
of Causal Explanation).  Descriptions at the physical level don’t ‘trump’ those at the design level, 
quite the reverse, since the causal trajectory that explains the functioning of the virtual machine 
happens at the level of the machine, in terms of the circumstances leading up to the current state.  
Those circumstances include facts ‘around’ (at hand, or causally proximal) the machine, whether 
that be ‘below’, ‘above’, or ‘about’.   
At this stage, we could drop the talk of levels all together; everything is happening at the same level 
in that everything is physical and is causally efficacious because it is.  Talk of new levels coming into 
existence explains the smell of dualist spirit that puts people off; what emerges over time is 
coalitions of physical stuff that together exhibit causal properties that it is useful to refer to as 
wholes, because the wholes have causal properties not explained by the causal properties of their 
parts when viewed as isolated individuals at a point in time and space.  For the moment, however, I 
will continue to follow the convention of referring to such emergent properties as being at a ‘higher 
level’ than physical properties.   
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Understanding these ‘high-level’ principles allows better understanding of how such systems work 
for the purpose of explanation, prediction and engineering.  Unlike traditional functionalism, which 
was often interpreted as being only interested in the so-called ‘design-level’ descriptions, with the 
rest being ‘mere’ implementation detail, understanding how virtual machines work, what they are 
built to do, and how evolution, development and society formed them, is a piece of interdisciplinary, 
empirical and conceptual work with clearly defined objectives.  The ‘design level’ is not a separate 
realm where there is a blue print waiting to be materially realised.  This is to confuse the way we 
design and build with the way nature evolves.  Nature’s process is incremental changes with no 
direction.  Traditional functionalism would take a problem domain, design a solution, then engineer 
it.  So we design a navigation machine by using senses to build a model of the environment, use the 
model to plan a route through it, then use the plan to set in motion a series of motor actions.  Then 
a ‘full-on’ functionalist may claim that any system that behaves just like this navigation system is an 
implementation of that design.  However, it may well turn out that that’s not how nature has solved 
the problem, since its solution was built randomly and incrementally on top of pre-existing systems.  
So, understanding how nature has built navigation systems may lead to novel empirical predictions 
about the behaviour of such systems, particularly patterns of failure, and could help us build better 
navigation systems ourselves, since our solutions may be too computationally expensive.  Thus, 
virtual-machine functionalism, unlike the traditional type, is a natural framework for the 
interdisciplinary endeavour that is concocting a scientific understanding of mind.   
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Chapter 7: Natural Minds 
7.1 Embodied Virtual Machinery 
Our subjecthood is a datum to be explained rather than an unshakeable foundation on which to 
build a system of knowledge.  It has been my aim to provide at least the beginnings of such an 
explanation, one that grounds our understanding of ourselves as unified subjects acting for 
conscious reasons, and brings closer together the normative, reason-giving style of explanation and 
the causal style of explanation.   
What makes me ‘selfish’?  Firstly, it is the automaticity with which the various parts of my mind yield 
their contents to the whole.  This makes the parts work as a 'systematic whole' with no noticeable 
delay caused by obvious processing.  Secondly, the ‘lower’ processes make their contribution 
without being available to introspection directly; we are only aware of the ‘finished product.’  This 
does not imply scepticism regarding the ‘higher’ contents of our mind that we use belief-talk of, but 
rather a critically realistic revisionism, one that helps rid ourselves of philosophical baggage that 
taints the very introspections that we use as data to justify our sense of self.   
Without the close integration of the various parts that make up our minds, we would not function as 
organisms, or survive as a species.  This selfhood is not an illusion; it is a necessary feature of 
creatures with complex brains because they have complex lives: our decision-making mechanisms 
have evolved to enable us to act on salient inputs.  The ontological level at which to seek 
explanations of actions that result from these mechanisms is that of those aspects of the world they 
have evolved and developed to operate on.  A mechanism that enables us to learn and apply the 
norms of the social groups we operate in will be best described at the normative level.  Such a 
machine may be built in many ways, where what these ways share is that they instantiate the same 
‘machine.’  There will therefore be no way to reduce machine descriptions to physical ones, even 
though the physical description necessitates the machine description in each case (maintaining 
supervenience).  Since functions like recognising threats lead to actions like taking evasive action, 
there will be downwards causation (as well as upward, and horizontal).  Kim’s (1992) arguments 
against downwards causation (§2.1.1 The ‘Special’ Debate) will not work against multiply 
instantiable machines, as opposed to multiply realisable states, because ‘virtual machine 
supervenience’ requires the existence of a ‘network of causally interacting, enduring, components’ 
(Sloman, A., pers. corr., 23/8/2011 – my emphasis).  That is, machines are necessarily diachronic 
entities and Kim's arguments only tell against synchronically described states (Chapter 2: Physicalist 
Reductionism).   
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Virtual Machine Functionalism is more demanding than simple functionalism, in that it is not a ‘black 
box’ theory: it is not enough just to say ‘whatever fulfils this functional role,’ when specifying what 
comes between input and output; a machine design is specified, the causal properties of the whole 
being determined by how the parts work together.  Actions are explained by referring to these 
machines, and by how those machines were constructed, which includes what they are made of, and 
the processes that formed them.  The fact that a machine is a dynamic whole means that being in 
time is an essential feature; unlike the laws of physics, the generalisations we form to understand 
the causal consequences of such machines are not time-symmetrical.  In general terms, actions are 
brought about by ‘need sensors’ (e.g. for sustenance), and ‘fact sensors’ (e.g. presence of food) 
(Sloman, et al., 2003, p. 10).  Needs that are stored internally and represented to the organism 
without having to be directly stimulated by the environment may be called ‘goals’ (Sloman, et al., 
2003, p. 12).  The rest of this section will look back at the metaphysical questions discussed earlier 
and show how this view may answer some of the questions raised. 
 
7.1.1 Causation & Causal closure 
The mind is made of multiple concurrently running virtual machines, each with causal relations to 
other virtual machines in the mind and portions of the world, as well as phylogenetic and 
ontogenetic causal histories.  These causal relations are necessarily diachronic in that to account for 
and explain the output, including how that output fits into a larger pattern of behaviour, it is 
necessary to cite events in the past relative to that output.  The statements of causal connection will 
not be strict and hedged with ceteris paribus clauses.  The causal properties of these virtual 
machines will be probabilistic and dispositional by nature, and the resulting causal event highly 
context dependent.  Each machine is part of the causal profile of a context, and when we refer to its 
causal contribution, we are not citing a universal regularity that is being prevented from expressing 
itself, but rather pointing out the fact that that mechanism tends to lead to this result in those 
contexts.  This accords with a ‘difference-making’ analysis of causation (§3.1.3 Making a difference).   
This view of the causal nature of the mind undermines the version of causal closure most commonly 
used in arguments for reducing the mental to the physical, because it is temporally and spatially 
extended.  Machines, even virtual ones, take up space, and work in a sequence of parts affecting 
each other.  Take as an example the way attentional mechanisms function in presenting the world to 
us in certain ways.  Changes in perception are caused by changes in attention, which is affected by, 
amongst other things, knowledge (O'Regan & Noë, 2001, p. 970; Sloman, 2011b).  We learn to notice 
salient forms in the world around us, which are picked out from the flux and presented to our 
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conscious awareness.  This may be because of basic drives, e.g. for sustenance or sex, drawing our 
attention to relevant bits of the world.  Even in such instinctual cases, where we as agents may have 
limited control over what our eyes are drawn to (although we might have varying degrees of impulse 
control thereafter) there may be associative learning involved in seeing objects as potential 
‘satisficers.’  In other cases, it is clearer that attention is driven by higher-level knowledge systems, 
for example when searching for a particular word in a page of text.   
In these cases of ‘top-down’ control, from the contents of conceptual beliefs to perception, these 
are instances of downward causation (§2.1.1 The ‘Special’ Debate).  Why did my eyes move that 
way?  The causal story involves a mechanism which requires time to function (and to evolve and 
develop), which violates a strict, synchronic, local causal closure principle (§2.2.1 Causal Closure).  Of 
course, there is a narrow type of explanation that involves such causal processes as wavelengths of 
light, retinas, nerves and neurons.  These types of explanations are good for some kinds of 
questions, but will not satisfy all the ‘why’ questions we can legitimately ask about actions.  If society 
morally judges someone for a failure of impulse control, a microcausal story about the molecules in 
their motor cortex will not be sufficient; we will need to refer to larger scale dynamics at the person 
level: we blame a person, not a neural circuit (although a neural circuit gone wrong, i.e. not 
functioning normally, may be reason not to hold a person responsible for their action).  
 
7.1.2 Natural Kinds 
When it comes to the kinds of things referred to in explanations of intentional action, microphysical 
kinds will also not suffice.  The causal story involving those kinds of things may be able to explain 
why a bunch of molecules (which happen to be in your hand) moved in a certain way (which 
happened to be upwards), but it wouldn’t be able to explain that the reason for that movement was 
that you were reaching up to pick the fruit off the branch.  Nor would the microphysical focus allow 
the formation of generalisations that could support predictions of future similar actions in similar 
situations, i.e. feeling peckish and seeing some apples ripe for the picking.  Events described this way 
would not be ‘visible’ under that sort of explanatory ‘lens.’   
Science gives us understanding to the extent that it explains observations, and as such its statements 
need to say something about the observed event in such a way that that understanding is 
transferable to other events of sufficient similarity.  It doesn’t really have a place for singular causal 
statements, as these are too particular, never-to-be-repeated.  In microphysical terms, every ‘macro’ 
situation is that particular in the real world, only in the isolation of the laboratory can we create 
enough similarity between different occurrences so as to form generalisations, so, in order to form 
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generalisations useful in the real world, we need to be able to talk about an ontological level that 
includes objects like organisms with mental states in a world of objects.  The terms used in scientific 
statements need to pick out things that are shared by various contexts, and so need to be 
projectable, that is, they need to be kind terms in the sense described above (Chapter 1: Natural 
Kinds).  
Given VMF, we can say more about the kinds of processes in operation than the abstract causal roles 
of traditional functionalism.  In fact, we can say enough about them to allow empirical sciences to 
get hold of them in a way that wasn’t possible in the purely formal language of old-fashioned 
functionalism.  It is here that the topographical view of natural kinds comes in useful.  The formal 
language of computationalist functionalism is so refined, the boundaries of types as picked out by 
symbols with purely syntactic properties so ‘clean,’ that it is of only limited use when dealing with 
the real, messy world of stuff and things.  In fundamental physics, the question of whether 
something is or is not a particular kind of particle may be clear, and given enough computing power 
the interactions of these may be predictable to arbitrary degrees of complexity.  But, these 
outcomes will be unique in their particularity.  From a higher level, we see patterns that are bigger 
and ‘messier,’ heaps of matter bound together by causal histories, more or less loosely, about which 
we can make useful generalisations because of the dynamics they share.  VMF is not fully abstracted, 
as it can point to particular kinds of real-world, embodied processes that play the necessary roles; it 
is only abstracted enough to allow that the different patterns of physical causes that play the role of, 
say, indicating that the apple is ripe for picking, are ‘lumpable’ together as beliefs with the content 
that the apple is ripe for picking, and in particular circumstance, e.g. when linked with another state 
that in our respective cases is the feeling of hunger, will lead reliably to the action of picking an 
apple. 
A virtual machine is still abstracted, but with the real world in mind, as it were.  As an illustration, 
take the following diagram, which shows how such a machine is a complex mechanism for dealing 
with complex input and output, and, moreover, one that is physically realised in a way that is flexibly 
distributed.  Each of the component mechanisms, represented by letters, should be simple enough 
to specify its workings, with the arrows representing information flow between them.  The short 
input and output arrows on the left represent some potentially complex and distributed, while the 
coiled arrows at the bottom represent the physical machinery that realises the virtual machines and 
constrains the machines that may be realised.  Each part is simple and physically realisable, but 
taken together, if assembled in ‘the right way,’ should be sufficient for the kind of mind I have been 
describing here.   
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This machine description is abstract in that there will not be a definite physical description that all 
machines of the same type follow, given that the same function could, in theory at least, be realised 
in different ways.  It’s grounded in the real world in that its design is constrained by the materials at 
hand and the time needed for the processes to construct them.  In the case of human mental 
processes, that means genes and other reliable developmental resources of the physical and cultural 
world, and the materials of the brain and the body over evolutionary and developmental 
timeframes. 
Our question is whether there is room in the world of natural causes for things like those referred to 
in standard belief/desire type explanations of intentional action.  I believe that the foregoing 
arguments point towards an affirmative answer.  States that we can call beliefs and desires (or 
belief-like and desire-like) are physical states of a virtual machine that play the role of carrying 
useable information about parts of the world, and motivate certain forms of action in the world, 
using the information carried by the belief-like states.  The process by which those states come to be 
what they are is one of multiple feedback mechanisms over phylogenetic and ontogenetic time.  For 
example, a state comes to represent the presence of a predator because it is reliably caused by said 
presence, and in the past has permitted the organism and its predecessors to escape predation, in 
conjunction with a motive state that upon detection of a predator leads to behaviour that promotes 
A Multi-component Virtual Machine, 
with components un-synchronised, new 
components coming into or going out of 
existence from time to time, and some 
of the components discrete, others 
continuously variable, all of them 
running on a Physical Machine, which 
may be composed of multiple 
networked physical machines, like the 
internet…. [and] the components of a 
VM may be parts of causal loops passing 
through the environment, for example 
during control of physical actions. 
(Sloman, 2013) 
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escape.  Clearly, some such states will be more or less innate reflexes, e.g. a mouse’s fear of snakes, 
while others will be learnt, e.g. a human fear of guns.  These states are causal by virtue of being 
parts of a physically embodied machine, but their causal powers are powers they have in virtue of 
being belief-like and desire-like states of the virtual machine.  They are natural kinds in that we can 
form true, useful generalisations using them; we can predict the behaviour of creatures that are 
classifiable as rational because their action is based on inner states that are there for a reason.  This 
reason, which is that we can tell a good evolutionary story as to why they are there, is what makes 
them not merely things about which we can take the intentional stance towards.  They are things 
that we can take the intentional stance towards because they have inner states that have evolved to 
perform the function of representing the world in a way that is useful given the needs of the 
organism. 
There is a possible objection to the VMF view of mental states as natural kinds, which is that it is 
through direct, first-person acquaintance with mental states that we pick out mental states.  The 
behavioural, observational, third-person regularities are both causally and inferentially consequent, 
rather than being reference fixers in themselves.  The problem is that if we are directly acquainted 
with mental states in a way that renders their essential properties fully transparent to us, then it 
cannot be the case that certain opaque properties of mental states, like physical or functional ones, 
are essential rather than contingent.  We can respond by questioning the notion of acquaintance, as 
it assumes this transparent access to the essential properties of some objects.  Papineau does this by 
assuming that all atomic concepts ‘are related to reality by facts external to our a priori grasp, such 
as causal or historical facts’ (Papineau, 2006, p. 102), relying on a Kripkean causal theory of 
reference by saying that this is ‘direct’ reference.   
While I agree with the aim of seeing through ‘transparency,’ I think different meanings of ‘direct’ 
may be being conflated in saying ‘both pain and C-fibres might similarly refer directly to the same 
entity, yet this not be transparent to someone who possesses these concepts’ (Papineau, 2006, p. 
103).  This assumes a kind of parallel relation between these terms and their objects.  But there is a 
difference.  Whereas we can ‘baptise’ objects ostensively with a name, leaving the empirical work of 
discovering just what makes things of that kind what they are to later, it is not so clear that we can 
do this with terms like ‘pain,’ as this assumes a shared space where ostensive definition can happen.  
Words are public, whereas feelings are not.  For a Kripkean account to work, we need to be able to 
say ‘let’s call things of that type such-and-such,’ and for this to be understandable by other users of 
one’s language. 
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Rather, I think the distinction between kinds of kinds like chemical kinds and mental kinds is this: we 
can discover necessary facts about the physical essences of chemical kinds we initially pick out by 
naming a particular sort of stuff we find around us in the world.  But with mental kinds, we learn 
them by observing the behaviour of others in particular contexts, identifying what happens in 
ourselves in similar contexts, and then discovering what realises these in this world contingently.  
Given all the facts about salt, and all the facts about sodium chloride, the entailment is necessary in 
both directions, whereas the same is not true of mental kinds and their realisers.  We never discover 
that ‘pain’ is identical to C-fibres firing, we discover that pain happens to be realised by certain 
physiological processes in us, but that doesn’t necessitate anything about how it may be realised in 
other creatures with different histories.  Even if it is insisted that the pain=C-fibres firing identity is 
token rather than type, it is still too direct an identity, as it is not C-fibres firing that makes it pain, 
but a broader fact about the mechanism that the C-fibres play a role in. 
Therefore, we may accept the use of the term ‘water,’ through a process of refinement that includes 
the conventional acceptance that science has authority over fixing what counts as water, as referring 
to stuff that shares the physical properties of being composed of H2O molecules.  Given that the 
lawlike generalisations we make about water are necessitated by its chemical composition, and 
exhaust all the generalisations we may care to form, XYZ can be ruled out as a possibility, since there 
will be some laws that don’t hold of both substances, otherwise they would be the same stuff.  For 
example, the law that at very high temperatures, when the water molecules begin to dissociate 
(about 2000°C), there will be hydrogen and oxygen gases present.  The result is that the XYZ world is 
not a possible world after all, because water is not a functional kind.  However, mental kinds are 
functional, and the worlds where the same mental kinds can nevertheless not share the same 
physical essences are possible.  They are what they are because of what they have been selected for, 
and indeed they have the properties they were selected for because of their physical properties, but 
it is not those physical properties they were selected for, and other physical properties could play 
the same role.   
The same point can be made about representational states.  A mental state that represents 
something in the world is more than a merely causally covarying brain state, it is a causally covarying 
brain state that has been selected because it covaries with something in the environment that the 
organism finds it useful to have information about.  It was selected because of its having physical 
properties that allow it to play a particular role.  As such, it is the kind of thing we can make useful 
generalisations about, but because many other physical states could have played the same role, 
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there is no necessary identity between narrow micro-physical instantiation and the mental state that 
is instantiated.   
To be called a law, according to Goodman (1955), a generalisation must be ‘projectable,’ that is, 
‘confirmable by its positive instances and supportive of subjunctive and counterfactual claims’ 
(McGinn, 1978, p. 204).  But the physical essences of mental states are not so projectable.  There are 
unlikely to be any useful psychophysical laws because the variability of the realisation of mental 
states by physical states precludes an explanation of the coincidence of these states.  But we don’t 
need psychophysical laws for mental states to be kinds if we reject the requirement for physical real 
essences.  In each case, the realisation base can give an explanation of how the mental state 
achieves the causal properties that make it the kind of mental state that it is, but that state’s 
membership in the broader functional category it belongs to, and which justifies the projections we 
can make on the basis of this categorisation, is based on its function within the system, which 
includes organism, mechanism, and environment.  It is in providing this higher-level similarity space 
in which to ‘lump’ otherwise distinct physical types together that the topographical approach is an 
advantage over other characterisations of natural kindhood, characterisations that lead to anti-
realism about natural kinds because of their reliance on strict physical essences and clean 
boundaries.    
The relationship between physical instantiation and mental state is a broad supervenience 
conditional, in that we can say that if a certain physical state is instantiated (not a narrow neural 
correlate, but also including other parts of the body and world that are part of the functioning of 
that state), then a token mental state of that functional kind will necessarily be instantiated (§3.4 
Emergence).  We don’t need strict psychophysical laws to legitimate a realist stance regarding 
mental kinds; the existence of true generalisations at the functional level is sufficient, the truth of 
these generalisations being underwritten by a theory of causation that can accept causal statements 
at this level (§3.1 Causation).  These causal statements are diachronic, rather than synchronic as in 
‘pure’ physical causation, are not affected fatally by overdetermination, as they are different, equally 
valid, descriptions of the same cause (different in that each satisfies a distinct explanatory interest), 
and are respectably physical in that they do not violate the transitive causal closure of the physical 
world (§2.2.1 Causal Closure). 
 
7.1.3 Physicalism 
Being physically realised, the kinds of systems in question, ones that contain causally efficacious 
intentional states, will always have a complete physical description, and such descriptions may be 
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used for some kinds of predictions, depending on our interests and epistemic and computational 
limitations.  Such descriptions will miss larger-scale patterns because they lack the vocabulary to pick 
them out, and will be limited because of the inherent indeterminism at that level.  Thus, higher-level 
descriptions that capture larger flows of causation at work, may, in certain situations, have 
explanatory priority.  This is metaphorically like the relationship between currents and liquid: there 
is nothing more than the matter in the liquid, and the motion of each molecule in isolation is a 
function of its previous state and the effects of its neighbouring molecules.  But, taking a wider view, 
we can see patterns of currents caused by the broader context, and we can see similarities between 
types of context, i.e. those that tend to lead to whirlpools (which is the kind of embodied knowledge 
an expert canoeist comes to have).  Looked at in terms of difference making, it is these contextual 
factors that cause certain currents to emerge, and it is those currents that push the molecules of 
water around.  The properties of the molecules of course play an important role in constraining the 
kinds of dynamics permissible, but for the purposes of explaining fluid dynamics of water, those 
properties become background conditions rather than causal contributions.   
This version of physicalism is not particularly esoteric.  Physicalism is about constitution rather than 
causation, and ‘straightforward physicalism’ can be characterised as using the term ‘physical’ 
broadly, not just to refer to kinds studied in physics departments, so ‘it should be understood as 
including physically realized role states along with strictly physical terms’ (Papineau, 2006, note 1). 
Sloman, when describing how he sees VMF as regards physicalism, makes a stronger claim: 
… a consideration of examples of virtual machine functionalism where the virtual machinery 
includes several concurrently (but not necessarily synchronously) active sub-systems with their 
own causal relationships, both within the VM and also across its boundaries (e.g. to internal 
physical memory, to physical interfaces and even to things referred to in the environment) would 
show that there is no version of physicalism as normally defined that survives, even though all 
the virtual machinery is ultimately implemented in physical processes. Part of the reason for this 
is that patterns that can exist in physical structures and processes need not all be definable in the 
language of physics. For example, what makes something an expression of the English sentence 
"Today is Fred's birthday" depends not only on how current users of English read text but also 
who Fred is, which calendar is in use and other complex social facts. What makes the state of 
part of a virtual machine a case of someone wondering what Fred thinks of him is even more 
remote from being translatable into a physical description…. 
I would agree with everything except that I think I have described a fairly straightforward 
version of physicalism that does survive. 
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7.1.4 Emergence 
The view advocated here is that the mind emerges over time through the feedback dynamics 
between organisms and environment found in biological and cultural evolution, and individual 
development.  Part of this individual development involves conscious reflection and the freely willed 
actions that result.  It is this, partly, that drives the emergence of novel behaviours which are then 
available to be copied by others in our social groups if they are judged to be worthwhile.  These 
behaviours are caused by emergent belief-like and desire-like states, and it is by reference to these 
states that science can sometimes give true explanations of behaviour, and furthermore, make good 
predictions. 
This emergence is robust in that the states in question exist with sufficient stability in terms of time 
and space, from our human perspective, for us to use them for meaningful generalisations; if we 
were very different creatures in terms of the timespans we operate in, or the kinds of things that are 
significant for us, then we would arrive at a different description of the topography of the world of 
objects around us.  There is not one unique such list of objects or one privileged perspective.  
Furthermore, this sort of emergence is not problematic for physicalists because it is not claiming that 
the novel objects that emerge are eternal kinds that need to be added to the pantheon of 
fundamental things that make up the universe.  They exist within a four-dimensional bubble in the 
transitive causal closure of the physical world.  Such systems are partly definable by the property 
they have of gathering resources to stave off the entropy of the second law of thermodynamics, but 
nothing can hold that off forever.   
 
7.2 Mental Causation  
7.2.1 United We Stand 
‘Why did I do that?’ is a seemingly simple question.  If we act intentionally, we give reasons we 
consider to be sufficient to rationalise the action.  Our interest is in the cases, if any, such 
explanations are true, rather than rationalisations of non-intentional behaviour, or merely 
metaphorical ways of referring to physical processes.   What would make such explanations true 
is having veridical experiences of decision making processes that involve believing certain things 
(facts and norms) and desiring particular outcomes.  My goal has been to dispel the apparent 
tension between this everyday conception of ourselves, as intentional beings who are the 
causes of our own actions, and the reductionist tendency that assumes that all the real 
causation is describable, in principle, at the level of fundamental physical stuff.   
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How can we reconcile the explanation of my action that involves the causal story of 
neurotransmitters, etc., with the explanation involving conscious reasons?  There is an apparent 
‘gap’ between these explanations, in that one cannot be derived from the other, and a tension, 
in that they appear to compete for consideration as the genuine cause because they cite, as 
explanans, states that seem to belong to different ontological realms.  To close this explanatory 
gap, I have tried to reduce the epistemological distance between felt experience and the 
physical world, and to render unproblematic the view that there can be different levels of 
genuine explanations within a physicalistic ontology. 
Organisms like us track the state of the environment in some detail and with some robustness, 
moreover we monitor our perceptual states and inner states, and we act on this information in a 
more or less coherent fashion using our limited supply of energy and mental resources.  We are not 
merely reactive, but flexible and adaptable, and unlike simple computers we do not follow 
algorithms, even if much of our behaviour may be describable algorithmically.  We process 
information, but in a way that doesn’t lead to automatic behaviours triggered by events, rather 
information is processed and an action is initiated using stored energy (Sloman & Chrisley, 2003), 
which we harvest from the environment through eating and breathing. 
Purely reactive systems following algorithmic processes may in principle be able to produce all the 
behaviours that deliberative ones can, but that would mean storing all possible scenarios and 
reactions to them, which is not practically possible or evolutionarily feasible.  Given the variation and 
complexity of human environments it makes sense to have a mechanism that can solve novel 
problems based on similar previous experiences, or pure creativity.  This requires a reflexive ‘meta-
management’ that monitors the system and prevents it getting stuck in indecision or otherwise 
‘crashing.’  This self-monitoring process may involve the need to categorise inner processes, and be 
the basis of the kind of self-awareness we call consciousness (Sloman & Chrisley, 2003, pp. 155-9).   
These layers of cognitive processes can be seen as emerging over evolutionary time, building upon 
what has been already achieved in an arms race where the winner is the organism with the greatest 
level of freedom to adapt.  We have achieved a level of evolution where we can reason abstractly 
using concepts we learn and then work with and on.  But this is still a work in progress; we are 
limited beings, and our concepts are ‘tethered’ to our embodiment.  I take this to be what Hurley 
(2003) meant by describing our space of reasons as locally coherent systems of concepts bound by 
context rather than fully generalizable.  Some of our conceptual abilities may approach the fully 
general, and it is to attempt to achieve those heights that we engage in scientific philosophy, even if 
this must ultimately remain an ideal given our limitations. 
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However, when we speak of the fully general, it is important to remember that we are not referring 
to approaching the drawing of the one true map of a territory.  The topography of the conceptual 
systems we create will always be relative to us, and our interests at that time, including the level of 
detail we need or can usefully use.  But given both those constraints, there is a standard of 
correctness, which is fully constrained by the actual structure of the world.  When we use our maps, 
we can be said to be wrong in a way that a moth circling a light cannot.  The causal structure of the 
environment has changed, meaning that its design is no longer fit for purpose, but it has no beliefs 
about the source of the light to which we can apply normativity.  Our deliberate actions, on the 
other hand, are based on models built using feedback, and these models can be said to be wrong 
because they are constructed using concepts, and the model may not accurately map onto the 
world.   
A possible objection to this causal interpretation of intentional explanation is that we may be eliding 
the distinction between a causal interpretation of folk psychology, where folk psychology is taken to 
be a largely true theory about the overall architecture of the human mind (a la Fodor), and the 
interpretationist interpretation, where folk psychology is seen as (merely) a practical tool for 
prediction and coordination (a la Dennett).  Sterelney (2003) & Godfrey-Smith (2003) claim we are 
faced with a dilemma: if we accept the causal interpretation it is hard to understand how such an 
architecture could arise by gradual mutation; if we take the interpretationist route, then folk 
psychology doesn’t cut our architecture at the joints.   
On the first horn, Sterelny gives strict condition for something to be said to be acting for reasons of 
its own: it must track its environment richly and robustly, this tracking should be largely decoupled 
from specific responses, and its motivational states have to be informationally sensitive rather than 
being based on the relative strength of internal drives (Sterelney, 2003, p. 263).  However, as should 
be clear from the preceding, this is much too strong a claim; it’s an idealised abstraction with as 
much real-world application as classical economic theory.  To argue from this abstracted ideal of 
rationality to the impossibility of evolving gradually to this point is to make the same mistake as 
creationists in assuming a perfection of design that is not evident.  If the formalism of the logical 
systems we use to express our best reasoning were actually an accurate way of describing the 
architecture of the mind, then we would find formal logic as simple as riding a bike, or walking down 
the street.  If instead we accept a more local, less abstracted holism when it comes to the reasons 
we give for action, then it is not difficult to see how these abilities could evolve gradually.  
Moreover, this middle way allows us to pass between the horns of the dilemma, as interpretations 
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are acceptable as long as, once we ‘fix’ the points of reference, there is a way of judging accuracy 
against reality. 
It may be that there is no real conflict between the causal and interpretationist views.  If, as 
Sterelney (2003) allows when sketching a possible way to take up his challenge, one of the important 
and distinctive facts about us is that we are subject to cultural as well as biological evolution, then 
interpretations can have a causal role.   We are designed to be able to develop in a social niche, 
where much of our learning is based on interpreting the actions of others and internalising what we 
learn, making it our own: ‘The connections to natural and social environments, as well as the 
internal wiring, are essential to the causal powers of minds themselves.  This is true at both the 
personal and subpersonal levels, at both the level of content and the level of vehicles of content’ 
(Hurley, 2003, p. 275). 
In arguing for taking the mental states referred to in intentional explanations as natural kinds, I am 
claiming that the general framework of intentional explanations that include belief-like and desire-
like states (‘how things are states and what I want states’ (Hurley, 2003, p. 271)) provides a genuine 
causal model for intentional action, one that can ground scientific explanations and predictions, and 
is open to scientific exploration and refinement.  Our ability to drive our own actions based on our 
own reasons has been woven through the intertwining feedback dynamics over phylogenetic, 
sociogenetic and ontogentic time.  The intentional level emerges through the development of 
increasing flexibility, including the development of tool use, until the symbolic ‘explosion’ and the 
resulting ratcheting up of cultural evolution.  These feedback systems form ‘dynamic singularities’ 
which persist and reproduce, and provide non-reductive explanations of the actions that result.   
To the question of what mental causation adds to the world if mental events are token-identical 
with physical events, we can answer as follows: without the ‘binding’ of the disparate physical 
events by coming under a statement of mental causation, the physical events at the end of the 
causal chains would be seen as mere coincidences.  This is downwards causation in the sense that 
we can infer lower-level, physical facts from higher-level, mental ones, and we can give explanations 
for physical events in terms of preceding mental events without fear of making category errors.  
These mental causes are not external to the physical causal order, just that they are invisible from 
the perspective of the causal properties of the composing particles.  If one were to somehow 
‘bracket’ the physical parts that constitute a mental state without referring to that state, and to 
trace the causal trajectory forwards or backwards, the result would be a complex case of singular 
causation (Lowe, 2000, p. 584).  It wouldn’t be very useful to do this, as explanations like this would 
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‘leak,’ in that the trajectory of some of the parts would not be part of the constituent matter of the 
subsequent or consequent mental state (if we were to take a step back). 
Being realist about intentional action is to take it to be a kind of causal explanation open to 
counterfactual analysis (Heyes & Dickinson, 1990, p. 106).  I believe that I have developed a realistic 
account of intentional action, based on three main premises.  These are: a theory of causation based 
on the causal tendencies of contextualised objects in the world; a subtler understanding of the 
principle of causal closure that retains the essence of physicalism without begging the question 
against supervenient causes; and an account of natural kinds that respects both the chaotic, partially 
undifferentiated nature of the physical world and the role we play in bringing order to our 
experiences of it.  This places the science of intentional action firmly within the interdisciplinary field 
of cognitive scientific pursuits.   
7.2.2 Freedom! 
I will end with some comments on the implications of the foregoing for the idea of free will.  The 
theories presented here, I argue, support the common-sense idea that we are creatures whose 
deliberations lead to actions.  When a person is trying to get to the top of a mountain, there are 
states in her which are motives and motivational, as well as knowledge and skills.  These explain her 
actions both by playing a role in causing them and in rationalising them.  Moreover, those states are 
there because they have that function.  And to the extent that those reasons can be said to be her 
own, then the action that results is her choice, i.e. she is there of her own free will.  In the case of 
the water droplet ‘trying’ to get to the bottom of the window, there are no such states the presence 
of which is explainable by their having the function to achieve such goals.  Therefore, the use of 
intentional descriptions of drops of water is purely metaphorical.  
Of course, it is important to realise that we are not always acting freely when we think we are; we 
sometimes confabulate or mislead ourselves, or are manipulated and misled by others.  Equally 
important, though, is that this does not mean that there are no cases in which our sense of agency is 
veridical.  In fact, using cognitive science to better understand in what ways we can be wrong about 
whether we are in control of our actions is a route to greater freedom, as this understanding can 
feed back into future decision making processes. 
An example is the bystander effect (Darley & Latané, 1968), where a subject comes across a 
situation in which someone is lying on the floor, apparently unconscious, but does not intervene, as 
they take their cue from others, who are not doing anything.  The more bystanders there are, the 
stronger the effect.  Subjects will rationalise their behaviour to maintain their view of themselves as 
autonomous agents.  If so, the reasons the subject might give for (in)action are not in fact the causes  
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of that behaviour, so said subjects cannot be said to be acting freely.  However, knowledge that one 
is susceptible to the bystander effect can influence how likely one is to fall prey to it in the future, as 
this knowledge will feed back into future decision making.  This might only happen given enough 
time for slow, deliberative thought processes influence behaviour, rather than fast, automatic 
processes.  Over time, however, given enough opportunities, these thought processes might become 
habitual. 
The issue of determinism is often seen as problematic for a physicalist theory of free will, as it seems 
to prevent actors from choosing between possible futures.  However determinism is not really 
relevant to the question of whether we can be the source of our own actions in a genuine way.  
Being able to affect one’s future is what counts, and that means being the cause of one’s actions.  
The answer to the question, ‘Can there be self-generated improvement?’ has ‘nothing to do with 
determinism, and everything to do with design’ (Dennett, 2003, pp. 91-92).  That is, the question is 
really whether we can learn from experience and consciously apply that learning in our 
deliberations, the results of which play a role in causing our actions.  It makes evolutionary sense to 
design learners, as they will eventually outperform non-learners.  Freedom emerges as a result of 
evolutionary and developmental processes, and is also constrained by the accumulations of those 
processes.  We are ‘designed’ to acquire dispositions, but we do have some ability to decide which 
dispositions to have.  We are creatures of habit, but we can be held responsible (sometimes) for the 
habits we have. 
An interesting example that shows mental causation to be real, and to be necessary but not 
sufficient for the action that results to be free, is behaviour that results from a placebo intervention.  
If a subject acts because of a false belief about a procedure carried out by someone pretending to be 
a doctor, then the action cannot be said to be free because it fails to satisfy externally evaluable 
norms of rational belief formation; they have been manipulated.  This means that being free 
depends not only on internal facts about mental causes, but also external facts about what counts as 
a rational belief given the information a subject could reasonably be expected to have.  This makes 
the question of what counts as free relative to a socio-historical context, which some might see as a 
problem, but which I won’t develop here.  In the case of such actions, though, at least we can say 
that the subject’s belief was causally efficacious, i.e. non-epiphenomenal. 
Of course, the beliefs that cause the placebo effect are physically realised, but, given the arguments 
above, this should not be seen as excluding the psychological explanation at the subject level.  It is a 
hangover from dualistic thinking that is responsible for the idea that a physical (i.e. neurological) 
explanation ‘trumps’ a psychological one.  This is clear in much of the scientific discussion around 
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experiments on free will, e.g. in Libet’s (1985) studies and its successors, in which subjects decide 
when to perform a simple action, noting when the decision to act was made (Libet, 1999).  
Meanwhile, data is gathered from EEG, showing that there is a build-up of activity before the 
formation of the conscious will to act.  This preparatory activity in the brain is interpreted by some 
as showing that we do not have free will, as the cause of the action is neurological, rather than the 
will to act.  Criticisms that such simple behaviours as a flick of the wrist cannot be used as a model of 
free will in general, or that subjective measures of the timings of events are unreliable, have led to 
further refinements of the technique.  In one, subjects had to decide between pressing a button on 
the left or right, and noted which letter was being displayed on the screen at the time of deciding 
(Soon, et al., 2008).  The experimenters used fMRI scans to see how far in advance the decision 
could be reliably predicted, and claimed to be able to do so up to five seconds before subjects 
became aware of their decision.  Furthermore, they suggested that the brain starts preparing for 
actions like these up to 10 seconds before.   
The conclusion drawn, that conscious willing is epiphenomenal as the true cause is neurological, 
relies on an implicit dualism.  But, given physicalism, these arguments lose their force: the mental 
states involved in causing the actions in question will be physically realised, so in order to show that 
the actions are not freely willed, it has to be shown that the neurological activity is not these mental 
states, but other ones.  But with ‘low stakes’ actions like pressing a button with no real 
consequences, and no extended period in which to develop habits of behaviour that satisfy needs, it 
is unlikely that we will spot the kinds of neural activity involved in actions where the exercise of free 
will is important, based on ‘hard won’ beliefs, like the decision to vote in a particular way.  There 
may be some who haven’t made up their mind when they enter the voting booth, and whose 
decision is rather like a random flexing of the wrist, but we can ignore them for present purposes (or 
more generally).  Some people make a carefully considered choice, reading up on the issues, looking 
at the options, subjecting their own political prejudices to clear minded scrutiny.  In such cases, I 
think we would be more likely to observe physical traces of these considerations playing a causal 
role in the action of placing a cross in a box.  The fact that this preparatory physical activity may be 
evident long before the immediate causes of the behaviour is not surprising given that these 
intentions come from a long process developing personal preferences over time. 
Such considerations are taken into account by other scientists in in this field, e.g. (Brass & Haggard, 
2010; Dayan, 2008), who accept that there may be multiple mechanisms of decision making, an 
important one being where the outcomes of past actions are evaluated, and fed back into the next 
time a decision is made in similar circumstances.  Of course, this involves physical traces of that 
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evaluation in the mechanism (e.g. in a physically realised virtual machine), but this is no reason to 
say that the resultant action is not free.  Decisions that consider the results of past actions are 
rational, and therefore, free.  Random, spontaneous actions of no consequence are not free, they 
are just random. 
This position could be called a version of mechanism based reasons responsiveness (Fischer & 
Ravizza, 1998), which claims that the important causal role in the sequence of events that leads to 
an action is a feature of the agent (the mechanism) that is responsive to reasons.  In other words, for 
an agent to be free, there must be in the agent a mechanism that is sensitive to reasons in such a 
way that if different reasons were brought to bear, its response would be different, and would differ 
in a way that that course of action accords with constraints of normativity.  This account of the 
nature of these mechanisms supports the externalist view of reasons, where it matters how these 
reasons come about.  This avoids problems raised by manipulation cases, where reasons enter the 
mechanism ‘artificially.’  For example, imagine a ‘swamp-reason,’ where some freak physical event 
brings about a mental state which happens to be exactly like a good reason for acting.  The resulting 
action would not be genuinely free on this account, because it didn’t come about ‘in the right way.’ 
The mechanism’s sensitivity to reasons also needs to be calibrated in the right way.  A mechanism 
that is too responsive to the ‘right’ reasons would mean that knowingly doing moral wrong would 
not count as free, and the subject wouldn’t count as morally responsible.  On the other hand, if it is 
not responsive enough, an insane, irrational agent could count as morally responsible.  Fischer and 
Ravizza (1998) aim to show that appropriate mechanisms are ones that respond to ‘reasons that 
hang together rationally as a class and fit a coherent or sane pattern’ (Fischer & Ravizza, 1998, p. 
62).  Such a mechanism would not need to be infallible, so long as it is responsive enough to reasons.  
On the question of how sensitive is sensitive enough, common-sense vagueness is sufficient; if we 
have to argue over the borderline cases, this seems like how moral debates do, and should, happen.  
A judgement that I shouldn’t have done what I did, and the guilt that (perhaps) accompanies that 
judgement, is based on the fact that I recognise there weren’t good enough reasons for acting as I 
did, and that I should have acted on the basis of the good reasons I had for acting otherwise, or 
could have had given sufficient thought. 
The occurrence, within a subject, of causally efficacious mental states that match information about 
states of affairs with motivations to bring about other states of affairs, together with knowledge of 
what needs doing to achieve these ends, provide sufficient conditions for actions that can then be 
judged to be free or not depending on wider considerations, including standards of rationality.  We 
act ‘in the light of’ reasons, which are the contents of our beliefs and desires, but it is what is 
187 
 
believed that is grounds for justifying action.  A reason for action is a state of affairs, not just a state 
of the agent.  In the case of a man’s paranoid belief he is being chased by aliens, that belief is a 
reason to seek professional help; if he hides in the bushes, he is not acting for a reason that would 
make his action free.   
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Conclusion 
The aim of this thesis has been to present an empirically informed view of the metaphysical issue of 
mental causation, and a philosophically informed view on the status of cognitive scientific general 
statements.  This has been achieved through showing that cognitive kind terms are natural, 
according to a topographical view of natural kindhood.  As scientists, we can say useful things using 
cognitive kind terms, and these statements will not be eliminated through being replaced by 
statements referring only to the kinds of things the physical sciences talk about.  That is not to say 
that our understanding of mental kinds, and of ourselves, will not be refined by physical-level 
investigations, or indeed by discoveries at the level of facts about societies.  
The metaphysical part of the project required giving reasons to reject arguments against the 
autonomy of psychological-level causal claims which rely on the concepts of supervenience, 
physicalism, and causation.  It was argued that a major premise in these arguments is the principle 
of the causal closure of the physical, but that once this principle is scrutinised closely, which it 
normally isn’t, it does not provide the support for reductionism that many take it to. 
It was argued that the correct account of the relationship between the cognitive and the physical 
levels is Virtual Machine Functionalism, as this not only shows how mental mechanisms can have the 
causal powers they do, through being built of physical parts, without being reducible to physical 
regularities, but also allows for a plausible story to be told of how those mechanisms evolved.  This 
approach also makes it plausible to discover the kinds of organisation likely to lead to the emergence 
of minded creatures with subjective perspective on the world, this experiential aspect being a 
necessary property of being an embodied cognizer.  With these parts in place, I believe we can 
justify a real distinction between literal and metaphorical uses of intentional descriptions of 
observed behaviour, which depends on whether the target of the description has been built, by 
evolution or design, with mechanisms that process information about the world which is used as the 
basis for actions to achieve the goals of the creature. 
My goal has been to put cognitive kinds on a map that can be referred to on both scientific and 
philosophical journeys as a common reference point, where features of concern to both sets of 
interests are plotted.  There are many parts that require further exploration, and some that will 
probably need to be redrawn, but I hope it serves as at least a roughly accurate depiction of the 
territory, one that helps to bring conceptual clarity to the field of cognitive science as it moves into a 
more mature phase that requires some settling on agreed definitions.  The framework provided by 
the topographical account is one that will be filled in in practice by researchers in the various 
disciplines of cognitive science; its advantage is exactly that is allows pluralistic, interdisciplinary 
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practices to add to the accurate description of portions of the cognitive landscape without imposing 
a single overarching metaphysics.  A problem in cognitive science, where multiple disciplines are 
searching for the right descriptions, is that all too often, a particular approach is touted as the one 
answer that can solve all the problems (e.g. computationalism, enactivism, eliminativism).  Rather 
than cooperating, these research groups compete.  The account promoted here provides the space 
for productive pluralism, not a relativistic pluralism that says all views are equally valid and equally 
trivial, but a pluralism where varied perspectives can be put together to form a complex vision.   
This metaphysical framework is of a piece with Virtual Machine Functionalism, which likewise is a 
philosophical account with scientific implications.  VMF has the resources to shape empirical 
research in investigating the ‘how’ of cognition, and to give direction to engineering projects in 
robotics and artificial intelligence research.  Philosophically, it also helps rule on questions such as 
what counts as intelligent action.  This is because it is not just output focused or behaviour centred, 
nor a matter of implementing an abstract algorithm.  Unlike traditional functionalism, VMF is not a 
‘black box’ theory; it does matter how the outcome is achieved, using real-time, real-world dynamics 
of the machine’s physical parts.  Understanding how the virtual machines that form the mind have 
evolved and developed, biologically and socially, provides the framework for interdisciplinary 
knowledge to be applied in explaining and predicting the behaviour of existing cognitive beings, as 
well as giving direction to engineers working on building cognitive machinery. 
Finally, a further advantage of this view, with the class of intentional beings being seen as a 
distinguishable feature on the map of the multidimensional intensional similarity space defined by 
the sharing of identifiably similar features of virtual machine architecture, is that it allows a clear 
distinction to be made between metaphorical and literal uses of intentional explanations.  
And as he drove on, the rainclouds dragged down the sky after him, for, though he did not know it, 
Ron McKenna was a Rain God.  All he knew was that his working days were miserable and he had a 
succession of lousy holidays.  All the clouds knew was that they loved him and wanted to be near him, 
to cherish him, and to water him. (Adams, 1984, p. 15) 
  
190 
 
Bibliography 
Adams, D., 1984. So long, and thanks for all the fish. London: Pan Books. 
Adelson, E. H., 1995. Checkershadow illusion. [Online]  
Available at: http://web.mit.edu/persci/people/adelson/checkershadow_illusion.html 
[Accessed 15 January 2017]. 
Aleksander, I. & Dunmall, B., 2003. Axioms and Tests for the Presence of Minimal Consciousness in 
Agents. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 10(4–5), p. 7–18. 
Armstrong, D., 1978. A Theory of Universals. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Ayers, M. R., 1981. Locke Versus Aristotle on Natural Kinds. The Journal of Philosophy, 78(5), p. 247–
272. 
Baars, B. J., 1988. A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press. 
Baars, B. J., 1997. In the Theater of Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Bach-y Rita, P. et al., 1969. Vision substitution by tactile image projection. Nature , Issue 221, p. 963–
964. 
Bach-y-Rita, P. & Kercel, S. W., 2003. Sensory substitution and the human – machine interface. 
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 7(12), pp. 541-546. 
Baldwin, J. M., 1896. Consciousness and evolution. Psychological Review, Volume 3, p. 300–309. 
Baron-Cohen, S., 1995. Mindblindness: An Essay on Autism and Theory of Mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press. 
Barsalou, L., 2009. Simulation, situated conceptualization, and prediction. Philosophical Transactions 
of the Royal Society of London: Biological Sciences, Volume 364, p. 1281–1289. 
Basso, D. &. O. B. M., 2006. The role of the feedforward paradigm in cognitive psychology. Cognitive 
Processing, 7(2), p. 73–88. 
Berkeley, G., 1710. Principles of Human Knowledge. 2004 ed. London: Penguin. 
Bermudez, J. L., 2003. Ascribing thoughts to non-linguistic creatures. Facta Philosophica, 5(2), pp. 
313-34. 
Bickhard, M., 2006. The Dynamic nature of Representation. [Online]  
Available at: http://interdisciplines.org/adaptation/papers/2 
[Accessed 3 February 2007]. 
Block, N., 1978. Troubles with Functionalism. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Volume 
9, pp. 261-325. 
Block, N., 1980. What is Functionalism?. In: N. Block, ed. Readings in Philosophy of Psychology vol.1. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, pp. 171-184. 
191 
 
Boden, M. A., 2004. The Creative Mind: Myths and Mechanisms. London: Routledge. 
Bourdieu, P., 1980. The Logic of Practice. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Bourdieu, P., 2004. Science of Science and Reflexivity. Chicago: Polity Press and the University of 
Chicago. 
Boyd, R., 1989. What Realism Implies and What it Does Not. Dialectica, 43(1-2), pp. 5-29. 
Boyd, R., 1991. Realism, Anti-foundationalism, and the Enthusiasm for Natural kinds. Philosophical 
Studies, Volume 61, pp. 127-148. 
Brandon, R. N., 2007. Interdisciplines: Adaptation and Representation: The Theory of Biological 
Adaptation and Function. [Online]  
Available at: http://interdisciplines.org/adaptaion/papers/10/printable/paper 
[Accessed 23 February 2007]. 
Brass, M. & Haggard, P., 2010. The hidden side of intentional action: the role of the anteriorinsular 
cortex. Brain Structure and Function, Volume 214, p. 603–610. 
Broad, C., 1925. The Mind and Its Place in Nature. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
Brogaard, B., 2013. The Brain Of The Real Rain Man. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/the-superhuman-mind/201303/the-brain-the-
real-rain-man 
[Accessed 19 January 2017]. 
Brooks, R., 1991. Intelligence without representation. Artificial Intelligence, 47(1-3), p. 139–159. 
Burge, T., 1986. Individualism and Psychology. Philosophical Review, Issue 95, pp. 3-45. 
Butterworth, G., 1995. An ecological perspective on the origins of self. In: J. Bermúdez, A. Marcel & 
N. Eilan, eds. The Body and the Self. Cambridge, MA: MIT/Bradford Press, p. 87–107. 
Cantwell Smith, B., 1996. On the Origin of Objects. Cambridge MA: MIT Press. 
Carnap, R., 1950. Logical Foundations of Probability. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Carroll, L., 1895. Chapter XI. In: Sylvie and Bruno Concluded. London: s.n. 
Carruthers, P., 2002. The cognitive functions of language. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, Volume 25, 
pp. 657-726. 
Cartwright, N., 1999. The Dappled World: A Study of the Boundaries of Science. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Chalmers, D., 2002. Consciousness and Its Place in Nature. In: Philosophy of Mind: Classical and 
Contemporary Readings. s.l.:s.n. 
Chalmers, D. J., 1995. Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 
2(3), pp. 200-219. 
192 
 
Chalmers, D. J., 1996. The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory. New York and Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Chalmers, D. J., 2003. Consciousness and its Place in Nature. In: S. Stich & F. Warfield, eds. Blackwell 
Guide to the Philosophy of Mind. s.l.:Blackwell. 
Chrisley, R., 1995. Non-conceptual content and robotics: Taking embodiment seriously. In: K. Ford, C. 
Glymour & P. Hayes, eds. Android Epistemology. Cambridge, MA: AAAI/MIT Press. 
Chrisley, R., 2009. Synthetic Phenomenology. International Journal of Machine Consciousness , 1(1), 
pp. 53-70. 
Chrisley, R., 2010. Interactive Empiricism: The Philosopher in the Machine. In: K. Guy, ed. Philosophy 
of Engineering: Volume 1 of the proceedings of a series of seminars held at The Royal Academy of 
Engineering. London: The Royal Academy of Engineering, pp. 66-71. 
Chrisley, R. & Sloman, A., 2016, in press. Functionalism, Revisionism and Qualia. APA Newsletter on 
Philosophy and Computers, 16(1). 
Chrisley, R. & Sloman, A., 2016. Functionalism, Revisionism, and Qualia. APA Newsletter: Philosophy 
and Computers, Fall, 16(1), pp. 2-11. 
Churchland, P. M., 1981. Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes. Journal of 
Philosophy, Volume 78, p. 67–90. 
Clark, A., 1994. Language of Thought (2). In: S. Guttenplan, ed. A Companion to the Philosophy of 
Mind. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
Clark, A., 1997. Being there: Putting brain, body and world together again. Cambridge, MA: MIT. 
Clark, A., 2002. Is Seeing All It Seems? Action, Reason and the Grand Illusion.. Journal of 
Consciousness Studies, 9(5-6), pp. 181-202. 
Clark, A., 2008. Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension. s.l.:Oxford 
University Press. 
Clark, A., 2016. Surfing Uncertainty: Prediction, Action, and the Embodied Mind. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Clark, A. & Chalmers, D., 1998. The Extended Mind. Analysis, 58(1), pp. 7-19. 
Clark, A. & Grush, R., 1999. Towards a Cognitive Robotics. Adaptive Behavior, 7(1), pp. 5-16. 
Clowes, R. W. & Chrisley, R., 2012. Virtualist Representation. International Journal of Machine 
Consciousness, 4(2), pp. 503-522. 
Cooper, R., 2004. Why Hacking is wrong about human kinds. British Journal for the Philosophy of 
Science, Issue 55, pp. 73-85. 
Cooper, R., 2005. Classifying Madness: A Philosophical Examination of the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders. s.l.:Springer Netherlands. 
193 
 
Cotterill, R., 2003. CyberChild: A Simulation Test-Bed for Consciousness Studies. Journal of 
Consciousness Studies, 10(4-5), pp. 31-45. 
Cussins, A., 1990. The Connectionist Construction of Concepts. In: M. Boden, ed. The Philosophy of 
Artificial Intelligence. s.l.:Oxford University Press, pp. 368-440. 
Daly, C. J., 2008. Fictionalism and the attitudes. Philosophical Studies, 139(3), p. 423–440. 
Darley, J. M. & Latané, B., 1968. Bystander intervention in emergencies: Diffusion of responsibility. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Issue 8, p. 377–383. 
Davidson, D., 1966. Emeroses by other names. Journal of Philosophy, Volume 63, pp. 778-80. 
Davidson, D., 1969. The Individuation of Events. In: N. Rescher, ed. Essays in Honor of Carl G. 
Hempel. Dordrecht: D. Reidel, pp. 295-309. 
Davidson, D., 1970. Mental Events. In: L. Foster & J. Swanson, eds. Experience and Theory . London: 
Duckworth. 
Davidson, D., 1980. Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Davidson, D., 1984. Thought and Talk. In: Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, pp. 155-179. 
Davidson, D., 1985. Rational Animals. In: E. Lepore & B. McLaughlin, eds. Actions and Events: 
Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson. New York: Basil Blackwell. 
Dayan, P., 2008. The Role of Value Systems in Decision Making. In: E. C & S. W, eds. Strüngmann 
Forum Report: Better Than Conscious? Decision Making, the Human Mind, and Implications For 
Institutions. Frankfurt, Germany: MIT Press, pp. 51-70. 
Dennett, D. C., 1981. Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology. Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press. 
Dennett, D. C., 1987. The Intentional Stance. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Dennett, D. C., 1991. Consciousness Explained. London: The Penguin Press. 
Dennett, D. C., 1992. The Self as a Center of Narrative Gravity. In: F. Kessel, P. Cole & D. Johnson, 
eds. Self and Consciousness: Multiple Perspectives. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Dennett, D. C., 1996. Kinds of Minds: Toward an Understanding of Consciousness. New York: Basic 
Books, Inc.. 
Dennett, D. C., 2003. Freedom Evolves. New York: Viking Press. 
Dennett, D. C., 2005. Sweet Dreams: Philosophical Obstacles to a Science of Consciousness. s.l.:MIT. 
Devitt, M., 1981. Designation. New York: Columbia University Press. 
Dupré, J., 1993. The Disorder of Things : Metaphysical Foundations of the Disunity of Science. 
Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press. 
194 
 
Dupré, J., 1996. Promiscuous Realism: Reply to Wilson. The British Journal for the Philosophy of 
Science, 47(3), pp. 441-444. 
Edelman, G. M., 1989. The Remembered Present. New York: Basic Books. 
Evans, G., 1982. The Varieties of Reference. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Fischer, J. M. & Ravizza, M., 1998. Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Fodor, J. A., 1974. Special Sciences (Or: the Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis). Synthese, 
28(2), pp. 97-115. 
Fodor, J. A., 1975. The Language of Thought. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Fodor, J. A., 1980. Methodological Solipsism Considered as a Research Strategy in Cognitive Science. 
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3(1), pp. 63-73. 
Fodor, J. A., 1983. The Modularity of Mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Fodor, J. A., 1987. Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press. 
Fodor, J. A., 1994. The Elm and the Expert: Mentalese and Its Semantics. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Fodor, J. A., 1997. Special Sciences: Still Autonomous After All These Years. Philosophical 
Perspectives, 31(11), pp. 149-163. 
Fodor, J. A., 2008. LOT 2: The Language of Thought Revisited. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Fodor, J. & Pylyshyn, Z., 1988. Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture: a Critical Analysis. 
Cognition, Volume 28, pp. 3-71. 
Franklin, S., 2003. IDA: A Conscious Artifact?. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 10(4-5), p. 47–66. 
Gallagher, S., 2001. The Practice of Mind: Theory, Simulation or Primary Interaction?. Journal of 
Consciousness Studies, 8(5–7), p. 83–108. 
Gallese, V., 2001. The ‘Shared Manifold’ Hypothesis: From Mirror Neurons To Empathy. Journal of 
Consciousness Studies, 8(5–7), p. 33–50. 
Gärdenfors, P., 2000. Conceptual spaces: The geometry of thought. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Gazzinga, M., 1970. The Bisected Brain. New York: Appleton-Century-Croft. 
Gibson, J., 1979. The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 
Godfrey-Smith, P., 2003. Folk Psychology Under Stress: Comments on Susan Hurley's ‘Animal Action 
in the Space of Reasons’. Mind and Language, 10(3), pp. 266-272. 
Goff, P., 2009. Why Panpsychism doesn’t Help Us Explain Consciousness. dialectica, 63(3), pp. 289-
311. 
195 
 
Goodale, M. A. & Milner, A. D., 1992. Separate visual pathways for perception and action. Trends in 
Neurosciences, Issue 15, pp. 97-112. 
Goodale, M. A., Milner, A. D., Jakobson, L. S. & Carey, D. P., 1991. A neurological dissociation 
between perceiving objects and grasping them. Nature, Issue 349, pp. 154-156. 
Goodman, N., 1955. Fact, Fiction and Forecast. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Gopnik, A. & Meltzoff, A., 1997. Words, Thoughts, and Theories. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Gould, S. J. & Lewontin, R. C., 1979. The Spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossian Paradigm: A 
Critique of the Adptationist Programme. Procedings of the Royal Society of London, Series B, 
205(1161), pp. 581-598. 
Hacking, I., 1990. Natural Kinds. In: R. Barret & R. Gibson, eds. Perspectives on Quine. Oxford: 
Blackwell, pp. 129-43. 
Hacking, I., 1991. A Tradition of Natural Kinds. Philosophical Studies, Volume 61, pp. 109-126. 
Hameroff, S. R. & Penrose, R., 1996. Conscious events as orchestrated spacetime selections. Journal 
of Consciousness Studies, Issue 3, pp. 36-53. 
Hare, R., 1952. The Language of Morals. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Haugeland, J., 1982. Weak Supervenience. American Philosophical Quarterly, Issue 19, p. 93–101. 
Heal, J., 2005. Joint attention and understanding the mind. In: J. Roessler, ed. Joint attention: 
Communication and other minds. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 34-44. 
Heidegger, M., 1927. Being and time. New York: Harper & Row. 
Heil, J. & Robb, D., 2003. Mental properties. American Philosophical Quarterly, 40(3), pp. 175-196. 
Heyes, C. & Dickinson, A., 1990. The Intentionality of Animal Action. Mind and Language, Volume 5, 
pp. 87-104. 
Holland, O. & Goodman, R., 2003. Robots With Internal Models: A Route to Machine 
Consciousness?. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 10(4–5), p. pp. 77–109. 
Honderich, T., 2006. Radical externalism. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 13(7-8), pp. 3-13. 
Horgan, T., 1982. Supervenience and Microphysics. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, Issue 63, pp. 29-
43. 
Horgan, T., 1993. From Supervenience to Superdupervenience: Meeting the Demands of a Material 
World. Mind, 102(408), p. 555–586. 
Hull, D., 1972. Reductionism in genetics – biology or philosophy?. Philosophy of Science, Volume 39, 
p. 491–499. 
Hume, D., 1738. A Treatise of Human Nature. s.l.:s.n. 
196 
 
Humphreys, P., 1997a. Emergence, Not Supervenience. Philosophy of Science, 64(Supplement, 
Proceedings of the 1996 Biennial Meetings of the Philosophy of Science Association. Part II: 
Symposia Papers), pp. S337-S345. 
Humphreys, P., 1997b. How Properties Emerge. Philosophy of Science, 64(1), pp. 1-17. 
Hurley, S., 2003. Animal Action in the Space of Reasons. Mind and Language, 18(3), pp. 231-256. 
Hurley, S., 2006. Making Sense of Animals. In: H. Susan & M. Nudds, eds. Rational Animals. Oxford: 
Oxfor University Press, pp. 139-174. 
Hurley, S., 2006. Varieties of externalism. In: R. Menary, ed. The Extended Mind. s.l.:Ashgate, pp. 1-
35. 
Hutto, D., 2013. Fictionalism about folk psychology. The Monist, 96(4), pp. 582-604. 
Israel, R., 2004. Two interpretations of ‘grue’ – or how to misunderstand the new riddle of induction. 
Analysis 64.4, October 2004, pp. 335–39., 64(4), pp. 335-39. 
Israel, R., 2006. Projectibility and Explainability or How to Draw a New Picture of Inductive Practices. 
Journal for General Philosophy of Science, Volume 37, pp. 269-286. 
Ivanov, I., 2016. Observational concepts and experience. PhD Thesis: University of Warwick. 
Jackson, F., 1982. Epiphenomenal Qualia. Philosophical Quarterly, Issue 32, p. 127–136. 
Jackson, F., 1998. From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defense of Conceptual Analysis. Oxford: Clarendon. 
James, W., 1890. The Principles of Psychology. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Kim, J., 1976. Events as Property Exemplifications. In: M. Brand & D. Walton, eds. Action Theory. 
s.l.:s.n., pp. 310-326. 
Kim, J., 1990. Supervenience as a Philosophical Concept. Metaphilosophy, Volume 21, pp. 1-27. 
Kim, J., 1992. ‘Downward Causation’ in Emergentism and Nonreductive Physicalism. In: F. K. 
Beckermann, ed. Emergence or Reduction?. Berlin: de Gruyter, pp. 119-138. 
Kim, J., 1992. Multiple Realization and the Metaphysics of Reduction. Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research, 52(1), pp. 1-26. 
Kim, J., 1996. Philosophy of Mind. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press. 
Kim, J., 2005. Physicalism, or Something Near Enough. s.l.:Princeton University Press. 
Kripke, S., 1972. Naming & Necessity. s.l.:Blackwell. 
Kripke, S., 1982. Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press. 
Kuhn, T. S., 1962. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
197 
 
Kuhn, T. S., 2000. The Road since Structure. Chicago: Chicago University Press. 
Lakoff, G. & Johnson, M., 1999. Philosophy In The Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to 
Western Thought. s.l.:Basic Books. 
LaPorte, J., 2000. Rigidity and Kind. Philospohical Studies, Volume 97, pp. 263-316. 
LaPorte, J., 2004. Natural Kinds and Conceptual Change. s.l.:Cambridge University Press. 
Levine, J., 1983. Materialism and qualia: the explanatory gap. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, Issue 
64, pp. 354-361. 
Lewis, C. I., 1929. Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge. New York: Charles 
Scribners. 
Lewis, D., 1966. An Argument for the Identity Theory. Journal of Philosophy, Volume 63, p. 17–25. 
Lewis, D., 1973. Causation. Journal of Philosophy, Volume 70, p. 556–567. 
Lewontin, R. C., 1970. The Units of Selection. Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics, Volume 1, 
pp. 1-18. 
Libet, B., 1985. Unconscious cerebral initiative and the role of conscious will in voluntary action. 
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, Issue 8, pp. 529-566. 
Libet, B., 1999. Do We Have Free Will?. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 6(8-9), pp. 47-57. 
List, C. & Menzies, P., 2014. The exclusion argument against free will, and what’s wrong with it. In: H. 
Beebee, C. Hitchcock & H. Price, eds. Making a Difference. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Locke, J., 1700. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. s.l.:Oxford University Press. 
Lowe, E. J., 2000. Causal Closure Principles and Emergentism. Philosophy, Volume 75, pp. 571-585. 
Lowe, E. J., 2008a. Free Agency, Causation and Action Explanation. In: C. Sandis, ed. New Essays on 
the Explanation of Action. s.l.:Palgrave Macmillan. 
Lowe, E. J., 2008b. Personal Agency: The Metaphysics of Mind and Action. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Machery, E., 2003. Concepts Are Not a Natural Kind. Philosophy of Science, Issue 72, pp. 444-467. 
Mackie, J. L., 1974. The Cement of the Universe. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Malcolm, N., 1972 -1973. Thoughtless Brutes. Proceedings and Addresses of the American 
Philosophical Association, Volume 46, pp. 5-20. 
Mameli, M., 2001. Mindreading, Mindshaping, and Evolution. Biology and Philosophy, Volume 16, 
pp. 597-628. 
Mameli, M., 2004. Nongenetic selection and nongenetic inheritance. British Journal for the 
Philosophy of Science, 55(1), pp. 35-71. 
198 
 
Mandik, P. & Clark, A., 2002. Selective Representing and World-Making. Minds and Machines, Issue 
12, pp. 383-395. 
Manzotti, R., 2006. A Process Oriented View of Conscious Perception. Journal of Consciousness 
Studies, 13(6), pp. 7-41. 
Margolis, E. & Laurence, S., 1999. Concepts: Core Readings. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Martin, M. G. F., 2007. School of advanced Study, University of London. [Online]  
Available at: http://sas-space.sas.ac.uk/630/1/M_Martin_Alienated.pdf 
[Accessed 22 March 2013]. 
McDowell, J., 1994. The Content of Perceptual Experience. The Philosophical Quarterly, 44(175), pp. 
190-205. 
McGinn, C., 1978. Mental States, Natural Kinds and Psychophysical Laws. Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes, Volume 52, pp. 195-236. 
McGinn, C., 1993. Problems in Philosophy: The Limits of Inquiry. Oxford: Blackwell. 
McGinn, C., 2006. Hard Questions: comments on Galen Strawson. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 
13(10-11), pp. 90-99. 
McGurk, H. & MacDonald, J., 1976. Hearing lips and seeing voices. Nature, 23-30 December, pp. 746-
748. 
McLaughlin, B., 1995. Varieties of supervenience. In: E. Savellos & U. Yalcin, eds. Supervenience: New 
Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 16-59. 
McLaughlin, B. a. B. K., 2008. Supervenience. [Online]  
Available at: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/supervenience/ 
[Accessed 20 July 2009]. 
McLaughlin, B. P., 1984. Perception, Causation, and Supervenience. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 
Volume 9, p. 569–92. 
Mead, G. H., 1934. Mind, Self, and Society: From the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Mellor, D. H., 1977. Natural Kinds. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 28(4), pp. 299-
312. 
Merleau-Ponty, M., 1945. Phenomenology of Perception. Paris: Gallimard. 
Metzinger, T., 2003. Being No One: The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Millikan, R. G., 1999. Historical Kinds and the “Special Sciences”. Philosophical Studies, Volume 95, 
pp. 45-65. 
Mill, J. S., 1843. A System of Logic. London: John W Parker. 
199 
 
Milner, A. D. & Goodale, M. A., 1995. The Visual Brain in Action. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Minsky, M., 1986. The Society of Mind. New York: Simon & Schuster. 
Morgan, C. L., 1894. An introduction to comparative psychology. London: W. Scott. 
Morgan, L., 1923. Emergent Evolution. London: Williams & Norgate. 
Nagel, E., 1961. The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation. New York: 
Harcourt, Brace, and World. 
Nagel, T., 1971. Brain Bisection and the Unity of Consciousness. Synthese, 22(3/4), pp. 396-413. 
Nagel, T., 1974. What is it like to be a bat?. Philosophical Review, Issue 83, p. 435–50. 
Nagel, T., 1979. Panpsychism. In: T. Nagel, ed. Mortal Questions. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, pp. 181-195. 
Ney, A., 2016. Microphysical Causation and the Case for Physicalism. Analytic Philosophy, 57(2), pp. 
141-164. 
Noë, A., 2004. Action in perception. Cambridge, Mass : MIT Press. 
Noë, A., 2006. Experience Without the Head. In: T. S. Gendler & J. Hawthorne, eds. Perceptual 
Experience. s.l.:Oxford University Press. 
Nunberg, G., 2006. Last Planet Standing. [Online]  
Available at: http://people.ischool.berkeley.edu/~nunberg/pluto.html 
[Accessed 17 July 2016]. 
O'Regan, J., 1992. Solving the "real" mysteries of visual perception: The world as an outside memory. 
Canadian Journal of Psychology/Revue Canadienne de Psychologie, 46(3), pp. 461-488. 
O'Regan, J. K. & Noë, A., 2001. A sensorimotor account of vision and visual consciousness. 
Behavioural and Brain Sciences, 24(5), pp. 939-1031. 
Panksepp, J., 1998. Affective neuroscience: The foundations of human and animal emotions. New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
Papineau, D., 2006. Comments on Galen Strawson. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 13(10-11), pp. 
100-109. 
Papineau, D., 2010. Can any sciences be special?. In: C. Macdonald & G. Macdonald, eds. Emergence 
in Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 179-19. 
Pascual-Leone, A. & Walsh, V., 2001. Fast Backprojections from the Motion to the Primary Visual 
Area Necessary for Visual Awareness. Science, Issue 292, pp. 510-512. 
Pietroski, P., 2000. Causing Actions. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Plato, 1997. Complete works. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company. 
200 
 
Poiriera, C., De Voldera, A. G. & Scheiber, C., 2007. What neuroimaging tells us about sensory 
substitution. Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews , Issue 31, p. 1064–1070. 
Prinz, J. J., 2004. Furnishing the Mind: Concepts and Their Perceptual Basis. s.l.:MIT Press. 
Prinz, J. J., 2006. Putting the Brakes on Enactive Perception. PSYCHE, 12(1), pp. 1-19. 
Putnam, H., 1969. On Properties. In: J. Kim & E. Sosa, eds. Metaphysics . s.l.:Blackwell, pp. 243-52. 
Putnam, H., 1975. The Meaning of Meaning. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Volume 
7, pp. 131-193. 
Putnam, H., 1981. Reason, Truth and History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Quine, W. V., 1969. Natural Kinds. In: J. Kim & E. Sosa, eds. Metaphysics. s.l.:Blackwell, pp. 233-42. 
Richter, H. et al., 2002. Long-term adaptation to prism-induced inversion of the retinal images. 
Experimental Brain Research, 144(4), p. 445–457. 
Rockwell, W. T., 2007. Neither Brain nor Ghost: A Nondualist Alternative to the Mind-Brain Identity 
Theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Rosch, E., 1999. Principles of Categorization. In: E. Margolis & S. Laurence, eds. Concepts: Core 
Readings. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 189-206. 
Rowlands, M., 2002. Two dogmas of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 9(5-6), pp. 
158-180. 
Ruse, M., 1987. Biological Species: Natural Kinds, Individuals, or What?. The British ournal for the 
Philosophy of Science, 38(2), pp. 225-242. 
Russell, B., 1905. On Denoting. Mind, Volume 14, p. 479–493. 
Russell, B., 1927. The Analysis of Matter. London: Routledge. 
Russell, B., 1948. Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits. London: George Allen & Unwin. 
Ryle, G., 1946. Knowing How and Knowing That. In: Collected Papers (Volume 2). New York: Barnes 
and Nobles, p. 212–25. 
Ryle, G., 1949. The Concept of Mind. London: Hutchinson. 
Salmon, W., 1984. Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
Schwartz, S. P., 2002. Kinds, General Terms, and Rigidity: A Reply to LaPorte. Philosophical Studies, 
Volume 109, pp. 265-277. 
Searle, J. R., 1980. Minds, brains, and programs. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3(3), pp. 417-457. 
Searle, J. R., 1992. The Rediscovery of the Mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
201 
 
Silberstein, M., 2002. Reduction, Emergence and Explanation. In: P. Machamer & M. Silberstein, eds. 
The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Science. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 80-108. 
Simons, D. J. & Levin, D. T., 1997. Change blindness. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 1(7), p. 261–267. 
Skow, B., 2014. Are There Non-causal Explanations (of Particular Events)?. British Journal for the 
Philosophy of Science, Volume 65, pp. 445-67. 
Sloman, A., 1987. Motives, mechanisms, and emotions. Cognition and Emotion, 1(3), pp. 217-233. 
Sloman, A., 1992. The Emperor’s Real Mind (Review of: Roger Penrose: The Emperor’s New Mind: 
Concerning Computers, Minds and the Laws of Physics. Artificial Intelligence, Issue 56, pp. 355-396. 
Sloman, A., 2007. Why Some Machines May Need Qualia and How They Can Have Them: Including a 
Demanding New Turing Test for Robot Philosophers. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~axs 
[Accessed 21 June 2011]. 
Sloman, A., 2008. The well-designed young mathematician. Artificial Intelligence , 172(18), pp. 2015-
2034. 
Sloman, A., 2011a. Virtual Machinery and Evolution of Mind (Part 1). [Online]  
Available at: http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~axs) 
[Accessed 21 June 2011]. 
Sloman, A., 2011b. Virtual Machinery and Evolution of Mind (Part 2). [Online]  
Available at: http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~axs) 
[Accessed 21 June 2011]. 
Sloman, A., 2013. Virtual Machine Functionalism (VMF) (The only form of functionalism worth taking 
seriously in Philosophy of Mind and theories of Consciousness). [Online]  
Available at: http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/misc/vm-
functionalism.html#block95 
[Accessed 14 January 2017]. 
Sloman, A. & Chrisley, R., 2003. Virtual Machines and Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness 
Studies, 10(4-5), pp. 133-72. 
Sloman, A., Chrisley, R. & Sheutz, M., 2003. The Architectural Basis of Affective States and Processes. 
In: Fellous & Arbib, eds. Who Needs Emotions?: The Brain Meets the Machine. s.l.:Oxford University 
Press. 
Smith, E. E., 1999. The Exemplar View. In: E. Margolis & S. Laurence, eds. Concepts: Core Readings. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 207-221. 
Soon, C. S., Brass, M., Heinze, H.-J. & Haynes, J. D., 2008. Unconscious determinants of free decisions 
in the human brain. Nature Neuroscience, 11(5), pp. 543-545. 
Steels, L., 2003. Language Re-Entrance and the ‘Inner Voice’. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 10(4-
5), p. 173–85. 
202 
 
Sterelney, K., 2003. Charting Control-Space: Comments on Susan Hurley's ‘Animal Action in the 
Space of Reasons’. Mind and Language, 18(3), pp. 257-166. 
Stoljar, D., 2009. Physicalism, s.l.: s.n. 
Strawson, G., 2006. Realistic Monism: Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism. Journal of 
Consciousness Studies, 13(10-11), pp. 3-31. 
Stuss, D. T., 1991. Self, Awareness, and the Frontal Lobes: A Neuropsychological Perspective. In: S. J 
& G. G. R, eds. The Self: Interdisciplinary Approaches. New York: Springer-Verlag, p. 255–278. 
Swinburne, R. G., 1968. Grue. Analysis, 28(4), pp. 123-128. 
The Independent, 2006. Solar system welcomes three new planets. The Independent, 15 August.  
Thompson, E., 2008. Representationalism and the phenomenology of mental imagery. Synthese, 
160(3), pp. 203-213. 
Tomasello, M., 1999. The Cultural Origins of Human Cognition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press. 
Ünver, E. & Güntürkün, O., 2014. Evidence for interhemispheric conflictduring meta-control in 
pigeons. Behavioural Brain Research, Issue 270, pp. 146-150. 
Van Gulick, R., 2001. Reduction, Emergence and Other Recent Options on the Mind/Body Problem. 
Journal of Consciousness Studies, 8(9-10), pp. 1-34. 
Varela, F. J., Thompson, E. & Rosch, E., 1991. The embodied mind: Cognitive science and human 
experience. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Voss, S., 2004. The Place of Mind in Nature. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.phil.boun.edu.tr/files/voss/voss_paper2.html 
[Accessed 2005]. 
Vygotsky, L., 1978. Mind in Society: The Development of Higher Psychological Processes. Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press. 
Wason, P. C., 1968. Reasoning about a rule. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 20(3), pp. 
273-281. 
Wilson, M., 2002. Six views of embodied cognition. Psychonomic Bulletin and Review, Volume 9, pp. 
625-636. 
Wittgenstein, L., 1953. Philosophical Investigations. Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd.. 
Wolman, D., 2012. The split brain: A tale of two halves. Nature, 14 March, pp. 260-263. 
Zahavi, D., 1994. Husserl’s Phenomenology of the Body. Études Phénoménologiques, Issue 19, p. 63–
84. 
203 
 
Zaidel, E., 1994. Interhemispheric transfer in the split brain: Long term status following complete 
cerebral commissurotomy. In: R. H. Davidson & K. Hugdahl, eds. Human Laterality. Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press , pp. 491-532. 
 
 
